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Introduction 
This dissertation analyzes temporal meaning in German. The framework 
is that of a model-theoretic semantics, more specifically one incorporating 
a multi-dimensional tense logic . Chapter 1 presents this framework and is 
sufficient for those interested only in the general theory of temporal 
meaning. It argues that three dimensions are optimal for the description 
of natural language temporalia, giving rise to a Reichenbachian system for 
temporal description. Special attention is paid to the definite 
interpretations of tense noted in Partee (1973). Although it is not the 
purpose of the investigation, it turns out that the interpretation of 
Reichenbach's speech, event, and reference times as indices within model 
theory explains several otherwise unmotivated aspects of Reichenbach's 
remarks on tense. 
Chapter 2 applies this theory to the analysis of temporal meaning in 
German. Frame adverbials, the Present and Past tenses, duratives, aspec-
tual adverbials using in, and the adverbial particle schon are examined. 
None of the last threewere included in Baeuerle's (1979) tense logical 
analysis of German, the most extensive (and best) to-date, and both of the 
first two are given novel analyses. The section on schon uncovers data 
which has escaped previous notice. 
Chapter 3 provides a formal syntax to bear the semantic analysis 
proposed in 2. This is of some purely syntactic interest because General-
ized Phrase Structure Grammar hasn't yet confronted German extensively and 
because it suggests one innovation, the use of complement features, to 
treat VP fronting. The chapter may also be of interest because it demon-
strates how temporal semantics may be incorporated within GPSG with essen-
tially no new grarmnatical apparatus. 
Chapter 4 explores syntactic and semantic extensions of the fragment, 
showing how the Perfect, the particle noch, the Passive, and a distinct 
reading of frame adverbials may be accommodated. 
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Chapter 1: A Reichenbachian Tense Logic 
1.1 Introduction 
The semantics of tense and other temporal expressions, involving as it 
does modification, recursion, contextual dependence, lexical variety,
crucial scope relationships, and the interaction of elements in several 
grammatical categories is perhaps as rich and problematic as any in the 
field of natural language semantics. Model-theoretic semantics allows 
precise investigation using fairly simple mathematical techniques, and 
there is, finally, no lack of very competent work upon which to build. 
This is, in short, a most attractive field of study.
This work proposes a semantics for the description of temporal 
expressions inspired largely by Hans Reichenbach's brief remarks on the 
English tenses, and the insights of a number of contemporary researchers, 
including Partee (1973), Kuhn (1979), Baeuerle (1979), and En~ (1981), that 
tenses behave semantically rather like definitely referring (nominal) 
expressions. In spite of the attention paid to it, the parallel between 
tense and definite nominal reference, it is argued, has been insufficiently 
appreciated--both with respect to its extent, and with respect to its 
consequences. 
The semantic theory presented in this first chapter is inspired by 
Reichenbach (1947), and it employs his three-way distinction among times 
relevant to semantic interpretation--the well-known speech, event and 
reference times introduced by Reichenbach. The semantics doesn't simply 
assume Reichenbach's system, but interprets it (and is somewhat selective 
about certain inexplicit aspects of his temporal descriptions). In the 
present interpretation speech, event, and reference times are viewed as 
times to which deictic reference may be made--effecting the parallelism to 
definite nominal reference mentioned above. 
The proposed semantics is illustrated in Chapter 2 by an extended 
semantical sketch of German temporal reference. The proposed system for 
temporal semantics will be tested on an extensive, but necessarily limited 
range of temporal phenomena--including tense, temporal adverbials and 
particles, and the inherent temporal structure of verbs (Aktionsarten).
All of these expressions are incorporated into a formal fragment (in 
Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar) in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents 
some semantico-syntactic extensions of the system developed in the first 
three chapters. 
Ultimately, if it is to be adopted, the semantics proposed here must 
allow cogent analyses of all temporal reference, including not only the 
phenomena named above, but also temporal clauses, sequence of tense 
restrictions, and aspect. The system hasn't been tested on these phenomena 
to-date, though they do not seem to present special difficulties. 
1.2 Triple Dependence 
Reichenbach is to be credited for introducing the idea that the meaning 
of some tenses and temporal expressions depends not only on the time of 
speech, and the time at which an event takes place (or is reported to take 
place), but also on a third time, the reference time. In this chapter, I 
suggest a semantical formalization of Reichenbach's triple dependence and 
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outline some further crucial background assumptions to a system using this 
formalization. Chapter 2 then argues that the semantics of temporal 
reference in German, in particular that of adverbs, and that of adverbial 
particles such as schon depends on the employment of reference time as a 
theoretical tool. (In the treatment proposed, reference time functions as 
one of three dimensions in a tense logic; it is otherwise the same concept
introduced by Reichenbach.) 
1.3 What is Reference Time? 
The concept of reference time has puzzled some researchers. 
Reichenbach distinguished speech times, event time e and reference timer. 
Let us examine these as Reichenbach applied them to the following example: 
In 1678 the whole face of things had changed ••• eighteen years of 
misgovernment had made the ••• majority desirous to obtain securi-
ty at any risk. The fury of their returning loyalty had spent i t-
self in its first outbreak. In a very few months they had hanged 
and half-hanged, quartered and emboweled, enough to satisfy them. 
The Roundhead party seemed to be not merely overcome, but too much 
broken and scattered ever to rally again. Then commenced the 
reflux of public opinion. The nation began to find out to what a 
man it had entrusted without conditions all its dearest interests, 
on what a man it had lavished all its fondest affection. 
(Reichenbach, 1947:288f) 
Speech and event time are easily recognizable. Speech time is simply the 
time of utterance (read here: writing), while the time of the various 
episodes described constitutes event time. As to reference time, let us 
note Reichenbach's remarks: 
The point of reference is here the year 1678. Events of this year 
are related in the simple past, such as the colTIDencing of the re-
flux of public opinion, and the beginning of the discovery con-
cerning the character of the king. The events preceding this t i me 
point are given in the past perfect, such as the change in the 
face of things, the outbreaks of cruelty, the nation 1 s trust in 
the king. (Reichenbach, 1947:289) 
An event is thus seen not only from the1vantage point of the speech time: it is also seen from time of reference. It is the time of reference which 
distinguishes the simple past from the past perfect. Each recounts epi-
sodes which are prior to speech time, but the episodes relayed in the past 
perfect are additionally prior to the time of reference. (We will accept 
Reichenbach's characterization of this distinction, and we try to provide 
additional support for it in principles for analyzing contextual dependence 
in 1.6.2.) 
A reference time may be explicitly identified, e.g. as 1678 in the 
passage above, or it may be provided e.g. by a superordinate clause, as in 
the sentence below: 
After he had eaten everything, he said good-bye. 
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The event time of the subordinate clause is the time at which he ate. The 
reference time of this same clause is provided by the event time of the 
main clause: it is the time of his saying good-bye. Note that event time 
is prior to reference time here, and that the past perfect is used, just as 
it was in main clauses in Reichenbach's example. The configuration of 
speech, event and reference times is crucial, not syntactic structure. 
(Cf. 1.7.2.)
Reference time may be neither explicit nor provided by superordinate 
clauses, but given only by the context, as Reichenbach noted. He commented 
that in the sentence Peter had gone: 
... it is not clear which time point is used as the point of 
reference. This determination is rather given by the context of 
speech. In a story, for instance, the series of events recounted 
detennines the point of reference, which in this case is in the 
past, seen from the point of speech; some individual events 
lying outside this point are then referred, not directly to the 
point of speech, but to this point of reference determined by the 
story. (Reichenbach (1947:288)) 
Two aspects of Reichenbach's proposal will be exploited below. First, 
reference time is subject to pragmatic influence. Second, and more specif-
ically, reference time may be given by the previous discourse. 
Given this rough characterization of the notions of speech, event and 
reference times, we note that it was Reichenbach's strategy to ascribe one 
configuration of these times to each tense. For example, he lists the 
following (p.297): 
Past Perfect E - R - S  
Simple Past R,E - S  
Present Perfect E - S,R  
Present S,E,R  
Simple Future S,R - E  
Future Perfect S - E - R  
E, R, and S stand for speech, event and reference times. A comma between 
two times stands for simultaneity, while the hyphen means that the left 
time temporally precedes the right. 
Impl icit in Reichenbach is surely the position that no more than three 
times are involved in the interpretations of any tense. I shall accept a 
slightly more general version of this position: 
Maximally Triple Dependence: No more than three times are involved in 
the interpretation of any temporal expression. 
The generalization is from "tense" to "temporal expression . " The notion 
"times" is admittedly still vague above . It may be made precise in 1.4 
through the notion "temporal index," and Maximally Triple Dependence will 
be seen to follow as a trivial consequence of the position that tense logic 
for natural language are three dimensional. 
There is some reason , however, to reject other positions which also 
seem implicit in Reichenbach's analyses. Returning to the tense schemata 
above, it is perhaps remarkable that every tense specifies a linear config-
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uration of all three times: in no case is a tense regarded as specifying a 
relation among less than three times, and never does it appear to have 
seemed necessary to Reichenbach to resort to nonlinear configurations of S, 
E, and R. On the contrary, however, the Perfect infinitive seems to 
require only that E precede R, and is indifferent to speech time, as the 
sentences below might suggest: 
He seems to have left She believes him to have left 
He seemed to have left She believed him to have left 
He will seem to have left She'll believe him to have left 
This isn't the point at which one even could argue for any semantic rule in 
detail; we've simply developed too little of the overall apparatus for any 
rule to be justified in detail. But if we accepted Reichenbach's specifi-
cation of the Present, Simple Past and Simple Future tenses (for the pur-
poses of this illustration), then it might be seen that the only relation-
ship with which the Perfect Infinitive may consistently be associated is 
that of the event time (of the VP to which it is attached) preceding refer-
ence time. The following schemata illustrate how the Perfect Infinitive 
specifies its times: 
seems seemed will seem 
believes believed wi 11 believe 
S,R,E E,R - S S,R - E 
I I I 
E' - RI E' - R' E' - R'  
leave leave leave  
At least in the complements of the verbs seem and believe, the event time 
of the matrix clause is used as reference time in the complement. The 
Perfect Infinitive then marks the time at which the episode reported in the 
complement clause takes place--regardless of speech time. 
The remarks above cannot be construed as defended analysis of the 
temporal import of the Perfect Infinitive--but only as an indication of the 
possible wisdom of allowing temporal elements to specify less than an 
exhaustive relation among speech, event, and reference times . 
Similarly, there are tenses which seem to specify a nonlinear relation 
among the speech, event and reference times. This is perhaps a bit sur-
prising. Relations are linear, of course, iff they are transitive, irre-
flexive, and connex. Clearly the points of time are ordered linearly under 
'<,' so that it may be surprising that some tense specify times in a 
nonlinear fashion. The key is connexity. Recall that a relation R is 
connex in a set S iff 
y; ESVi 2ES(i1Ri 2 V i2Ri 1 V i 1=i 2)1





and i_1 are distinct, but unordered with respect to each other. Note the tollowing use of the Future Perfect: 
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I don't know whether he's left. He certainly will have left by tomor-
row, however. 
The pair of sentences is sensible enough, but this indicates that the event 
time of the Future Perfect may either follow or precede speech time. 
Either of the following configurations is thus compatible with the Future 
Perfect: 
S - E - R (Reichenbach's configuration)  
E - S - R  
(Cf. Comrie, 1981:28.) The Future Perfect requires then that speech, event 
and reference time be ordered thus: 
This relation is nonlinear. 
Let us avoid one potential confusion: the time of utterance and the 
time at which he left (in the sentence above) will certainly be ordered 
with respect to each other (in any particular use of that sentence). This 
isn't the point, which is rather that the Future Perfect cannot seecify 
that speech and event time always stand in one or the other relation. The 
tense cannot require a particular linear relationship among the three 
times. 
We therefore will not follow Reichenbach in having each tense exhaus-
tively specify a linear relation among the three times. It is not explicit
in Reichenbach in any case that one ought to do so, though it certainly was 
his practice. 
I would like now to turn to an area where Reichenbach will be followed 
most exactly; this concerns his conception of reference time. Let us be 
careful to note the nature of the influence of context on reference time 
(noted above): reference time may be given by the previous discourse. This 
seems to have been ReichenbachTconception as well. Notice that his 
remark about how the events recounted may determine reference time is 
likewise qualified: this is so 11 in a story. 11 This suggests that reference 
time isn't always provided in previous discourse, and that we have, in 
effect, two sorts of discourse--that in which reference time is fixed by 
previous discourse, and that in which it isn't. Let us call the first sort 
(temporally) connected discourse and the second (temporally) free discourse 
(or tellporally nonconnected discourse), and let us contrast examples of 
these: 
(1) Temporally connected discourse  
Al went to N.Y. The others were there, too.  
Temporally free discourse  
Al went to N.Y. The others were there once, too.  
The temporally connected discourse continues talking about the 11 same 11 time, 
while the temporally free discourse does not. In connected discourse, 
times may not be out of order, while in free discourse, this is possible. 
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(We will examine which times these are presently.) 
There will obviously be different principles of temporal reference in 
force in these two different types of temporal discourse. Let us attempt a 
first formulation of these, however rough. Reichenbach claims that "the 
series of events recounted determines the point of reference" (in connected 
discourse), and the example above bears him out. The time spoken of in the 
second sentence in the connected example in (1) seems to be identical to 
the time at which Al arrived in N.Y., the event time. Some examples are 
different, however. 
(2) Al went to N.Y. Bo had found him a room. He went directly to it. 
Here it is clear that the time spoken of in the final sentence is not the 
event time of the previous sentence, i.e. the time at which Bo found the 
room. It is also clear that events have not been recounted in order, and 
therefore that event times are not ordered properly. Still, this has the 
feel of a temporally connected discourse--a story.
The not overly elusive principle of organization is based on reference 
time. The second sentence in (2) has an event time prior to the first's, 
but its reference time is fixed and non-prior to the first's. And it is 
again the reference time of the second sentence which is used in the third. 
This suggests the following codification of Reichenbach's pragmatics. 
In moving toward a formalization, we note that we shall employ an 
"interval" semantics, following most notably Bennett and Partee (1972),
Cresswell (1977) and Dowty (1979). Van Benthem (1983) investigates the 
model theory of tense logic based on both points and "periods" {objecting 
to the boundaries implied by "interval"), We retain the linguistically 
familiar term "interval," In this semantics propositions are evaluated as 
true or false not relative to points of time, but rather relative to 
intervals. 
We first need to define some subsidiary notions. Since the times we 
will be dealing with may be intervals, the notion of precedence is somewhat 
vague. Consider the time line below: 
) 
It is clear that ; 1 precedes both i, and ; 3 , since every point of time in 
i 1 precedes every point of time in Doth i 2 and i 3. We shall symbolize this 
rel at ion as •< ' : 
Definition: For all intervals 1 , J, all points of time t,t' 
1<J iff V'tEi Vt' Ej t<t' (read: 1 i completely precedes j') 
But i2 seems to precede ; 3 in some sense as well, even though the rela-
tionship of complete precedence doesn't hold. This will be symbolized'<.' 
Definition: For all intervals i,j, all points of time t,t' 
i~j i ff Vt Ei 3t I Ej t~t 1 (read: 1 i does not extend beyond j' ) 
(For brevity's sake we shall occasionally write i-<j for -(i<j) and i-<j
for -(i<j). This is especially convenient in specTfying relations among 
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three times.) Note that this definition allows that i2<i~: i 2 does not 




Using these definitions, we may formalize Reichenbach's implicit prag-
matics: 
Reichenbach's Pragmatics (RP) (weak version) For S, S , ••• ,s a 
sequence of sentences uttered in a temporally connette~discouPse: 
(i) r(Si) .5_ r(Si+l) 
where r(S) designates the reference time of S. (Cf. Dowty, 1980:19 for a· 
similar fonnulation of the relation of successive times in narration.) Let 
us note that this is a weaker version of connectedness; a stronger version 
is discussed in 1.6 below. Furthermore, the principle says nothing about 
reference times in temporally unconnected (free) discourse. 
This principle obviously does not determine a unique reference time; in 
particular, it doesn't specify how r(S) is defined, or how it may be 
shifted by temporal expressions. The principle does provide a limit within 
which reference time must function, however. This is its purpose.
Let me again emphasize that "(temporally) connected" is deliberately 
vague. Certainly answers are connected to questions, and most traditional 
narrative counts as (temporally) connected, but most Linguistics disserta-
tions certainly are not. No independent characterization of this vague
notion will be offered. Hopefully, the concept will have some foundation 
in intuition, and examples may help to clarify the notion intended somewhat 
further. It is in any case worth noting that not all narrative prose is 
(temporally) connected in the relevant sense. Consider first: 
A (temporalli) connected passa9e 
Letzhin kam 1ch zum Brunnen un fand ein junges Dienstmaedchen, ••• Ich 
stieg hinunter ••• 
--J.Goethe Die Leiden des jungen Werthers, Brief vom 15.Mai 
'I recently came to the spring and found a young servant girl, ••• ! 
dismounted ••• • 
--J.Goethe The Sorrows of Young Werther, Letter of May 15 
The events are recounted in order without major change in temporal perspec-
tive. The following passage begins in the same way, but then a shift 
occurs: 
A (temporally) nonconnected ~assage
Im September vorigen Jahresegab ich mich in mein Schlafzi11111er, oeff-
nete das Fenster weit, verzauberte mich und flog davon. Ich habe es nicht 
bereut. 
--W.Hildesheimer 11Warum ich mich in eine Nachtigall verwandelt habe 11 
in: W.Hildesheimer Lieblose Legenden 
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'In September of the past year I made my way into my bedroom, threw the 
window open wide, said the magic words, and flew away. I haven't regretted
it. I 
--W.Hildesheimer "Why I Changed Myself into a Nightingale" in: W. 
Hildesheimer Loveless Legends 
The passage from Goethe recounts the series of events in temporal 
succession, allowing the perspective of the reader to follow the chronology 
exactly. Hildesheimer's passage begins similarly, but shifts abruptly in 
the last sentence excerpted. In another context ich habe es nicht bereut 
might mean 'I didn't regret it (then), ' but here, where the Preterite has 
been established in the narrative, it clearly means 1 I haven't regretted it 
ever since.' The connectedness of the series is broken for this comment. 
(This is the situation in general for High German; it is different in the 
southern dialects. Some speakers from the south claim that narration can 
switch back and forth from Preterite to Perfect, or remain in one or the 
other tense, without effect on the perceived temporal relations. In all 
spoken German, the Perfect may be used for narration; but in High German at 
least, once the Preterite h'as'Deen established as the tense of narration, 
as above, the Perfect is usually felt to represent a switch in temporal 
perspective.) 
The examples from Goethe and Hildesheimer may indicate that the dis-
tinction between the temporally connected and the temporally free really 
should not be understood as one between two types of discourse, since the 
distinction seems to cut across the usual distinction in discourse types 
(both of the above are literary narration and the original examples in (1) 
might have been from any informal sort of discourse). Perhaps the distinc-
tion should be understood (and formulated) as one between utterance types 
--i.e. between utterances which assumes the reference time of previous 
discourse and those which do not. I have no objection to this recasting of 
the distinction, since, as may be seen below, the formalization of refer-
ence time will show that the distinction amounts to exactly this. 
1.4 The Logic
The logic to be employed will semantically treat all temporal expres-
sions as sentential operators . For this reason, a sentence logic is 
sufficient to demonstrate the treatment. As explained above, we will 
assume that an interpretation function I assigns truth values to atomic 
sentences, i.e. those simple sentences to which no sentential operators
have yet been attached, with respect to intervals of time. This is encoded 
in (1): 
(1) fort an interval, pan atomic sentence I(p,t)=O or I(p,t)=l 
(Since virtually all reference is to intervals of time, there is no need to 
distinguish intervals from points notationally. At those few points where 
both points and intervals are referred to, intervals are designated i 1, i 2, 
etc. and points t 1 , t 2, etc . Cf. the definition of 
1 <' and '<' in 1.3.) 
For atomic pr~pos1tions, only one interval of time--not three, as the 
full system allows--is relevant to the determination of truth conditions. · 
(2) for atomic p, for all models A, speech times s, event times e, and 
reference times r: As,e,r ~ p iff I(p,e)=l, i.e. p holds ate. 
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Before commenting on the substance of (2), let's demystify the formal-
ism. A formula such as the one in (2), of the form: 
Aa,b,c ~ P 
is always to be understood: sentence pis true in model A relative to 
speech time a, event time b, and reference time c. The model A simply 
encodes the truth of falsity of the atomic propositions--here, those with 
no temporal modification whatsoever. Speech time is always written first, 
normally designated by the mnemonic 1 s, followed by event time, normally 
designated by 'e,' followed by reference time, normally designated by 'r. 1 
Of course, other variables must be used whenever more than one speech, 
event, or reference time is relevant to the evaluation of a given utter-
ance. The' =,' or so-called 'turnstile,' may be read 'satisfies,' as long 
as this in turn is understood so that As satisfies p iff pis true in A 
relative to a, b, and c. ,e,r 
Important to the substance of (2) is first the treatment of speech, 
event, and reference time as parameters of interpretation, and second that 
tenseless expressions are interpreted with respect to a single time . (I 
use "tenseless" here in the sense of tense logic--to designate expressions 
with no elements which make temporal reference, i.e. no verbal tense, no 
temporal adverbials or clauses, etc. whatsoever.) We shall consider the 
latter point first. It is important that basic expressions are still 
assigned semantic values with respect to single times because this pre-
serves the intuitively persuasive notion of temporal dependence from 
simpler tense logics, guaranteeing us the same relatively cogent founda-
tions. Intuitively clear foundations are required if we are to interpret 
the formal system. It is not immediately clear how one could interpret a 
basic expression with respect to pairs or triples of time. At the risk of 
redundancy then, let me emphasize that nothing new in the interpretation of 
tenseless expressions is being proposed--this proceeds the same as it does 
in simpler tense logics. The second and third temporal indices are used 
exclusively in the interpretation of temporal expressions . 
There are also important consequences of treating Reichenbach's speech 
time, event time and reference time as "dimensions" or parameters of 
interpretation in a tense logic. These will be easier to appreciate after 
we have examined a rule using these parameters. Moreover, no simple 
sentences in German are interpreted by atomic formulae. All include some 
temporal modification, viz. tense. Let us then turn to its analysis . 
1.5 The Preterite and the Indexical Interpretation of Reichenbach 
1.5.1 The Motivation for Indexical Treatments of Tense 
Some sentences seem to contain no temporal modification other than 
tense, however, so that we do have an apparently simplest case from which 
to begin. Thus it seems reasonable to analyze Sam left as containing no 
temporal modification other than Past tense marking (or "Preterite" tense 
marking--these terms will be used synonymously here) . Since all temporal 
expressions will be analyzed as sentential operators, as remarked above, we 
then analyze Sam left as PAST(Sam leave), where Sam leave is tenseless. 
Let us recall that the tenseless Sam leave holds ,n A at s,e,r iff it holds 
ate, the time of leaving. Clearly, the Past (or Preterite) tense requires 
that this e precedes s. The situation in German is fully parallel, and (1) 
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formalizes the requirement as a first approximation of the actual semantic 
rule: 
(1) (Necessary truth condition of sentences in the Preterite) 
If As,e,r f PRET(p), then e<s and As,e,r f p 
The use of Reichenbach's various times as parameters provides a mechan-
ism for dealing with an aspect of temporal interpretation first noted in 
Partee (1973), who argued for the need for tense operators with definite 
interpretations in place of (or in addition to) the indefinite interpreta-
tions which the Priorean operators provide. Prior (and many others), it 
will be remembered, had investigated a PAST operator of a sort that PAST(p) 
holds at tiff there is a t'<t and p holds at t'. Thus (2) would be true 
if there were any time prior to speech time at which Cal forgot to turn off 
the stove: 
(2) Cal forgot to turn off the stove 
On the Priorean view, the tense is interpreted indefinitely: if there 
is any past t' at which the tenseless Cal forget to turn off the stove 
holds, then (2) is to be regarded as true. Partee pointed out that, on the 
contrary, a sentence such as (2) would normally be uttered not to assert 
that Cal once forgot, but rather to assert of a definite time that he 
forgot then. Further proof of this may be found in the interaction of 
tense and"negation. For example, in (2') 
(2') Cal didn't turn off the stove 
we find neither of the likely representations under the Priorean view 
satisfactory: 
PAST(-(Cal turn off the stove))
-(PAST(Cal turn off the stove)) 
The first is too weak, since it is true if there is any past time at which 
Cal didn't turn off the stove, and the second too strong since it is only 
true if there is no past time at which he did. Partee points out that (2 1 ) 
is rather understood to assert of a definite time that Cal didn't turn the 
stove off then. 
En~ (lmIT:"59-69) has extended Partee's criticism by showing that the 
predicted scope relations in the indefinite analysis of tense do not hold. 
En;'s tack is to show that NP's do not fall within the any of the predicted 
scope slots. She points out e.g. that in the sentence All rich men were 
obnoxious children, the scope analysis predicts that the sentence will 
either be understood about all present rich men or about all past rich men, 
but not both. But there is a reading available in which the sentence says 
something about all rich men, present and past. A similar, but more 
problematic case is that of sentences such as John will meet every hostage, 
which seem capable of saying something about past hostages in the absence 
of any past tense morpheme. A third very damaging case for the scope 
analysis involves sentences where scopes clash. Ens considers the sentence 
below from Cooper (1978): 
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Every congressman who remembers a president will be at the party 
She considers the case in w~ich the sentence is uttered long after the 
abolition of the presidency when a party is to be given for those con-
gressmen old enough to remember a president. Every con ressman must be in 
the scope of the future tense (they're not congressman now, and a 
president must be within the scope of every congressman (they may-remember 
different presidents). But since scope 1s trans1t1ve, this would mean that 
a president would be within the scope of the future tense--in which case 
the sentence would have to be nonsensical, which of course it isn't. 
Thus tenses are not interpreted analogously to the variables introduced 
by existential quantifiers, i . e. indefinitely, but rather (more) analogous-
ly to singular terms, whose reference is fixed in any given context, i.e. 
definitely. (1) provides for the latter interpretation of the tense 
operator directly. 
To see this, reconsider example (2): 
(2) Cal forgot to turn off the stove 
This would be analyzed in the present system as true of a particular (con-
textually specified) time, i.e. the time at which the stove should have 
been, but wasn't, turned off. The time is supplied by the context of 
utterance. (Since (1) is not a semantic rule, but only a necessary truth 
condition, and especially since the actuaT"semantic rule specifies that 
event and reference time are the same in the Preterite, this discussion 
cannot be construed as an argument that we must directly provide for 
definite reference to event time in addition to providing for definite 
reference to reference time. 1.6.1 contains the argument that we ought to 
provide for direct reference to event time and reference time.) 
We suppose then that (2) is uttered in a context where e.g. the time of 
utterance is 2:00 pm, the most prominent stove is Cal's, and the time 
spoken about is 1:00 pm. All of this information is available in the 
context of utterance. Let us suppose that (2) is analyzed as: 
PRET(Cal-forget-to-turn-the-stove-off) ( F PRET(p)) 
Rule (1) then foresees an evaluation of the following sort: 
A2pm,lpm,r FPRET(p) 
which, by (1), requires that 
1 pm< 2 pm and A2 1 m ~ ppm, p ,r 
which, by (2) in 1.4, holds iff 
1 pm< 2 pm and I(p,1 pm) = 1 
i.e. iff 
1 pm< 2 pm and I(Cal-forget-to-turn-the-stove-off,1 pm)=l 
We may grant that 1 pm completely precedes 2 pm and therefore sunmarize 
that (2) holds in the context given iff Cal forgot to turn the stove off at 
- 13 -
1:00 pm. The time is important. If Cal turned it off at 1, but forgot 
yesterday at 6:00 pm, the sentence is still false. The tense refers to the 
time given in the context--and only that time is relevant to the evaluation 
of the truth of (2). The time at which he was to turn it off is thus a 
parameter of interpretati~n to which "indexical" tense refers. 
The problems which En~ (1981) noted about the failure of the scope 
predictions in the indefinite treatment simply do not arise under an 
indexcial treatment of tense. We are simply under no obligation to inter-
pret e.g. noun phrases with respect to the same contextual parameters which 
turn out to be crucial in evaluating tense. 
This indexical conception of the definite interpretation of tense is 
not an ad hoc feature of the present analysis within formal semantics. 
(Cf. Dowty, 1982 and Baeuerle, 1979 for extended treatments of tense which 
incorporate this feature.) The method is moreover the accepted way of 
treating context dependence in formal semantics. Let us review the moti-
vation for this. It is only reasonable to assume that the time to which 
definite reference is made is a feature of the context--not unlike speaker, 
hearer, speech time, or the denotata of demonstratives. The assumption is 
justified by the fact that the time to which reference is made varies in 
contexts independently of the sentence uttered. Thus, even though (2) is 
usually understood as referring to "the last time I was supposed to turn 
the stove off," it may also be understooaas "that time," for example, in 
the context of a narrative, or in a courtroom.--
One common way of accounting for such contextual dependence in Analytic 
Philosophy was to suppose that such contextually implied elements were 
tacitly asserted. Thus Cal left asserts tacitly Cal left at t. This sort 
of analysis is usually l1ngu1st1cally supect, however, and in any case, it 
has given way to a similar, but syntactically less radical proposal. The 
presently accepted method of accounting for the effects of context on mean-
ing, at least since Lemmon (1966), is to suppose that the meaning of the 
utterance of the expression X in context c may be calculated from the 
conventional content of X and the relevant aspects of c. Schematically: 
(3) Lemmon's Principle 
the utterance of X inc =(semantically) X'(c) 
where X' is the conventional content of X. 
So e.g. the utterance of you in a given context must have the semantic 
value of applying the function which is the conventional content of you to 
the (relevant parameters) of the context. Similarly, Cal left may be said 
to assert that he left at time t if this time is a parameter of context. 
(Note that Lemmon's principle is emphatically not to be confused with 
Grice's (1975) program which requires that theTmport of an utterance be 
calculable from the meaning and general principles of rational purposive
behavior--the conversational postulates.) The present proposal follows 
Lemmon's principle.
The important programmatic point is that speech event and reference 
times are formalized as parameters of interpretation. Let us ca~l this the 
indexical interpretation of Reichenbach. It may be contrasted with e.g. 
Hornstein (1977), where Reichenbach's speech time S, event time E, and 
reference time Rare used as the basic elements in "tense structures," 
without a commitment as to their interpretation. I suggest that we call 
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this the representational interpretation of Reichenbach. 3) 
The indexical treatment has the irmnediate and substantial advantage of 
explaining the discourse dependency of temporal interpretation. This may 
be seen if one reflects that discourse constitutes part of context, so that 
it should be reflected in different parameters of interpetation associated 
with that context. The representational treatment isn't helpless in this 
respect, but requires additional apparatus to deal with context dependence. 
To appreciate further differences in the two approaches to temporal 
analysis, let us regard the representational treatments more closely. In 
representational systems structures of S, E, and Rare built up by rules of 
interpretation. The rules work 11 top-down, 11 first creating a basic repre-
sentation for the matrix tense and temporal elements, and then moving
11 down 11 into subordinate clauses, where s1, R1, and E1; s2, R2, and E2; etc. are added to the structure. 
It i s at this point that an important difference between the indexical 
interpretation and the representational interpretation arises. The index-
ical treatment is committed to interpreting every temporal expression with 
respect to at most three indices (or some other fixed, and pragmatically 
plausibl e--read: small--number). The representational treatment, on the 
other hand, allows reference in principle to the full representation built 
up by previous rules. (Cf. Hornstein, 1977:539 for an example of a rule 
which refers to six points of representation. Most of the rults in Smith, 
1978:87-92 refer to more than three points of representation.) In this 
respect , the indexical interpretation of Reichenbach is more restrictive, 
so that the burden of proof ought5to lie on those proposing the less re-strictive, representational view. On the other hand, I do not know 
whether the indexical interpretation is more restrictive in any absolute 
sense, and I certainly do not claim that here. 
This might be put a slightly different way: the indexical treatment 
requires a more strictly compositional treatment of temporal semantics. In 
general, a semantics is compositional if it specifies the meaning of compo-
site expressions as a function of the meanings of its components (and 
therefore without reference to the larger construction in which the compo-
site may appear). We can often obtain compositionality where it hasn't 
been achieved by employing more complicated meanings in the component 
expressions and by complicating the model theory which evaluates the 
expressions (and thus the suggestion of this thesis, that three temporal 
indices be employed, should make compositionality easier to obtain than it 
was in one- or two-dimensional tense logics). The less we have to 
complicate basic expressions or model theory to obtain compositionality, 
the more compositional a treatment may be said to be . The indexical treat-
ment, in limiting the number of temporal parameters to which a semantic 
rule may refer to three, allows less complicated basic temporal meanings, 
and so may be said to be more compositional than the representational 
treatment. 
Perhaps this can best be appreciated in a second distinctive aspect of 
indexical tense logic. Many semantic rules for temporal expressions in 
other frameworks take the following form: 
(4) fort a temporal expression, a its argument, c and c' contexts 
t(a)(c) 	= a(c') and cRtc' 
where 'Rt' designates a relation between contexts 
For example, the Priorean Past operator might be formulated: 
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(5) Past(a)(c) = a{c') and c'<c 
where '<' designates temporal order of the appropriate sort 
Note that {4) and (5) have altered the original reference to context. In 
this case the event time of (c) has undoubtedly changed in going to (c' ). 
Those aspects of context altered by semantic rule are irretrievably lost to 
the application of later rules. This puts constraints on allowable tempor-
al meanings. For example, we have already seen that the indexical treat-
ment of the definite interpretation of tense requires that the time to 
which definite reference is made be a parameter of context. This means 
that any rule which alters this parameter must have the concommitant effect 
of barring definite reference to that time. Some rules certainly do alter 
the parameter to which definite reference is made in the Past tense rule, 
e.g. the rule introducing futurate Perfects {4.1) and the rules introducing 
duratives (3.7.1). Thus it is a predicted consequence of the indexical 
interpretation (of tense in general, and of Reichenbach in particular) that 
some temporal expressions cannot be understood as defin;te--viz. all those 
within the scope of a parameter-altering expression. (I.e., such expres-
sions with narrower scope cannot refer to the same parameter definitely.)
The fate of altered indices in representational treatments, where the 
old indices may become part of the "tense structure" which is built up by 
the rules of tense interpretation, is not written in stone. In particular, 
the old indices are certainly available for use in subsequent rules of 
interpretation--in contrast to their aloof behavior in nonrepresentational 
treatments, where they are forever irretrievable. Since there are not the 
same automatic predictions in the representational treatments of tense, 
machinery must be developed and deployed to generate predictions, e.g. in 
the case of definite reference to time, some machinery will be required to 
distinguish definite and indefinite pieces of "tense structures." 
A third, and final point of distinction between representational and 
indexical treatments of tense concerns again the definite interpretation of 
tense (and might be regarded as a more specific consequence of the first 
point). According to the indexical treatment of the definite interpreta-
tion of tense, definite tenses refer to parameters of context. According 
to representational treatments, they refer to pieces of the representa-
tional structure being created. The difference then is this: the contexts, 
unlike representations, normally do not change after the interpretation of 
each new temporal element. For example, there is no reason to think that 
the definite Past tense should change the context with respect to which the 
rest of the sentence is evaluated (in the indexical treatment), while it 
certainly would change the representations it is added to. Thus the 
indexical treatment predicts that definite tense should not affect the 
interpretations of adverbial elements within its scope. No such prediction 
is made by a representational treatment. Thus the indexical treatment will 
generate rather more specific predictions than the representational one, 
which is flexible. · 
1.5.2 Vagueness and Indexicality
There is no sense in denying that the added flexibility of nonindexical 
treatments can appear to be very attractive--especially in sentences that 
seem to refer definitely to more than one time. Notice that if the sen-
tence below is evaluated at any single event time, then it could only be 
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true in very limited circumstances. 
{6) Tom left school and got a job 
In particular, the sentence would be evaluated as false any time when Tom 
first left school and then got a job. This is counterintuitive, and it 
therefore suggests thattne indexical treatment of tense is too strict. 
Since there appear to be other advantages to the indexical treatment {and
since it is the raison d'etre of this work to explore the indexical treat-
ment), however, we might search for the minimal correction consistent with 
the correct analysis of sentences such as (6). 
The optimal explanation of this phenomenon would be a general principle 
which foresaw no special apparatus for conjunction. One formulation of 
this sort of principle is straightforward if we keep the use of definite 
temporal reference in mind: in particular, we often refer definitely but 
inexactly to time. {6) might e.g. be uttered several years after Tom's 
leaving school and getting a job, when the exact date has long been forgot-
ten. This doesn't make it indefinite. It still might pick out a definite 
instance of his e.g. getting a job {from many such instances), but the 
exact time at which he got the job cannot be regarded as available, let 
alone salient, within the context of utterance. {It is worth pointing out 
that definite nominal reference is quite parallel in this respec~: one can 
refer definitely to e.g. Thomas Pynchon using the phrase "Thomas Pynchon" 
or "the author of The Crying of Lot Forty-Nine," without knowing at all 
exactly who that is, and certainly without being able to recognize the man. 
Cf. Stalnaker, 1978:317f, and En~, 1981:26f, who make this point about 
nominal reference; and Barwise and Perry, 1983:43f, who make it about 
temporal reference.) 
{7) would seem to allow for vagueness in temporal reference in a 
sensible way: 
{7) VaguenesF in Temporal Reference  
As,e,r p iff there exists e' e such that As,e' ,r Fp  
Given (7), we might evaluate {6) as true with respect to an event time e as 
long as there are subintervals e and e of eat which Tom left school and 
got a job. This assumes that {6~ woul;eventually be reduced to a sentence 
conjunction, evaluated ate, so that its two conjuncts would presumably 
also be evaluated ate, and that {7) would apply to one or both of their 
evaluations. {7) thus would have the status of a clause in the definition 
of satisfaction. 
{7) is unacceptable, however, because it reintroduces the difficulties 
which Partee noted about indefinite tense operators. To see this, first 
note that {7) suggests that any tense might be used definitely if one were 
just begin from a large enough event time interval. Thus we ought to be 
able to use e.g. {2) to assert that there has been at least one instance of 
Cal's forgetting to turn off the stove: 
{2) Cal forgot to turn off the stove 
(2) ought then to be able to amount to the assertion that Cal hasn't always
remembered to turn off the stove. (2) doesn't seem to be able to bear this 
meaning, however. 
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Similarly, (7) seems wrong in explaining the interaction of negation
and tense. Let's reconsider {2' ): 
(2 1 ) Cal didn't turn the stove off 
There are various scope possibilities, but most of them are obviously 
wrong. We can symbolize the different scope relationships in the following 






(It would also be possible to invoke the vagueness principle several times 
in evaluating (2'), but this would not improve the derived readings as 
equivalences of (2').) Clearly (2') would not be taken to assert that 
there is some time at which Cal wasn't involved in turning the stove off, 
and this eliminates the first two scope relationships. Similarly, (2') 
couldn't mean that within the definite past time in question, there is some 
time at which Cal weren't turning the stove off, which the third line would 
imply. This leaves only the last line as a possible scope representation. 
Supposing this were to be regarded as equivalent to (2' ), let us 
consider the situation in which Cal has been cooking a large meal, so that 
he may have turned the stove on and off several times in the course of an 
hour: the vagueness principle (7) predicts that {2') would certainly be 
regarded as false if asserted about the time of Cal's cooking in the 
example, since within this definite time there is a time at which he turned 
the stove off. But this is counterintuitive: IT') might be truly asserted 
about the situation if Cal didn't turn the stove off when he was through, 
or if he didn't turn it off at another time when he was supposed to {and
perhaps overcooked something). 
This example indicates that definite reference to time is not captured 
well by a system which incorporates a principle of vagueness such as (7). 
It reinforces the point made above in connection with (7), viz. that refer-
ring definitely need involve neitcer exact knowledge of what is referred to 
nor even ability to recognize it. 
But the rejection of (7) re-poses the question of how one can deal with 
(6). The solution, first proposed by Cresswell (1977 :16) and modified by 
van Benthem (1983:195) , which I shall adopt is less immediately attractive 
than (7), because it is less general. It is presented to demonstrate that 
(6) does not pose insurmountable problems for indexical interpretations of 
tense. 
(8) Let VPl[+fin]•···,VPn[+fin] 	be verb phrases.  
Then 'VP1, VP2, •.. ,und VPn' is also a VP, with the meaning:  
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(Note that finite VPs have been interpreted for tense, as the tensing rules 
in (3.6) make explicit.) Then we need a rule to interpret temporal con-
junctions: 
(9) As,e,r FP1 at P2 at •..at Pn iff 
(i) there exists subintervals e1, •.. ,en of e such that 
As,el,r ~ Pl' As,e2,r FP2,···, and As,en,r ~ Pn·  
and (ii) ve·~e(e' an initial or final subinterval in e -->  
3 n {in ( i ) ) en overlaps e' )  
First, let us note that the latter rule (9) allows that a conjunction 
be true at an event time when neither of its conjuncts is true--as long as 
all of the conjuncts are true of subintervals of that event time. This 
provides a means of analyzing sentences such as (6). Second, note that, 
because (8) applies only to VPs which have been interpreted for tense, 
there will effectively be a tense marker on each of the conjuncts created 
by (8), so that consequently each of the subintervals e1, .. . ,en must satisfy whatever tense is on its respective VP. 
The second clause in (9) exists only to rule out the case where a 
sentence is asserted to hold of an interval larger than the one required to7encompass the event times of dts conjuncts. This pair of rules would 
surrmarize the data correctly. 
There are obviously several predictions about the behavior of tens~ in 
VP conjunctions implicit in (8) and (9) which would be worth pursuing. 
They will not be pursued here, however, because they lead astray from the 
main point, which is not to defend them as the correct method of dealing 
with the problem of tense and conjunction, 6ut rather to illustrate one 
strategy for dealing with the problem of multiple relevant times in an 
indexical tense system, and in order to demonstrate that the problem does 
not, as might first be suspected, set an absolute limit on the explanatory 
capacity of the system. This is clearly a problem which merits further 
investigation. 
One aspect of (8) and (9) is worthy of mention because it may indicate 
a flaw in the strategy of dealing with multiple relevant times in this way: 
the method may break up a fairl y general pattern into many disparate rules. 
For example, quantification may similarly involve several event times, but 
since there need be no instance of VP conjunction, (8) and (9) have no 
specific application here. 
(10) Every one of my brothers and sisters graduated from high school. 
The problem is similar: the sentence may be true (presumably of a single 
event time), even though there is no single time at which each of my sib-
lings finished high school. Bufusince· there is no conjunction involved, 
(8) and (9) are of no use here . 
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1.5.3 Indefinite Reference to Time 
The indices provide a neat method of modeling definite reference to 
time, but how may indefinite temporal reference be accounted forn The 
logic of indefinite reference to time is not in doubt--it is aptly describ-
ed e.g. by the Priorean semantics in (5) of 1.5, which might be modified in 
straightforward fashion for employment within the present system. But the 
exact semantics of indefinite temporal reference has its twists, and its 
grammatical status also has to be clarified. This section argues that 
indefinite reference to time should not be analyzed via general pragmatic 
principles nor as a series of distinct indefinite tenses, but rather as a 
sort of temporal adverb, which is normally expressed as mal, although it 
may have to be analyzed as possibly inaudible. -
Most of the relevant facts are quite familiar. Not all uses of tensed 
elements are understood indexically. Nonindexical tenses in German are 
marked by the particle mal 'once' as in (1): 
(1) 	Klaus war mal in China  
K was once in China  
'Klaus was once in China'  
It is worth emphasizing that mal seems to be required to refer indefi-
nitely to time. Ignoring genericrtatements about the past, we might claim 
that there is no indefinite temporal reference without mal. Thus the 
sentence below is always understood as about a definite--Ume and sounds 
peculiar in a context where indefinite reference would be expected. 
(2) 	Klaus war in China 
was in C  
'Klaus was in China'  
(3) 	Ich brauche Informationen ueber China. Kann mir wer helfen ? 
I need information about C can me s.o. help 
'I need information about China. Can someone help me ?' 
- (2) 	 OK - (1) 
This fact lends a further bit of initial plausibility to any treatment 
which attributes the indefinite reading to the presence of mal. 
Before presenting a rule of interpretation formal, we should note that 
it often cooccurs with frame adverbials such as gestern 'yesterday.' In 
this case the sentence has the meaning 'sometime yesterday.' 
(4) Gestern war er mal da 
yesterday 	was he once there  
'He was here sometime yesterday'  
This is nonetheless indefinite reference time. The only difference between 
(1) and (4) is that the class of times to which indefinite reference is 
made is more restricted in the case of (4). The rule of interpretation for 
mal will have to guarantee that his being there falls within yesterday in m. This may be formally accomplished in one of two ways. We might 
assign very wide scope to mal and let the time indefinitely referred to be 
modified by tenses and frame adverbials (with narrow scope). Or we might 
allow e to first be modified by the (wide scope) adverbials and tense and 
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then allow mal to pick out a subinterval of the time. 
The latter approach is preferable because it is immediately compatible 
with the use of mal (and other frequentatives) with somewhat definite tem-
poral reference.--C-5) may be used to state that Uwe has been there once (in 
his life) or that he was there within a particular (understood) time, e.g. 
since the hearer left. 
(5) Uwe war mal da 
was once there  
'Uwe was once here' or: 'Uwe was here once'  
This use of mal to indiscriminately pick out a time within a given period 
is exactly wnat is always required of mal in the second approach sketched. 
We can now formulate a rule of interpretation formal. 
(6) As,e,r ~ mal'(p) iff 3e's.e and As,e',r Fp. 
Let us note that this rule of interpretation, together with the assumption 
that mal has narrower scope than tense (and frame adverbials), provides an 
explanation for the phenomena observed thus far. Moreover, (6) has an 
immediate parallel in the field of nominal reference, that of indefinite 
pronouns.
It would be possible to formulate semantic rules which allowed indefi-
nite temporal reference indiscriminately as a property of utterances, or 
even as an alternative with certain tenses . But as long as indefinite 
temporal reference correlates exactly with the presence of the adverb mal, 
there is little need to speculate about these possibilities. Should there 
be a very few instances of indefinite temporal reference without (at least 
an implicit anaphor of) mal, we might suppose it tacitly present. Finally, 
if other specific temporai--expressions are understood indefinitely, there 
is nothing in the theory here to prevent them from being interpreted with 
an existential quantifier, in the manner of (6). 
The important result which we can carry from this section is that 
indefinite interpretations of tense can, by and large, be ignored. They 
are signalled by the presence of mal (or by the fact that its addition to a 
sentence would be semantically negTfgible), result from the meaning of mal, 
and are readily treated with the theory of tense developed here. The in-
dexical theory of tense was developed to handle definite reference to time, 
but it adapts well to the description of indefinite reference to time . 
1.5.4 Summary 
It has been the purpose of this section to present and defend the 
analysis of tense as indexical. This analysis follows from E.J. Lemmon's 
principle of analyzing context dependence of utterance meaning as a case of 
applying the meaning of the uttered expression (as function) to the context 
(as argument). The indexical treatment furthermore provides an insightful 
way of treating the definite interpretation of tense, is compatible with 
mechanisms for dealing with the multiple relevant event times which may be 
found e.g. in conjunction or in quantification, and accommodates the facts 
of limited indefinite reference to time as well. The next section illus-
trates another advantage of the indexical treatment, viz . that it allows a 
characterization of the temporal 11 flow 11 found in at least most narration. 
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1.6 Temporal Reference in Connected Discourse 
We have argued hence that an indexical interpretation of 
Reichenbach's speech, event, and reference times provides a satisfactory 
and somewhat constrained account of definite interpretations of tense. Let 
us now try to link this account to the description of temporal reference in 
discourse sketched in section 1.3 above. This sketch was founded on the 
principle, RP, that reference times are ordered in (temporally) connected 
discourse, such as traditional narrative. There we considered the 
discourse (1), repeated here (again as (1)): 
(1) Al went to N.Y. The others were there, too. 
in which we argued that the reference times of the sentences are to 
provide for their temporal relationship. 
Suppose then that the first sentence is analyzed as equivalent to 
PRET(Al-go-to-N.Y.), to be evaluated at r = 1 pm and the second as 
PRET(the-others-be-there), to be evaluated at r = 2 pm. Since 1 pm< 2 pm, 
this discourse satisfies RP. Now we would like to show that the first 
sentence is true at 1 pm and the second at 2 pm. (The exact choice of 
times is of course irrelevant. The point is that we must guarantee that 
the sentences in connected discourse describe successive states of affairs. 
This is the sense of such discourses, and it is the purpose of RP to faci-
litate the proper description of this phenomenon.) But it will not do to 
simply say that the sentences have successive reference times: we must also 
guarantee that the events described in sequences such as (1) also take 
place in succession. 
It must be obvious that the necessary truth condition for the Preter-
ite, (1) in 1.5, is insufficient for this purpose. The problem is to 
specify a dependence of the Preterite on reference time, but (1) in 1.5 
makes absolutely no mention of reference time. (2) remedies this: 
(2) Preterite (final version) 
for 	all A, s, e, r, and p:  
As,e,r FPRET(p) iff e=r<s and As,e,r ~ p  
(2) is identical to the necessary truth condition ((1) in 1.5) except that 
(2) requires additionally that e=r. 
Using (2), we can immediately derive the desired evaluation of (1). 
Let us note that: 
(3.1) As,e,lpm FPRET(Al-go-to-NY') iff e=lpm<s and  
A r Al-go-to-NY' s,lpm,lpm 
{3.2) A 2 r PRET(oth-be-thr') iff e=2pm<s and s,e, pm L 
A 2 m 2 mr oth-be-thr's, p. p 
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Given principle (2} in 1.4, that an atomic proposition is true at s,e,r iff 
it is true ate, we derive exactly the desired result: the first sentence 
must be true at 1 pm and the second at 2 pm. Thus (2), together with the 
discourse principle RP, guarantees that the times spoken of in connected 
discourse are successive. 
Having achieved our desired result, we might wish to compare it to our 
intuitive understanding of discourses such as (1). We have derived the 
truth conditions for (1} so that the first sentence Al went to N.Y. must be 
true at the first reference time of the discourse, and so that The others 
were there, too must be true at the next. The discourse thus might be true 
of any of the following sequences of reference times: 
(4.1) -~---~-----------~  
~Tues.8-8:30 p.m.  
1,Tues.6-8:05 p.m. 
(4.2) ------------------4)  
V',Tues.7-8 p.m.  
1,Tues.6-8 p.m. 
(4.3) -...---~----~-----4  
~,Tues.7-8 p.mVz,Thurs.9!10 a.m.  
All of these situations are allowed by RP as presently formulated, and 
while I take it that everyone would agree that (1) might be felicitously 
uttered about (4.1) and (4.2), there may be some disagreement about (4.3),
which may strike one as odd (as described by (1)). There is no difficulty 
given the right sort of facilitating context, however, such as (5): 
(5) The friends agreed to meet the following Thursday at 9 am 
in the lobby of the Ledo hotel in New York City. Al's last 
possible plane was Tuesday night, and he spent most of the day in 
indecision about whether to back out. Finally, he made up his 
mind and drove out to the airport. Al went to N.Y. The others 
were there, too . 
It might be objected here that (5), as contrived as it is, simply shows 
that the inference that the times are not disjoint in discourse (1) is 
cancellable--but not that it plays no role whatsoever. To accorrmodate this 
view, we would have to show how RP may be used to calculate a conversation-
al implicature to the effect that discourse times must be nondisjoint (with 
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some kinds of propositions, at any rate). 11 We want to guarantee the 
result: 
(6) Reichenbach's Pragmatics (strong version): 
For s1, s2, .•. , Sn a sequence of sentences uttered in a temporally 
connected discourse: 
(1) r(S1) ~ r(Si+l) 
(2) 	 it is conversationally implicated (for all atelic Si) 
that r(Si) ~ r(Si_1) 
Sis atelic iff it is an activity or a state. These terms are defined in 
the section below. 
1.6.1 	The Treatment of Aktionsarten 
Brugmann (1904:493) seems to have introduced the concept of Aktionsart, 
defining it as"[ .•. ] die Art und Weise, wie die Handlung des Verbums vor 
sich geht." We will follow the tradition of German scholarship in refer-
ring to the telic/atelic distinction as a distinction among Aktionsarten; 
the history of this concept is discussed in Schlachter (1968:202ff) and 
Andersson (1972). We will also follow this tradition in viewing the dis-
tinction as semantically based, but we will look to the methods of tense 
logic for a formal characterization. 
Taylor (1977) noted that telics are true at unique intervals, so that 
if e.g. 'x read Faust' is true of the interval from two to five o'clock (in 
the sense that x began at two, finished at five and was primarily occupied 
with reading in that interval), then, since this is a telic Aktionsart, it 
follows that 'x read Faust' is not true of any subinterval of the time in 
question, and it needn't be true of any other interval at all. Telic ac-
tion takes place at a unique time . Atelic states, such as 'x be sick,' or 
activities, such ' x dance,' on the other hand, are never true of uni{ue
intervals. If xis sick from two to five o'clock, then he· is also s ck at 
all times between two and five. The same holds, with some qualifications, 
for activities such as 'x dance.' (There are also imperfective readings of 
telics, which will be treated in 2.6.) 
1.6.2 	Time in Connected Discourse 
Returning to the strengthened version of RP in (6) in 1.6 above, note 
the effect that it will have: for states and activities Si' this RP has 
the consequence that 
(1) r(Si_1) ~ r(Si) and r(Si) ~ r(Si_1) 
Since we are dealing with intervals, we may not therefore conclude that 
r(S. ) = r(S.). The definition of'<' specified that a<b iff a does not 
extinb beyond1 b. From (1) we may therefore conclude only that r(S.) and 
r(S. 1 ) do not extend beyond each other, i.e. they must end simultlneously.1Tnis strengthening of RP rules out (normally) situations of the ques-
tionable sort. There is clear indication that it must be limited in 
application to atelic Aktionsarten (be at home, talk with Jones, and not 
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write a paper, arrive), as may be verified directly: 
(2) 	Smith walked around. Jones was at home.  
Brown talked with Jones.  
(3) 	Smith came in. Brown wrote a letter.  
Brown arrived.  
I.e., the normal understanding of atelic following atelic is that they are 
nearly simultaneous (2), while the normal understanding of telic following 
telic is that the first precedes the second (3). There is undoubtedly more 
going on here, but at least this much ought to be accounted for. 
Since at least (2) in the strong RP in 1.6 is to be a conversational 
implicature, we need an account of its calculability. Dowty (ms.) provides 
one account along the following lines: we assume that there is a principle 
that times in narration are successive (as in RP, though the details might
differ). States and activities may be true of times, without for that 
reason being false of their subintervals. Thus if Jones be at home is true 
of 9-10 am, it isn't therefore false of 9:00-9:10 am. If this sort of 
sentence is s. within a connected discourse, one may suppose it to be 
predicated of1 an r(S.} such that r(S.) < r(S. 1)--even if it is also true 
of superinterval j 1r(S.) such that 1j :-< r(S: ). The situation is 
entirely different with ~entences such as Sam1rtad the book or Sam arrive. 
Neither of these is true at subintervals of intervals j at which they hold. 
Thus, even if RP allows that r(S ) < r(S. }, this isn't very likely to 
hold; in fact, it holds just in ~ase the 1eients described ins. 1 ands. 
end simultaneously. 1- 1 
If this discussion of the Preterite in discourse is clarified, then let 
us return briefly to the improved rule of interpretation for the Preterite 
(2) in 1.6. It is worth noting here that the added condition in (2) that 
e=r in the Preterite may be a conventional implicature. It might arise 
from the facts that (i) if e<r<s, then the Pluperfect fs appropriate; and 
(ii) if r<s and r<e, then the conditional is appropriate. Thus the Preter-
ite is appropriate only if e=r. But some of the tense information must be 
conventional meaning, and I see no need to take a stand on the issue here. 
It is also worth noting that (2) says nothing about the distinction 
between iterative and noniterative readings of the Preterite. Nothing will 
be said here about iterative meanings, except that Carlson (1978) is an 
excellent source of information about their idiosyncrasies. 
Let us finally note that we were forced to the adoption of (2) once we  
accepted RP as the principle of temporal organization in narration. It is  
therefore somewhat remarkable that (2) is exactly the meaning assigned to  
the (English) Preterite by Reichenbach (1947):  
r,e s 
We can regard this as a confirmation 1~f the correctness of the present work 
as an interpretation of Reichenbach. 
Finally, let us note that filling out (5) in 1.5 to (2) above has in no 
way affected the account of the definite interpretation of tense in 1.5 
above. There is still a time which is a parameter of interpretation fixed 
by context and capable of being referred to definitely. (2) does make two 
alternative accounts accessible, however, namely, one based on reference 
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time, and one based on event time. They would be, at this point, minimally 
different, so that we may postpone a choice between the accounts until more 
temporal expressions have been examined. 
1.6.3 Some Special Uses of the Preterite 
This concludes the discussion of the Preterite in this chapter. Some 
apparent counterexamples to the rule proposed, viz. the futurate uses of 
the Preterite in sentences such as the following: 
(1) Warte, 	 bis er hier war  
wait until he here was  
'Wait until he's been here'  
are not important to the system of temporal interpretation proposed here. 
Because this use is limited to a few verbs whose Perfect tenses with past 
meanings are also often replaced by Preterite forms, I would analyze these 
as Preterite forms with semantically Perfect meanings. 
There is another large class of exceptions to this semantic rule, as 
especially Wunderlich (1970:139), but also Gelhaus (1969:17), Latzel 
(1977:36-37), Baeuerle and Stechow (1980:400), and Steube (1980:27-28) 
note . Some of Wunderlich's examples: 
(2) Wie war Ihr Name ?  
how was your name  
'What was your name ?'  
(3) 	Was gab es morgen im Theater ?  
what gave it tomorrow in theater  
'What was playing in the Theater tomorrow?'  
(4) 	Wir kamen [ ••• ] nach Florenz, das in einem breiten Tal lag 
we came to Florence which in a broad valley lay 
'We came[ • • • ] to Florence, which lay in a broad valley [ .•. ]' 
Wunderlich very aptly dubs these "subjective Preteri tes . 11 Thus the 
Preterites in (2)-(3) invite the inference that the name, or theater 
schedule, was mentioned earl ier, which suggests that the use of the Pre-
terite is dependent on the context of utterance, while (4} emphasizes that 
the subject's recognition of Florence lay in the past--and11oes not suggest that its geography is past, as a Preterite normally would. (2)-(4) may 
represent disparate phenomena which will eventually require separate 
accounts, but they may be grouped together here under Wunderlich's rubric 
because they all deviate from the account in (2) in 1.6. 
These uses of the Preterite are extremely suggestive for those inter-
ested in subjectivity and discourse, but they should not make us lose sight
of the fact that the Preterite meaning postulated above needn't be modifi-
ed, but only extended in order to account for subjective uses. Several 
cfrcumstances persuade me that this is so. First, all of the above can be 
understood as normal Preterites, though this is often comical in effect. 
Thus the first can be interpreted as 'What was your name (before it was 
changed) ' (The second example would of course be contradictory on the 
nonsubjective reading.) This is what would be expected if the Preterite 
were ambiguous. Second, conjunction facts indicate that we are deal ing 
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with an ambiquity, not a vagueness, in meaning. Thus in the following 
sentence either both conjuncts have the subjective reading, that recently
mentioned information is being repeated, or they both have the "objective" 
reading, that a past state of affairs is being described (with the sugges-
tion that Schmidt is deceased or long absent). There is no way to mix 
readings among the conjuncts. 
(5) Sein 	Name war Schmidt und sein Beruf Ingenieur  
his name was S and his occupation engineer  
'His name was Schmidt and his occupation engineer'  
Third, scope facts are peculiar, and different, in this use of the Preter-
ite. Note that morgen seems to fall within the scope of the Preterite in 
(3) (because the sentence means 1 What was it mentioned that tomorrow.• ,' 
rather than 'As of tomorrow, what will it be the case that it was to have 
appeared ..• '). Normally tense falls within the scope of frame adverbials, 
as 2.1 shows. It doesn't seem then that "subjective" Preterites present 
occasion to modify our treatment of definite Preterites. (Because the 
semantics of the subjective Preterites seem to involve modal and discourse 
notions, such as expectation, and because the phenomenon seems to be 
separate, as the facts above suggest, we will not attempt a formulation of 
the semantics here.) 
1.7 	The Need for Three Indices 
1.7.1 The Need for at Least Three Indices 
We have argued hence that an indexical interpretation of temporalia is 
best, and that the three-index approach advocated here is an accurate 
model-theoretic reconstruction of Reichenbach's remarks on tense, without, 
however, attempting to establish that the three temporal indices are 
required for descriptive purposes, and not merely for the sake of fidelity 
to Reichenbach's particular views. We should like to establish that three 
are indeed necessary. 
No less an authority than Prior (1967:13f) is famous for the criticism 
that Reichenbach's three reference points are unnecessary so long as one 
keeps the scope of the various operators in mind: 
11 [ ... ] it becomes unnecessary and mi sl eadi ng to make such a sharp 
distinction between the point or points of reference and the point 
of speech; the point of speech is just the first point of refer-
ence."[italics in original] 
But as we saw in 1.5, Partee (1973) demonstrated that Prior's method of 
explaining away Reichenbach's tense distinctions in terms of scope distinc-
tions is limited to those times to which only indefinite reference is made. 
Since we clearly do refer definitely to more than just speech time, Prier's 
criticism has to be rejected. As we have seen, Baeuerle (1979) and Dowty 
(1982) have proposed systems in which two indices are employed in order to 
accommodate the definite interpretations which Partee noted. 
The task of this section is to show that Partee's critique may be 
extended to two-index systems, since they are incapable of dealing with 
definite reference to more than two times. To lay the groundwork for this 
argument, we first note that the need for an index corresponding to speech 
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time (in addition to a displaceable index) is universally recognized, at 
least since Kamp's (1971) demonstration that now continues to refer to 
speech time no matter how deeply embedded in tne scope of tense operators 
it might be. Kamp 1 s essay introduced two-dimensional tense logic. The 
two-dimensional systems employed e.g. by Baeuerle {1979) and Dowty {1982)
have parameters which correspond to Reichenbach's speech and reference 
times, which allows them {i) to account for the definite interpretation of 
the Preterite in the manner of 1.5 above, and {ii) to account for the 
definite interpretation of reference time in examples such as {1): 
{l) Dee hadn't ever lost 
It may not be immediately clear that the reference time of {1) is 
understood-definitely. Keeping in mind Reichenbach's E-R-S schema for the 
Past Perfect, we note that the reference time of (1) is the time before 
which Dee hadn't ever lost. Two facts argue that this reference time is 
understood definitely. First, (1) would be inappropriate in a context in 
which a reference time hadn't been established, for example at the begin-
ning of most discourses. This is expected if the reference time of the 
Past Perfect is understood definitely. If it were understood indefinitely,
there is no reason to see why any such context dependence would exist . 
Second, (1) is understood distinctly from the Past tense. If we assumed 
that reference time were understood indefinitely, and that time is dense 
(so that between any two distinct points or closed intervals of time there 
is a third), then in particular, given any E<S, there would be an R such 
that E<R<S, so that the Past Perfect should hold whenever the Past does, 
and vice versa (at least given the arguments below that event time is 
understood definitely). This means that we have to abandon one of the two 
initial assumptions, either that reference time is understood indefinitely 
or that time is dense. The assumption that time is dense seems quite 
reasonable, however, so that it is best to regard reference time as under-
stood definitely.
Given that we must provide for definite reference to both speech and 
reference time, it will suffice to find examples of definite reference to 
event time (when that is distinct from reference time) to show the need for 
a three-index system. We want to show therefore that we can use the Past 
Perfect to refer definitely to event time. (The other tenses in which 
event time is distinct from reference time, the Present Perfect and Future 
Perfect tenses, are probably not used definitely.) The alternative to the 
view that one can refer definitely to event time is of course the view that 
the Past Perfect is always indefinite vis-a-vis event time. To see that 
this is wrong, and that we can indeed refer definitely to event time, note 
first that (2) is certainly not understood to be true iff there exists some 
prior instance of Ed's losing; the time of his bad mood(= reference time) 
is definite, but so is the time of his losing. This cannot be any arbitra-
ry prior time, but rather is taken to refer to a definite instance. 
(2) Ed had lost (and was in a bad mood). 
This may not seem entirely convincing because it could be maintained 
that the relevant interval of time within which Ed's losing must have taken 
place might be inferred from the context of utterance (and for example the 
parenthetical, since we would not normally assume that anyone would stay in 
a bad mood forever about a single loss). Note that the same objection 
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could have been made against Partee 1 s example (the context of having just 
left the house suggests that the remark about leaving the stove on pertains 
to it), and that it really misses the mark, however, since the point is not 
how 	 the parameter is specified, but that it is required for the interpreta-
tion of (2). 	 --
We can also establish the possibility of referring definitely to event 
time by examining the effect of negation on the interpretation of the Past 
Perfect. Let us consider therefore (3): 
(3) 	 I talked to Fran. Gary hadn't left. 
The first sentence is needed in order to provide a reference time, without 
which the Past Perfect is infelicitous. It is neutral enough, however, so 
that it shouldn't bias the understanding of the event time of the second 
sentence. 
Is the event time referred to indefinitely~ If it were, then the 
second sentence in (3) should be understood to mean one of the two below: 
- 3t(t<r 11 (G.leave at t}) 
3t(-(t<r 11 (G.leave at t)) 
i.e. either that there is no (prior) time at which G. left, so that he'd 
always stayed, or that there is some (prior) time at which he didn't leave, 
so that he hadn't always been leaving. The latter would presumably hold of 
everyone, and the former only of first time visitors (to wherever G. is). 
This indicates that event time isn't understood indefinitely, but rather 
definitely, and that we must allow for definite reference to event time 
even when it is distinct from reference time. 
But this calls for a system of temporal logic in which speech, event, 
and reference time may all be referred to definitely. The proposed system 
of logic in which all three function as contextual parameters allows just
this. 
1. 7 .2 More than Three Indices? 
If we turn our attention from the single tensed element to the temporal 
discourse, it is clear that more than three times may be referred to 
definitely: 
(4) Hal got up. He walked downstairs. After breakfast, he left ••. 
And given the ease with which such discourses may be fused into single
sentences using temporal conjunctions, it seems as clear that more than 
three times may be referred to within complex sentences: 
(5) After the 	man who got up late walked downstairs and before he left, 
he had breakfast (with the woman who had arrived early). 
The 	 same point is perhaps made better by verbs with propositional objects: 
(6) 	Hal thought that Ike had noticed that Jan had mentioned that Ken ••• 
There is an imbalance here, however. 1.7. 1 demonstrated that the 
single Past Perfect fonn involves reference simultaneously to three dis-
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tinct times, while the evidence in this section suggests that discourses, 
or (complex} sentences may involve reference to any number of definite 
times. I know, moreover, of no temporal expression which requirf4 refer-ence to more than three times in the statement of its semantics. This 
suggests that, while there may be no limit to the number of distinct times 
to which definite reference may be made, there may be a fixed limit, viz. 
three, on the number of times relevant to the evaluation of any given 
temporal expression. Stronger hypotheses might also be maintained, e.g. 
that maximally three times may be employed in the evaluation of a "clause,"
or of a "VP. 11 
Since the present work does not involve complementation, or complex 
sentences, there has been no attempt to implement the idea of the above 
paragraph. Since the idea is novel, however, I should like to explain it 
in some further depth, first by an analogy to pronouns. 
Suppose we wished to present a unified theory of pronouns. First and 
second person pronouns seem to refer always to the respective speaker and 
hearer within a context, so that it is natural to formulate their semantics 
so that the reference of these pronouns depends on the contextual paramet-
ers speaker and hearer. A third person pronoun may refer successively to 
different people (or things} within a single discourse, or even complex 
sentence, so that its semantics would more adequately be formulated so that 
the nth instance of a pronoun is seen as referring to the nth element of an 
infinite sequence of available referents. The theory of tense I have been 
presenting views tenses like first and second person pronouns--fixed in 
their reference by contextual parameters. The question is, now that it is 
clear that tenses aren't limited to referring definitely to three times, 
must we move to the model in which reference is allowed to an infinite 
number of times 
The answer is yes, at least to some extent, since we must allow for 
this variability in reference. But we might do so using mechanisms in-
spired by the view of tense as contextual parameter. The mechanism might 
reflect that while any number of times might be referred to definitely, the 
evaluation of any expression will make special reference to three distin-
guished times--speech, event and reference time. 
In fact, something similar will be required in the analysis of first 
and second person pronouns as well, at least if the use of these pronouns 
in quotation is to be taken into account as well. Consider (5): 
(5) Bill said to me, "I didn't recognize you." 
The reference of the first person pronoun in the matrix clause is under-
11 111stood to be the speaker, but the reference of the within the quotation 
clearly isn't the actual speaker, but the speaker in the event reported . I 
don't think that this observation would cause anyone to abandon the stan-
dard account of first and second person pronominal reference. Instead, the 
shift in reference surely ought to be attributed to the effect of quotation 
itself, so that a semantic rule ought to specify something to the effect 
that: 
(G) [ "p" ]A-spkr,hrr = [ P ]A-spkr' ,hrr' 
That is, the semantic value of the quoted proposition equals the semantic 
value of the proposition evaluated at a context with another speaker and 
- 30 -
hearer--presumably supplied in this case by the matrix verb subject and 
indirect object, and in general by context. This solution retains the 
speaker and hearer indices as contextual parameters while recognizing that 
they may shift in some limited circumstances. 
A parallel treatment for tense and other temporal expressions would 
seem promising. Consider the use of the Pluperfect in sentences such as 
(7) and (8): 
(7) Moe hadn't noticed that Ned had left. 
(8) " " " " " was absent. 
The use of the Pluperfect in the subordinate clause in (7) suggests that a 
situation is being described in which E<R<S, and that R should be contextu-
ally definite. Clearly (7) is understood to mean that the time of Ned's 
leaving is prior to the time of Moe's failing to notice it. (8) contains a 
Preterite, on the other hand, so that we expect that E=R<S, and (8) is 
understood to mean that Ned was absent at the time that Moe failed to 
notice it. In each case, the event time--and only the event time--of the 
matrix clause functions as the reference time of the subordinate clause 
((8) disqualifies the reference time of the subordinate clause). Note that 
the same relationship between matrix event time and subordinate reference 
is found in (4) above. This suggests that a parallel to (6) might be 
employed to show the relationship between matrix event time and subordinate 
reference time: 
<9> [ that P ]As,e,r = [ P ]As,e' ,e 
Note that r on the right side of the semantic equivalence has been replaced
bye on the left, effecting the dependence of the subordinate reference 
time on matrix event time. The new subordinate event time e', if it is to 
be analyzed as definite, must be contextually specified in much the same 
way that the possible denotations of third person pronouns are (e.g. as the 
next in a sequence of definite referents). 
An analysis incorporating a rule such as (9} would be consonant with 
Gelhaus (1972), who demonstrated that the sequence of tense restrictions 
(consecutio temporum) in German should not be viewed as restrictions on 
syntactic combinations. (9} incorporates the view that whatever, if any, 
"restrictions" there might be on sequences of tense are semantic, and (9) 
is fully compatible with the position that no such general restrictions 
(though there may be tendencies). 
The sort of analysis I am suggesting now differs from one in which it 
is simply maintained that there may be definite reference to any number of 
times in that it goes on to specify that these times will play specific 
roles in semantic evaluation, and in that the points at which reference to 
new times may be introduced might be delimited (implicitly by the set of 
rules which introduce such times, and possibly explicitly in other ways). 
In this way the thesis that three temporal indices are required in the 
optimal tense logic for natural language differs from, and is compatible
with, the position that there may be definite reference to any number of 
distinct times within a given discourse, or even complex sentence. 
As stated at the outset of this section, there is no attempt here to 
flesh out the proposal in (9) to a full treatment of tense in subordinate 
clauses (and/or VP's}. This section has been included because the fact 
that one is able to refer definitely to more than three times within a 
- 31 -
single sentence might be thought to disconfirm the position of this thesis, 
i.e. that an indexical interpretation of Reichenbach's speech, event, and 
reference times provides an improved tense logic for the analysis of 
natural language tenses. 
Notes--Chapter One 
1. Reichenbach (1947:289) is responsible for the formulation that 
reference time is the time "from which an event is seen." 
2. Nerbonne (1982) discusses examples of narratives that indicate that 
RP is a principle of conversational implicature. In particular, one can 
find examples of fairly careful narration in which reference times are 
nonetheless out of order. The examples there are of English prose, but 
German prose likewise contains occasional exceptions to RP: 
11 
•••Auf der Insel Frauenchiemsee wurden erst in den letzten Jahren 
Bauteile des ••• Benediktinerklosters wiederentdeckt ••• Die Gnaden-
kapelle in Altoetting war Pfalzkirche des spaetkarolingischen
Koenigshofes ••. " in: Rudolph Poertner, Die Erben Roms: Staedte 
und Staette des deutschen Frueh-Mittelalters Duesseldorf-Wien, 
1965. Quoted in: Hoberg (1981:169). 
" ••• Pieces ••• of the Benedictine monastery weren't discovered until 
recent years on the island Frauenchiemsee ••• The chapel in Altoet 
ting was the Palatinate church of late Carolingian royal court ••• " 
Of course, this isn't a narrative, and I haven't noted examples of excep-
tions to RP in German narrative. I would still be surprised if none were 
forthcoming. 
1.3 also contains the first distintively German data, so that this is 
perhaps the best point to note their provenance. Examples from the 
linguistics literature were used as much as possible, and Erhard Hinrichs, 
a Ph.D. student in Linguistics at The Ohio State University, served as my
principal respondent. Mr. Hinrichs is a native of East Frisia who studied 
in Swabia. My wife, Ellen Uhlmann, originally of Baden, and friends 
Juergen and Linda Dressel, originally from Bavaria, were also consulted as 
were Klaus Obermeier, originally from Bavaria, and Dagmar Lorenz, 
originally from Hamburg, somewhat less frequently. 
Very questionable data led me to form questionaires which were 
submitted to the native German instructors in the offices near mine in Cunz 
Hall at The Ohio State University. There are about a dozen there. 
In every case, the respondents were asked if the expression in question 
might be used in any fashion in High German, regardless of style level. 
3. Since there are several other differences between the present use of 
Reichenbach and Hornstein's, some further remarks might be in order. To 
begin, Hornstein emphatically does not wish his system to be understood as 
one which directly models the times that tenses are about. For example, 
his system disallows that simultaneity (Reichenbach's ',') be reflexive, so 
that E may be simultaneous with R, but not vice versa (Hornstein, 1977, 
323). (Hornstein is quite aware of this, and even explicit about it, but 
it still seems problematic to me because it makes most of his system
difficult to interpret; this cannot be pursued here, however.) The present 
system does wish to model times directly. 
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As a second point of divergence, note that Hornstein proposes that every 
tense in every natural language specifies an exhaustive linear relationship 
among speech, event and reference times. We indicated above why we reject
the idea that (English) tenses be so specified, acknowledging at the same 
time that this was at least Reichenbach's practice. Hornstein adds to 
these conditions the condition that only simultaneity(',') and precedence 
('-') be allowed in the specification, again in keeping with Reichenbach's 
practice. The proposal that tenses are universally specified this way is 
more problematic, however, because linear specifications of three para-
meters do not, in general, allow linear specification of complement tenses, 
which are a common enough feature in the world's languages. To provide an 
immediate concrete example, the German Past seems to require E,R-S, just as 
Reichenbach suggested for the English Past, but, as will be argued 
extensively below, the German Present tense might be more accurately dubbed 
a ''Nonpast," since it allows either that S-R,E or S,R,E (without being 
ambiguous). This can easily be represented linearly, e.g. as S<R=E, but 
not in a system which allows only simultaneity and proper preceaence as 
relation terms. 
4. Although Smith (1978) may be criticized on this point, her use of 
Reichenbach is like the one advocated here in many details. There is no 
attempt to specify an exhaustive linear relationship among S, E, and R 
(p.53), for example, and no attempt to find a universal tense scheme. The 
possibility of deictic specification of at least reference time is empha-
sized (p.47), and the need to analyze adverbials such 3 pm, tomorrow, etc. 
as modifiers of reference time (rather than as scope-inducing operators) is 
recognized (p.51), although it is suggested (p.49) that times named in 
adverbials such as before midday are actually reference times (i.e. midday 
itself in the example). 
The main points of divergence are that the present treatment urges that 
speech, event and reference times are all deictic {except when explicitly 
otherwise: cf. 1.7), and that these are to be formalized as contextual 
parameters in model theory. These points might be viewed as extensions of 
Smith's ideas, but clearly ones which allow a good deal of restructuring of 
the system in Smith (1978). For example, they allow us to eschew the 
construction of temporal representations, which Smith's (1978) system 
relies on. 
5. Hinrichs {1981:69-70) does argue that a fourth point of reference is 
required in addition to the customary Reichenbachian three, but only with 
reference to tense in narratives. 
6. There is an arlditional minor problem connected with (7) which 
pertains specifically to German, and which may be worth explaining here for 
the further light it sheds on the sorts of predictions that (7) makes about 
tensed formulas. In particular, for any temporal expression, X, that 
describes, but does not alter, the parameters of interpretation, (7) pre-
dicts that X will hold for subintervals of event time. This may be easier 
to state formally than it is in prose: Suppose X describes the parameters 
of interpretation without altering them, so that its rule of interpretation 
is of the form: 
As,e,r ~ X{p) iff ___ and As,e,r ~ p 
Then, (7) predicts that X will hold for subintervals of e. To see this, 
suppose that X(p) were under evaluation. By assumption, this holds iff 
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__ and As,e,r ~ p 
The 	 latter half of which, by (7), holds iff 
3e'fe such that As,e' ,r f p 
The empirical prediction is that p's holding of some subinterval e' of 
an interval e satisfying Xis sufficient guarantee of X's satisfying pat 
e. For most temporal expressions, this is harmless enough, since, if an 
interval e satisfies X, then so will its subintervals, including e' (every
subinterval of a past interval is also past). But not every temporal 
expression is so indiscriminate. A standard view of the German Present 
(which is defended in Chapter 2) is that it requires that a proposition 
hold of an interval e which is not wholly past. Some subintervals of non-
past intervals are past, however. We can therefore use the Present tense 
to test (7).
The result, not surprisingly, is that the German Present really does 
require that a proposition be true of a nonpast interval--and that a 
proposition's holding of a past interval within a nonpast interval is 
simply not sufficient to allow the Present tense proposition to be true. 
This holds whether we are speaking of simple sentences (which would also be 
covered by (7)) or conjunctions, such as (6), or (ii) below: 
(i) 	Er schreibt einen Brief  
he write a letter  
'He's writing a letter'  
(ii) 	Er isst sein Fruehstueck und schreibt einen Brief  
he eat his breakfast and  
'He's eating his breakfast and writing a letter'  
The events described in (i) and (ii) must be simultaneous with, or subse-
quent to, speech time. Even we restrict (7) so that it applies only to 
conjunctions (and not to (i)), (ii) contradicts (7)--and it contradicts it 
whether or not there are two instances of the semantic operator 'PRES' in 
(ii). (If there are two instances, they are each inrnediately problematic. 
If there is a single instance, it must distribute to each of the conjuncts, 
which are then incorrectly analyzed.) Finally, note that these proposi-
tions really must be analyzed as holding of intervals, and that these must 
be allowed to extend into the Past. (7) presents difficulties which call 
for radical revision. 
7. The second clause represents a slight modification of van Benthem's 
(1983:196) modification of Cresswell's original rule. The present formula-
tion allows that the event time of the conjunction might include times at 
which none of the conjuncts holds, so that the conjunction might e.g. be 
true of successive nonoverlapping times. 
8. The problem discussed in Note 5 doesn't arise in connection with 
rules (8) and (9) because each conjunct will be independently marked for 
tense, which its respective e must satisfy. The problem would arise if 
0there were a single tense which distributed to each of the conjuncts. 
9. The predictions which I find interesting arise from the fact that 
(9) predicts that tense in conjunctions will be understood somewhat indef-
initely (there is definite reference to an interval within which relevant 
event times indefinitely occur). I find this suspicious, but hard to test, 
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and furthermore interesting because it is a point at which the present 
theory of tense (as deictic dependent on three parameters) may make differ-
ent predictions from the theory developed in En~ (1981). in which tense is 
a deictic dependent on an unlimited sequence of times. I say that the 
theories m?y differ because it seems to me the present theory is compatible
with a revision of (9) in which definite reference to several times within 
a VP conjunction might be provided for; some similar mechanism is certainly
required to deal with sentence conjunction. 
10. But even if the exact same rules are inapplicable here, the same 
technique may be applied. The following has been adapted from Cresswell 
(1977:12): 
(i) every may combine with a common noun phrase CN, to yield an NP 
with the meaning: XPVx(CN'(x) --> SUB(P(x))}, where 1 P1 is a 
variable of the VP type. 
(ii) As,e,r FSUB(p) iff there is an e' e such that As,e' ,r ~ p. 
Taking (10} as an example, we assume that the NPs created by (i) are 
combined with finite VPs to create sentences, so that (ii) has the conse-
quence that for each brother and sister, there must be an e' (not necessa-
rily the same in each instance) which satisfies the truth conditons of the 
English Past tense and which is when that brother or sister graduated.
This is the needed set of truth conditions. 
At the risk of redundancy, let me emphasize that (i) and (ii} and (8) 
and (9) are presented here not to solve all the problems of tense combining 
with conjunction or quantification, but to demonstrate how an indexical 
treatment can deal with the phenomenon of multiple relevant event times. 
11. But recall Note 2, which suggests that all of RP might best be 
viewed as a kind of conversational implicature. 
12. This also indicates that Comrie (1981:28) is hasty in attempting to 
dispense with all mention of reference time in the Preterite, although I 
accept his general point, i.e. that one need not follow Reichenbach slav-
ishly in specify s. e, and r exhaustively for every tense (or temporal 
expression). 
13. Dowty (1977) presents an alternative account of Preterites such as 
(3) which analyzes them as past variants of futurate Presents such as The 
train leaves at midnight. If this analysis can be maintained, there may be 
no need to posit a special meaning of the Preterite. but this depends on 
the details of the analysis. Note that Dowty's analysis depends on the use 
of scope-inducing operator, which are problematic (but possible) in the 
present approach. 
14. Prior (1967:13) suggests that more than three times might be 
required in a Reichenbachian sort of system to handle the Future Perfect 
Progressive in examples such as: 
I shall have been going to see John 
which he diagrams: 
>s E 
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But it isn't clear either that R or E are understood definitely or that~ 
to+ infinitive ought to be rega~ded as a tense form {since it involves the 
use of the VP with complementizer rather than the bare infinitival VP 
{which shouldn't be taken as a criticism of Prior, since he clearly wasn't 
addressing questions about the structure of natural language.) I don't 
wish to evaluate this issue in depth, but I would also note that Prior's 
remark would point at most to the need for a fourth index, and not for the 
need for an unlimited number. 
Chapter 2: A Tense Logical Sketch of German 
The semantics proposed in Chapter 1 is illustrated here by an extended 
semantical sketch of German temporal reference . The particular elements of 
German selected for description emphasize what seem to me novel aspects of 
the proposed system--either because a particular analysis is required or 
distinctive. In addition to this, I wish to illustrate perhaps the primary 
virtue of the proposed system: it allows straightforward description of the 
complex temporal reference which may result from the interaction of even a 
few temporal elements. It is for this reason that the chapter closes with 
an examination of the interaction of schon with tense, with frame adver-
bials of the sort gestern 'yesterday,' and with durative adverbials. The 
semantics proposed for these expressions is defended, but an explicit frag-
ment cannot be provided until Chapter 3, where the syntax of these (and 
other) expressions is examined . 
2.1 	Frame Adverbials 
As Bennett and Partee (1972) propose, adverbs such as gestern 'yester-
day' or morgen 'tomorrow' may function to located time within a specified 
frame. A var1ant of this is formalized in (1) : 
(1) 	 for fa {rame adverbial  
As I f(p) iff r k [ f ]A and As,e,r I= p ,e' r 	 s e r
' ' 1 
[ f 	]A ' stands for the semantic value off in As,e,r (in the 
s,e,r 
case of gestern only sis relevant). Notice that the time designated by f 
modifies reference time for the evaluation of the remainder of the 
sentence. This aspect of the analysis of frame adverbials, viz. that they 
specify an interval within which reference time must fall, is consistent 
with Bennett and Partee's {1972) term 'frame adverbial,' and it is 
consistent within the preformal intuition of reference time as "the time 
from whose vantage point the event is viewed." This was, of course, 
Reichenbach's position on such adverbials, which figured in his famous 
analysis of the English Present Perfect (Reichenbach, 1947:294f).
Let 	us consider an example to see how (1) functions: 
(2) 	Es regnete gestern  
it rained yesterday  




As,e,r I= (3) iff r e [gestern']As and e=r<s and As,e,r I= es-regn- 1 
(2) is therefore true in the situation sketched in (4): 
(4) s > 
=::ern 'yesterday'~ 
The "derivation" in (3) obviously lacks some steps, e.g. how gestern is 
assigned the denotation of the day preceding speech time. But it illus-
trates how frame adverbials and tense interact. Note that relative scope 
is consistent with the intuitive understanding of "frame, 11 i.e. that it is 
outermost. This turns out not to be crucial; however, it seems preferable 
in the case of the Perfect. Here we just note that the frame adverbial has 
wider scope, even though this is unimportant in example (2).
Notice that (1) requires of the reference time alread~ deictically
referred to that it fall within a certain interval. We might have 
achieved much the same effect in (1) if we had required only as much as 
(1'): 
(l') A F f(p) iff there is an r' such that r' ~[ f ]As and s,e,r A b
s,e,r' r p. 
(l'} does not require that the original r fall within the time designated 
by the frame adverbial. But the relaxation of this requirement will have 
as a consequence that r is irrelevant in the evaluation of sentences with 
frame adverbials, and therefore, that virtually any sequence of sentences 
may count as temporally connected, e.g. (5) and (6). 
(5) H kam Dienstag. A war Donnerstag weg. D war.Mittwoch da. 
came Tuesday was Thursday away was Wednesday here 
'H came on Tues. A was away on Thurs. D was here on Wed.' 
(6) Mkam zur Tuer. Er ging am Tag zuvor weg. Er machte sie auf. 
came to door he went on day before away he made it open
'M came to the door. He went away the day before. He opened it.' 
But (5) and (6) don't sound at all like temporally connected discourses; 
they hardly soun1 coherent. This indicates that the stronger (1) is pre-
ferable to (1'). Notice that RP has thus forced the choice of hypothesis 
(1} over (1 ' ) • 
There is an additional, more important reason for rejecting (l') in 
favor of (1). Notice that (l'} introduces its new reference time 
indefinitely, i.e. with an existential quantifier. This suggests that 
there ought to be an asynunetry between sentences with, and those without, 
frame adverbials. In particular, it ought to be the case that sentences 
with frame adverbials are always understood indefinitely (though with 
respect to a particular interval). I want to argue that this isn't the 
case. The argument takes the same form as the argument used in 1.5.2 
against the possible "Vagueness Principle" discussed there, but the 
argument there may not be applied here without alteration (because now we 
must argue against indefiniteness over a restricted domain).
Consider then (7): 
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(7) 	Hans liess gestern die Tuer auf 
left yesterday the door open  
'Hans left the door open yesterday'  
(7) 	 seems as capable of referring to a definite time as (8): 
(8) 	Hans liess die Tuer auf  
'Hans left the door open'  
That is, (7), like (8), may be used to speak of a specific past instance of 
Hans's leaving the door open--for example in a conversation about who is to 
blame that the office door was found open today at 7:30 am. (7) (or (8)) 
might then be used to cast doubt on Hans's innocence. In this case it 
would not mean there exists some one time yesterday when he left it open
(since that would presumably be the case for almost anyone using e.g. a 
main office), but rather that he failed to close the door when he left for 
the day. 
The argument for the definite understanding of tense even in connection 
with frame adverbials may be strengthened by examining the interaction of 
tense and negation: 
(9) 	 Hans schloss gestern die Tuer nicht ab 
locked yesterday the door not up 
'Hans didn't lock the door yesterday'  
Were we to employ (1') as the semantic rule associated with frame 
adverbials, we would have the choice of assigning negation either wider or 
narrower scope with respect to the frame adverbial, i.e. either (10) or 
(11): 
(10) not{yesterday{H.lock the door) 
11 11{11) yesterday( not( 11 	 " ) 
We may ignore the role of tense at this point. But in the situation 
described above, where the cause of the morning's unlocked door is being 
sought, (9) is surely not understood as saying that there is no time 
yesterday at which he locked the door (10), since he may have locked it as 
he left for lunch. Nor is (9) understood as saying that there is at least 
one time yesterday at which Hans didn't lock the door (11), which would 
amount to saying {uninterestingly) that his day didn't consist entirely of 
locking doors. Both possible scopes of negation vis-a-vis frame adverbials 
are therefore inadequate, given the assumption that times are referred to 
indefinitely in sentences with frame adverbials. For this reason too, we 
ought therefore to prefer the analysis (1), which allows that a time may be 
understood definitely in a sentence with a frame adverbial. 
But if this shows that tense may be interpreted definitely in sentences 
with frame adverbials, it nonetheless remains that it often isn't. Thus 
Guenthner {1979) notes that {12) seems to mean that he didn't play at any 
time yesterday--and not merely that he didn't play at a particular time 
referred to. 
(12) John didn't play tennis yesterday 
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Cf. Kuhn (1979:247) for a similar point. This judgement about the 
interpretation of the sentence seems correct to me, but I believe that it 
arises as a conversational implicature from the definite interpretation of 
the sentence, i.e. that he didn't play tennis yesterday at the(±) time when 
he plays. Given this interpretation, it is a short step to conclude 
further that if he didn't play then, then he probably didn't play at all 
yesterday.
In defense of this account of the "indefinite" reading, note first that 
it is similar to the indefinite sense of the pronoun he in: 
I expected a phone company repairman, but he never showed up 
He is readily understood indefinitely here--as "no one"--even though it 
is usually taken to be definite referring. As a second point in favor of 
this account, note that we can cancel (12)'s implicature, and more readily 
understand it as referring definitely, if we can identify the time being 
referred to. To see this, suppose that I regularly play tennis on my lunch 
hour, but that I didn't show up as expected yesterday. Then it seems to me 
that the following exchange would be quite natural: 
(13) John, 	you didn't play yesterday!  
- No, I had a league match last night.  
It is more difficult to use the exact original, 'play tennis,' because in 
any situation where interlocutors know the time that John plays, they 
certainly know what he's playing. But (13) shows that the inference that 
John didn't play at all is cancellable, as is expected of conversational 
implicatures. 
I conclude therefore that temporal reference in sentences with frame 
adverbials is as {semantically) definite as it is in sentences without. 
An alternative analysis, in which temporal reference is normally 
definite, but indefinite in sentences with frame adverbials, has been 
proposed in Baeuerle (1979) and Baeuerle and Stechow {1980). Since their 
analysis also treats German temporal reference in depth, this is an 
opportune point at which to describe their work. 
Before turning to their work, a further point about (1) is worth 
noting. We might have achieved the effect of (1) e.g. in sentence (2) if 
the adverbials interpreted by (1) were to place event time within a 
specified frame directly, rather than by requiring thatreference time fall 
within the frame. The subsequent application of the Preterite tense rule, 
which requires that e=r, would then no longer be needed to ensure the 
desired consequence. As far as the interaction of frame adverbials with 
the simple Preterite tense is concerned, we might just as effectively
stipulate that frame adverbials require that e [frame adv.]A, since the 
Preterite requires that e=r<s. This would be satisfactory a~sfar as the 
simple Preterite were concerned. 
In fact, the Perfect tenses, which do not require that r=e, seem to 
show the wisdom of analyzing these adverbials as modifiers of event time 
rather than analyzing them as modifiers of reference time. Frame 
adverbials may modify event time in the Perfect tenses. Consider the 
second sentence in (14): 
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(14} 	 Ich habe A gestern gesehen. Er hatte den Brief vorgestern 
I AUX yesterday see(prt} he AUX the letter day before 
schon bekommen. 
already receive(prt} 
'I saw A yesterday. He had received the letter the day before.' 
In (14} the adverbial vorRestern is understood to specify the time at which 
he received the letter--t e event time (at least by most}. The situation 
is more complicated with the future use of the Prefect in (15}, but here, 
too, we find adverbials modifying event time. 
(15} 	 Morgen um diese Zeit habe ich die Stadt schon var zwei  
tomorrow at this time AUX I the city already ago two  
Stunden verlassen 
hours leave(prt} 
'At this time tomorrow I'll have left the city as of an hour before.' 
The var zwei Stunden phrase is understood as specifying the time at which 
'I' will actually leave in (15}. 
But the Perfect· tenses do not provide unambiguous evidence in favor of 
the analysis of frame adverbials modifying event time. In this connection, 
note (16} and (17}: 
(16} 	 Naechsten Freitag hat er es geschrieben  
next Friday AUX he it write(prt} 
'He'll have it written by next Friday'  
(17} 	 Ich habe A gesehen. Er hatte den Brief damals schon bekonwnen. 
I AUX see(prt} he AUX the letter then already get(prt} 
'I saw A. He had already gotten the letter then' 
The adverbials in (16} and (17} are understood to refer to reference time, 
not to event time. Thus (16} may be true if he writes it before Friday, 
and (17} may be true if he received the letter before then. (Sentences
such as (16} suggest, but do not force, the assignment""o'r""wider scope to 
frame adverbials. Without the future reference time, guaranteed here by 
the frame adverbial, the Perfect has the same temporal meaning as the 
Preterite. This suggests the scope assignment: frame adverbial - tense. 
The reverse scope assignment is as adequate semantically, but does not 
mirror the dependence as nicely. Because of these sorts of examples, we 
allow the generalization that frame adverbials specify reference time. 
Thus, although there are examples where frame adverbials are seen as 
modifying event time, there are also examples where they are seen as 
modifying reference time. It therefore seems necessary to allow that frame 
adverbials modify either event time or reference time; the only possible 
dispute would then be about whether one of the uses is limited to the 
Perfect tenses. 
Two very minor points favor regarding the reference time adverbials as 
the more general. First, some speakers have difficulty interpreting the 
- 42 -
adverbs in sentences such as {14) as event time modifiers. Second, the 
general conception of reference time as the time from whose vantage point 
the event is viewed suggests that it ought to be the subject of frame 
adverbials. At this point, there seems little sense in pushing this 
question. We adopt {1} as a necessary rule for the interpretation of frame 
adverbials. 
2.2 Baeuerle and Stechow's Analysis of German 
Rather than develop all of Baeuerle and Stechow's considerable 
semantical apparatus, the relevant parts of their analysis will be 
translated into the notation that has been developed here. To justify the 
translations, note that their semantic definitions take the form: 
(1) tE[p]As iff _____ 
Cf. {S3} in Baeuerle and Stechow {1980:400f). Speech time is retained as a 
parameter of interpretation. We can see that the 't' on the left of the 
epsilon in (1), which Baeuerle and Stechow call Betrachtzeit, parallels 
event time in the present description because it is the time at 
{subintervals of) which temporally atomic sentences must hold ({Sl} in 
Baeuerle and Stechow {1980:396)), and because it is a time to which deictic 
reference can be made {as can be seen in Baeuerle and Stechow 1 s (1980:397) 
discussion of their treatment of Partee's example, and as the term 
Betrachtzeit 'examined time' might suggest. This means that we can write 
(1) as (l' ) : 
(1') As,e ~ p iff ____ 
In fact, Baeuerle and Stechow (1980:412f) introduce a third parameter to 
keep track of temporal relations in the Perfect tenses (Baeuerle's
(1979:51) dismissal of three-parameter systems such as Reichenbach's 
notwithstanding), so that we can simply continue to write semantic rules in 
the form of (1 11 ): 
(1' ') As,e,r ~ p iff ____ 
Their treatment of frame adverbials, rules (SlO) and (Sll) in Baeuerle 
and Stechow (1980:408), assumes that a frame adverbial such as heute 
'today• denotes the entire present day, and proposes the rule in (2): 
(2) As,e,r ~ f(p) iff e=[f]As and As,e,r ~ p 
It may seem counterintuitive e.g. that the entire time specified by the 
frame adverbial is to be equal to event time. But (2) never operates 
except in tandem with a rule interpreting the implicit frequentative 
mindestens einmal 'at least once,• whose semantics are given in Baeuerle 
and Stechow (1980:405) as the following: 
(3) As,e,r f m.einmal 1 (p) iff 3e 1 se and As,e' ,r ~ p 
Given the fact that (2) and (3) always operate in tandem (in the 
absence of an explicit frequentative), and that frame adverbials have wider 
scope than the implicit frequentative, this treatment will obviously be 
- 43 -
equivalent to (1'} in 2.1, repeated here for convenience: 
(4) 	As,e,r ~ f(p) iff there is an e' such that e' s [ f ]As and 
As,e,r' FP· 
Baeuerle and Stechow's Preterite rule (p.400) is rendered in (5): 
(5) As e r ~ PRET(p) iff 3e'Se(e'<s) A As e', r Fp, where e'' 
' ' 	 ' .is the maximal subinterval of e before s. 
Baeuerle and Stechow must complicate the semantic rules for tenses with 
reference to "maximal subintervals" of times referred to because of their 
decision to analyze frame adverbials as specifying exactly (event) time. 
To see this, reflect that in (6), reference is made to the entire present
day: 
(6) 	 Heute war Arnim da  
today was A there  
"Arnim was there today"  
Since the interval consisting of the entire day clearly isn't past, and 
since the subintervals picked out in connection with the implicit 
frequentative mustn't allow a nonpast interval to affect the truth 
conditions of a Preterite sentence, the reference to the maximal past 
interval is required. 
2.1 presents my case against the idea that temporal reference must be 
indefinite in sentences with frame adverbials. To that point I should like 
to add three criticisms on points specific to Baeuerle and Stechow's 
implementation of the idea. First, it seems especially counterintuitive to 
allow that deictic reference might be to the entire nonpast interval 
consisting of today (or this entire week) in a sentence such as (7)--but 
exactly this is required if both (6) and (7) are to be treated in Baeuerle 
and Stechow's system: 
(7) 	Arnim war da  
was there  
'Arnim was there' 
Second, the same principle that allows that a sentence with a frame 
adverbial is true when uttered about an interval i when it is properly true 
only of a subinterval of i (i.e. true even without an implicit frequenta-
tive} will predict that sentences without frame adverbials will have this 
same property. But this is just the prediction about vagueness in temporal 
reference that was rejected in 1.5.2. That is, Baeuerle and Stechow 
predict that e.g. (8) would be true in any situation in which Arnim did any 
more than turn the stove on and off (during the time referred to}: 
(8) 	Arnim liess den Herd an 
left the stove on  
'Arnim left the stove on'  
But consider the situation in which Arnim was cooking and turned the stove 
off when he was through. If he is any sort of normal cook, he certainly 
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left the stove on while he was cooking, so that he left it on at some time 
within virtually every interval one might care to refer to. But then, as 
we maintained in 1.5.2 as well, the sentence is simply false, at least in 
the situation in which we are complaining about finding the stove on later 
in the day. 
Third, the assumption of the implicit frequentative requires a Present 
tense rule which is less than adequate: 
(9) A 	 e ~ PRES(p) iff 3e' c;.e (s<e')A As e', r ~ p wheres, ,r , , 
e' 1 is the maximal subinterval of e afters 
Given the rest of Baeuerle and Stechow's system, this semantic rule is 
required. In particular, we can't allow e' 1 in the rule above to extend 
beyonds into the past, since that, in combination with the implicit 
frequentative, would predict that a Present tense sentence could be true of 
a past time. 
The difficulty with this rule is that the Present tense is used about 
times which extend into the past. Consider e.g. (10) and (lTI: 
(10) 	 Er ist schon zwei Stunden da  
he is already two hours there  
'He's been there for two hours'  
(11) 	Er baut ein Haus  
he build a house  
'He's building a house'  
(10) is true only of intervals which extend two hours into the past, 
and (11) may be true of intervals which similarly extend into the past.
Particularly in the case of (10), there are ways in which one could try to 
preserve the analysis, but (i) there is at least at prima facie difficulty 
here, and (ii) although one can attempt to preserve the analysis, the 
attempt hasn't been made, and is not straightforward. The difficult case 
is that of (11). If this sentence has a reading which requires that he 
finish bulding the house for (11) to be true, as it almost certainly does, 
then we must allow him to have begun before speech time. It is not clear 
way how2to analyze these sentences properly within Baeuerle and Stechow's system. 
Because of these three additional difficulties with this implementation 
of the idea that temporal reference is only indirectly definite, it would 
seem worthwhile to explore alternative analyses. 
This concludes the discussion of Baeuerle and Stechow's work on the 
semantics of German tense and temporal adverbs, easily the most 
sophisticated on this subject. 
2.3 	The German Present Tense 
2.3.1 	The Semantics of the Present Tense 
A first formulation of the semantics of the Present tense might be (1): 
(1) 	Preliminar1 Present Tense Rule (Reference Time Insensitive) 
Ase r f PRES(p) iff e-<s and A Fp, , 	 s,e,r 
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An alternative, which the analysis of the Preterite in 1.6.0 should 
certainly suggest, is (1 1 ): 
(1 1 ) Present Tense Rule (Reference Time Sensitive)  
Ase r f PRES(p) iff r=e-<s and Ase r ~ p 
' ' ', 
This stipulates that the meaning of the Present tense is not that e-<s, but 
rather that r=e-<s, which is a more exact complement of the Preterite's 
r=e<s. 
We shall adopt (l' ), but the choice is conditioned largely by the 
choice of frame adverbial rules made in 2.1. {1) is a live, but less 
attractive option. We shall first discuss both rules . 
The proposal for the analysis of the Preterite in 1.5 (and continued in 
1.6) is likely to be a great deal less controversial than any proposal 
about the meaning of the Present tense. For this reason, some immediate 
comment: First, although a number of variations will be discussed, they 
will all be very close in spirit. They will all view the present and 
futurate uses of the Present tense as derived from a single nonambiguous 
tense (rather than as an ambiguous marking of present or future). This 
decision will be defended in 2.3.2 below. Second, none of the examined 
refinements can be applied to cases of the so-called "historical present" 
or "present of vivid narrative, 11 which is available in German as in many 
other languages. There does not seem to be much point in regarding these 
uses of the Present tense form as anything but distinct. They constitute a 
marked use limited to narration. Third, iterative readings are ignored 
here, just as they were ignored in considering the Preterite. 
Fourth, and most important, the refinements differ in whether they 
allow that any Present tense sentence may be understood as about a future 
time. The reason for this is quite simple: many Present tense sentences 
seem to disallow future readings. For example, (2), in the absence of 
preceding discourse, would only be understood about present time, even 
though the sentence is fine with a future adverbial, as in (2' ): 
(2) Jo ist krank 
is sick  
'Jo is sick'  
(2 1 ) Morgen ist er krank  
tomorrow is he sick  
'He'll be sick tomorrow'  
Of course, one is free to try to attribute this to pragmatics, as indeed 
the present treatment eventually will. 
Before taking up this point, let us first note that under both accounts 
the Present is not a Priorean 11Nonpast tense," true whenever there is a 
nonpast time which satisfies the radical p. (Such an account would 
conflict with the account of frame adverbials given in 2.1 in any case.)
Both (1) and (1') allow definite reference to time, which is in their 
favor. Either rule, together with the rule introducing frame adverbials 
(in 2.1), has the further immediate consequence of explaining how it is 
that (2 1 ) refers to the future. The frame adverbial rule will require that 
event time fall within the time denoted by morgen, i.e. the day after 
speech time, while both rules allow that reference time> speech time. 
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The choice of (1'} over (1} is forced by the choice of frame adverbial 
analyses made in 2.1. To see this, consider (l)'s interaction with frame 
adverbials. Morgen requires only that r fall within the time it denotes, 
i.e. the day after speech time. But then (1} predicts that the sentence er 
konmt morgen 'he is coming tomorrow' is true when r is in the day following 
s (the contribution of morgen} and e-<s (the contribution of the Present}. 
But surely the semantics must somehow require that e also fall within the 
day followings. The sentence is simply false unless the time of his 
coming really is sometime tomorrow. Because (l} says nothing about 
reference time, the modification of reference time by frame adverbials ends 
up having no effect on the truth conditions of sentences in the Present 
tense. 
It is true, but irrelevant that frame adverbials are eventually ana-
lyzed as possible modifiers of event time, because the problem here is not 
to provide another reading, but to block an incorrect one. This could be 
done e.g. by restricting the rule which allows frame adverbials to modify 
reference time, but there does not seem to be any other motivation for 
doing this. (In contrast, note that the adoption of (l'} does not commit 
us to restricting the rule which allows frame adverbials to modify event 
time since r=e according to this rule.) 
There is a further potential disadvantage of (1} as opposed to (1'}, 
viz. that it would make our account of temporally connected discourse, 
Reichenbach's Pragmatics in 1.3 above, inapplicable to nonpast discourse. 
This may be seen from the fact that RP calls for an ordering of reference 
times, while (1) makes reference time irrelevant to the truth conditions of 
Present tense sentences. This is probably not fatal: narrative, our only 
closely examined example of temporally connected discourse, is rather rare 
about nonpast time. But e.g. (3} has the feel of temporally connected 
discourse: 
(3} Ich fahre Dienstag weg. Linda faehrt mit. Bis dann hat sie 
I drive Tuesday away drive along by then AUX she 
ihre Arbeit geschrieben. 
her paper write(prt} 
'I am going away Tuesday. Linda is coming along. By then she'll have 
her paper written.• 
This discourse obeys the principle formalized above as RP. If there is a 
class of such examples, then we should prefer to analyze them of a piece 
with the examples of temporally connected discourse about past time. This 
provides a second bit of motivation for the choice of (1') over (1). 
2.3.2 Sample Derivation of Complex Truth Conditions 
It may be helpful to sketch the analysis of some examples where the 
interaction of tense and frame adverbials is important. These examples are 
straightforward: 
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(1) 	 Er kommt morgen  
he come tomorrow  
'He is coming tomorrow'  
(l') 110rgen'(PRES(er-konm-') 
As e r f (l') iff r ~ [110rgen 1 ]A and A e I= PRES(er-ko•- 1 )
' • 	 (by (1) in 2.1) s s, ,r 
To this we apply the Present tense interpretation rule, obtaining: 
iff 	r ~[110rgen 1 ]As and r=e-<s and As,e,r ~ er-k011111- 1 
Thus (1) holds in situations such as the following: 
( 2) 
--+-,s-----"'Tv=r/--f-e---r---,.---------'>>
V morgen 'tomorrow' 
Other examples are as straightforward since the reference time 
modification illustrated by (1) is general. 
(3) 	Er ist morgen da  
he is tomorrow here  
1 He 1 ll be here tomorrow'  
(3') morgen'(PRES(er-da-sei-' )) 
A ~ (3') iff r s[morgen']A and A ~ PRES(er-da-sei- 1 )s,e,r 	 s s,e,r 
(We note again that even though this is the main verb sein 'to be,' as in 
the example in (2) in 2.3.1 above, so that one might expect there to be 
some conflict between the future adverbial and the tendency of some verbs 
to be understood as referring to Present time, there is none.) Using the 
Present tense interpretation rule, we obtain that the above holds iff 
r .f. [morgen' ]A and e=r-<s and As e Fer-da-sei- 1 s 	 , ,r 
i.e. in the following sort of situation: 
(4) __________~----' .. V 	 , 
morgen 'tomorrow' 
2.3.3 Why Atelics are Presumed to Refer to Speech Time 
But we still have no explanation of why the Present tense of some 
verbs, and (2) in particular, refers only to present time (in the absence 
of future adverbials or strong pragmatic indication). 
- 48 -
(2) 	Joist krank 
is sick  
'Jo is sick'  
(2' ) 	Morgen ist er krank  
tomorrow he  
'He'll be sick tomorrow'  
We noted in 2.1 that the approach taken here to the analysis of 
definite temporal reference entails that frame adverbials are analyzed as 
modifiers of contextual parameters rather than as substitution operators 
which introduce new times to which reference would be definite. Given this 
analysis of frame adverbials, we cannot say that (2') refers to future time 
because of the future frame adverbial. The frame adverbial does not change 
the context with respect to which the rest of the sentence is semantically
evaluated, as e.g. a scope-inducing operator would. If the future reading 
of the Present tense is possible with a frame adverbial, it ought to be 
possible, within the present treatment, without one. 
We must instead explain the distinction between (2) and (2') in terms 
of a preferred reading for atelics in the Present tense, i.e. in terms of a 
(cancellable) implicature. This doesn't mean, however, that we must adopt 
one sort of explanation for the lack of future readings that one often 
hears. Acccording to this sort of explanation, it is unlikely that a 
speaker would know about future illnesses, for example, so that the hearer 
may infer that a present illness must be the one being reported (in (2)). 
But this explanation in terms of conversational implicature is unsatisfac-
tory-.-Its premise, that one is unlikely to be able to know about certain 
future events and therefore be unable to report about them, is probably 
false. After all, one can know about future illnesses if e.g. one knows 
about the causes of illnesses. The hypothesis is furthermore clearly wrong
about other examples, as the minimal pairs in (3) demonstrate (the minimal 
pairs don't differ in predictability). 
Finally, the predictability hypothesis leaves unexplained the fact that 
there is a definable class of sentences which lack the futurate reading, 
viz. the class of atelic Aktionsarten. (The distinction between telic and 
atelic Aktionsarten was introduced in 1.6.1.) Thus we have minimal pairs
such as the following: 
Telic - Ready Future Reading 
(3) 	Er baut ein Haus Es gibt Regen 
he build a house it give rain  
'He is building a house' 'There will be rain'  
or: 	 'There is rain' 
Atelic - No Ready Future Reading 
{3') Er baut an einem Haus Es regnet  
at rain(verb) 
'He is building a house [now]' 'It's raining'  
Atelic - Future Reading with Future Adverbial 
{3' ') Morgen baut er an einem .. Morgen regnet es 
tomorrow 
'He's working on a house tomorrow' 'It'll rain tomorrow' 
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A somewhat redundant caution on (3'): The fact that there is no ready 
future reading must not be taken to mean that these sentences cannot be 
used to refer to future time in the right context. Even though atelics do 
indeed normally refer to speech time in the Present tense, they can refer 
to other nonpast time if the context strongly indicates this. Since they 
can, we shall look to a explanation that depends on context. Let us 
examine one such case. We will then attempt an explanation of the special 
dependence of atelics on speech time. 
(4) is understood to be about the present (and note, for the sake of 
the hypothesis, quickly discarded above, that present time is assumed 
because it is too difficult to predicate anything about the unknown future,
that one clearly could predict it}: 
(4) 	Er ist bei seinen Eltern .  
he is at his parents 
'He is at his parents' house.'  
--unless, of course, (4) is used in a context which strongly indicates that 
the future is the relevant time. That is, (4) is normally understood to 
mean that he's there now, not that he's to be there in the future. Strong 
pragmatic indication allows the futurate reading, however. (4) would be 
appropriate in answer to a question about the future. 
(4') Was macht er morgen ? Er ist bei seinen Eltern.  
what do he tomorrow he is at his parents  
'What is he doing tomorrow? -He'll be at his parents'.'  
Similarly, (4} might follow another sentence about the future, and in this 
case also be understood about the future. 
(5} 	 Morgen gehen wir zur Kari n. Der Christoff ist da.  
tomorrow go we to K the C is there  
'Tomorrow we are going to K's. C. will be there.'  
'Tomorrow we are going to K's. c. is there.'  
(The Present tense may indicate present time as well in (5) . ) Vater 
(1975:87-90) confirms the ability of atelics to refer to future time. 
Of course, the dependence on context to determine exact temporal 
reference is reminiscent of the the dependence we noted in the Preterite, 
especially as it is used in narrative. Given the reference-time sensitive 
formulation of the Present tense semantic rule in {1'}, we can explain this 
parallelism by describing the phenomena using the same principle for past 
and nonpast time. We would assume then that (4 ' ) and (5) are temporally
connected discourses. We would suppose more specifically that the 
reference time (of the second sentences) in (4'} and (5) is "inherited" in 
the manner of RP (cf. 1.6) and that the German Present tense is dependent 
on reference time in much the same way that the German Preterite is 
{contrary to the initial formulation of Present tense semantics in (1)). 
The dependence is less obvious in the Present than it is in the Preterite, 
it might be argued, simply because narrative is less CO'J"on, indeed less 
possible, about nonpast time than it is about past time. 
This suggests that the proper way to explain the tendency of the 
Present tense of atelics to refer to nonfuture (nonpast) time is through a 
condition on reference time. We shall argue for the following principle: 
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Default Value of Reference Time 
Where reference time is not explicitly stipulated, or indicated by 
context, assume that r=s (as long as this is plausible). 
An immediate remark on the status of this default principle is in 
order. Since this is, in effect, a normally allowed inference which may be 
explicitly contradicted (cancelled), it is something on the order of a 
conversational implicature. This means, however, that the principle ought 
to be calculable from the conventional content of the utterances involved 
together with general principles of conversational interaction--which 
means, in turn, that the principle has no status of its own in the theory. 
There is no particular difficulty in seeing how the default value of 
reference time would be arrived at. When in doubt about the intended 
referents in any speech situation, we look to salient items. Thus Lewis 
(1973) suggested that definite reference was in general sensitive to a 
parameter indicating "salience." Surely speech time is the salient time in 
any speech situation. The default value of reference time thus does not 
need to be stipulated, though the principle formulated above might suggest 
this. 
One isn't completely comfortable calling this sort of principle a 
"conversational implicature. 11 It is the sort of general rule which 
certainly ought to justifiable (calculable), but it differs from well 
accepted instances of this concept in the manner in which cancellability 
may be demonstrated. We can demonstrate the cancellability of the infer-
ence from a question about ability to a request by conjoining the question 
with an explicit denial that a request is intended: 
(6) I don't want you to open it, but can you open the window? 
The same sort of conjunction sounds hopelessly garbled in the case of the 
inference that speech time is the intended reference time in Present tense 
atelics: 
(7) ?Er ist zu Hause, aber nicht jetzt, erst morgen.
he is at home but not now only tomorrow 
?'He is at home, but not now, not until tomorrow' 
We can "cancel" the default context only by including temporal expressions 
in the same clause which rule that context out (such as the frame adverbial 
in the original example (2')). For this reason I would prefer not to 
insist on the designation "conversational implicature"; there is a 
distinction between cases such as (6) where one possible inference about 
the motivation for an utterance is denied, and (7) where the default 
context must first be assumed, then rejected. 
The default rule is more closely analogous to the principles which 
determine nominal reference. Thus, we normally take the reference of he to 
be the same as a most recently used NP {with a male referent): 
(8} Susan spoke with Sam. He was furious. 
He is taken to be coreferential with Sam. But (8) may be embedded in a 
context in which another referent wouTdbe plausible, in which case the 
(default} rule that he refers the same as a most recently used NP is 
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inapplicable: 
(9) Susan's boyfriend 	is insanely jealous. Unfortunately, he 
happened to arrive while Susan spoke wi th Sam. He was furious. 
Thus, even i f the default pri nciple is not exactly a conversational 
implicature, I think that it is a natural principle determining the 
understood temporal import of sentences which is, in the sense outlined 
above, "cancellable." 
On the other hand, the principle is not very widely applicable among 
the tenses. The tenses whose semantics were investigated in Chap. 1, the 
Preterite and the Past Perfect, stipulate that e=r<s and that e<r<s 
respectively, so that the possibility that r=s is in both cases excluded. 
Of the tenses examined, only the Present allows the principle any
application whatsoever. 
For the purpose at hand, it is most important to note that it would be 
implausible to assume that r=s in the case of telic Aktionsartenin the 
Present tense. The Present tense requires that e=r, as 2.3.1 establishes. 
Thus, assuming the default value of the reference time as r=s has the 
immediate consequence that e=s, i.e . that the telic Aktionsart should hold 
of exactly the interval (or point) of time which constitutes the speech 
time. This is a consequence of the position proposed by Taylor (1977) (and 
presented in 1.6.1 above) that telics are true of unique intervals of time. 
It would be implausible to assume that this unique interval coincided 
exactly with speech time. 
For atelic Aktionsarten, on the other hand, we find no implausibility 
in the assumption that r=s. This is also related to the Taylor (1977) 
characterization: if an atelic Aktionsart holds of an interval i, then it 
holds of subintervals i' i. Thus to assume that the event time of an 
atelic coincides with speech time is not to commit oneself to anything very 
strong. The atelic may also hold of superintervals of s without 
contradiction. 
Let us note that the hypothesis that the default value of reference 
time is speech time explains the data we have encountered so far. It 
allows (i) that any sentence can have a futurate reading with strong 
pragmatic indication, or with a futurate adverbial (as e.g. the original 
(2') in 2.3.1 indicated, and (ii) that all and only telics may have future 
readings in the Present tense in the absence of either future adverbials or 
strong pragmatic indication. This is exactly the pattern of meanings which 
we set out to account for. 
Nor is the hypothesis that the default value of reference time is 
speech time without further consequences. Schon (2.6), the future use of 
Perfects (4 . 1), and noch (4.3) are all sensitive to reference time. In 
each of these cases,--ru°rther tests of the hypothesis are possible; in the 
case of schon, rather striking confirmation of the principle is possible
(2.6.3). 
Let 	us turn now to some special issues concerning the Present. 
2.3.4 	Kratzer 1 s Speech Time Pragmatics
The following phenomenon was noted by Kratzer (1978:81-82). 
(1) "Wenn ich den Satz Heute gehe ich ins Abnormitaetenkabinett 
aeussere, so habe ich das Gefuehl, dass ich etwas falsches gesagt 
- 52 -
habe, wenn ich vor ein paar Stunden schon da war und jetzt natuer-
lich nicht noch einmal hingehe. Mein Gefuehl schlaegt sich in die 
andere Richtung, wenn ich mir einen anderen Fall ansehe: 
Ich kann mich nicht mehr so recht an den Oreitagesplan von 
Rumpelstilzchen erinnern. Ich weiss, dass es vorgestern gebacken
und gestern gebraten hat, aber was in aller Welt es heute tut, das 
habe ich vergessen. So frage ich halt jemanden: 'Was macht 
Rumpelstilzchen heute?' Wenn dieser mir nun antwortet: 'Heute 
halt Rumpelstilzchen der Koenigin ihr Kind,' so wuerde ich nicht 
der Meinung sein, dass mein Gespraechspartner etwas falsches 
gesagt hat, wenn Rumpelstilzchen das Kind bereits vor der Zeit der 
Aeusserung geholt hat. 
Was die beiden Faelle unterscheidet ist das: 
Beim ersten Fall zieht mir eine Situation durch den Kopf, bei 
dem mein jetzt recht klein ist, auf keinen Fall den ganzen Tag 
einschliesst, vielleicht nur die paar Augenblicke der Aeusserung 
selbst. Es geht darum, wie ich den restlichen Tag verbringe. Und 
diesen restlichen Tag sondert hier das Praesens aus, wenn wir die 
paar Aeusserungsaugenblicke vernachlaessigen, die vorne an diesem 
Intervall noch haengen. Daher kommt der Eindruck, dass diese 
erste Aeusserung etwas Futurisches an sich hat . Anders steht es 
mit dem zweiten Beispiel: dort zaehle ich im Tagesrhythmus: Am 
ersten Tag wird gebacken, am zweiten gebraten, am dritten das Kind 
geholt. So umfasst in diesem Fall mein jetzt das gesamte heute. 
Und dies ist dann auch das Intervall, das durch das Praesens 
ausgesondert wird." 
Given a context where plans have been made for times that needn't be past, 
the Present tense may be used appropriately--so long as the speaker doesn't 
definitely know whether the plans have materialized yet. The situation is 
no different in English : if A knows that Cathy is to pick up her parents 
at the airport today, but doesn't know when, then he might respond as he 
does below: 
(2) Q: What's Cathy doing anyway ? 
A: She's picking up her parents at the airport today. 
If it later turns out that A knew that she had already picked them up, the 
answer might be regarded as deceptive (depending on whether the exact time 
of Cathy's activities is important to (Q) in (2)). Kratzer (1978:82) opts 
for regarding the sentence in (2A) as true in this situation, which is 
accomplished by allowing the entire day to count as the time of utterance 
in such contexts with "plans." According to this scheme, A might still be 
regarded as deceptive is it turns out that he knew the prior time of 
arrival, but this is because he would then have offered less than the 
relevant information--not necessarily because he told an untruth. 
Kratzer's position on the truth value of these statements seems entire-
ly correct. To see why this is so, let us consider the other case, i.e. 
where the parents have arrived before speech time in {2) without A's 
knowledge. In this case, a third, better-informed interlocutor might
offer: 
(2') B: I think she has already picked them up - this morning 
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to which (A) might plausibly respond: 
(2'') A: Perhaps she has, but she's picking them up today in any case 
If these continuations of (2) are possible, they demonstrate that the 
inference from (2A} that Cathy has not yet picked her parents up is 
cancellable in Grice's (1981) sense. This indicates that (2A) implicates,
but doesn't entail Cathy's not having picked her parents up yet. This is 
consistent with Kratzer's position, but not with one which regarded (2A) as 
false in the situation in which Cathy has picked up her parents at the time 
of utterance. 
In my opinion, Kratzer's is correct about the truth value of these 
sentences and reasonable about the mechanism she suggests to account for 
it. I mention her observations here not to improve upon them, but only 
because in the sort of situation one finds in her examples, i.e. one in 
which a plan has been made, and is "now" being carried out, a special sense 
of the Present tense evolves, and special interpretations are possible that 
have heretofore been ignored. This will be important in the following 
section. 
2.3.5 The Nonambiguity of the Present Tense 
One further aspect of the Present tense semantics, (1') in 2.3.1, 
deserves some attention. It might be supposed that each form of the German 
Present tense is ambiguously a designator of a Present or a4Future tense, rather than an unambiguous nonpast tense, as (1') requires . Hendricks 
(1981:60} cites evidence which might be regarded as indicating that the 
German Present tense is ambiguous (though Hendricks uses this data to 
argue, not for an ambiguity of tense, but rather one of aspect). 
(1) Harald 	wartet auf dem Wilhelmsplatz und Susanne auch.  
wait on the square and too  
'Harald is waiting at Wilhelm square and Susanne is, too.'  
(=both now)  
'Harald will wait at Wilhelmsquare and Susanne will,too.'  
and 	 normally: 
; 'Harald will wait at Wilhelm square and Susanne is waiting [now]' 
; 'Harald is waiting at Wilhelm square and Susanne will wait' 
Either both conjuncts are interpreted as referring to present time or both 
are interpreted to refer to future time (iterative readings are to oe 
ignored). Readings which involve one future and one present interpretation 
are strained--maybe impossible. This follows automatically from the 
assumption that the morphological marking 'Present' stands ambiguously for 
PRESENT or for FUTURE tense, and that the rule of ellipsis responsible for 
the truncated second conjunct is sensitive to which of the two tenses is 
involved. 
Before attempting an explanation of Hendricks's data, let us take care 
to note its nature. Kratzer's point about the elasticity of "intended 
speech time" must be kept in mind. Imagine e.g. in connection with (1) 
above the following situation: we are traveling to Berlin and will be 
picking up people in various cities along the way. The driver is unsure of 
whom he is to pick up next, so that he is told: 
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(2) Harald 	wartet hier auf dem Marktplatz und Susanne vor dem 
wait here at the market square and before the 
Museum in Darmstadt 
museum in D 
'Harald is 	waiting here at market square and Susanne in front of 
the museum 	 in Darmstadt' (allowing the possibility that he is there 
now and she will be there in the future] 
(2) is true in the cross-temporal interpretation, and in general, all four 
combinations are possible in this use of the Present tense. Most respon-
dents cl aim that (2) could not be true with a cross-temporal interpretation 
simply because the context involving a plan does not occur to them. The 
cross-temporal interpretation is nonetheless available here--and in most 
other cases. But, as Kratzer explains, this is simply due to the fact that 
the time planned is taken to be the time of utterance in such situations. 
Given this, the truth conditions for (2) etc. follow directly from the 
Present tense rule (1 1 ) in 2.3.1. 
There is still something to be explained here, however, namely why the 
cross-temporal readings are impossible unless we envision some sort of 
schedule, or otherwise engage in speech-time contortions . After all, we 
normally do not. Given this, we may reexamine the hypothesis that the 
Present tense is ambiguous.
Further evidence refutes this hypothesis convincingly, however. In 
particul ar, if there were two separate tenses, then one should never serve 
as the antecedent for the other in a deletion rule. As (3) indicates, 
however, this is anything but impossible: 
(3) 	 Ich arbeite jetzt am ersten Kapitel, und morgen am vierten 
I work now on first chapter and tomorrow on fourth 
'I'm working on the first chapter now, and on the fourth 
tomorrow.' 
If the tense is unambiguous, what could account for the pattern of readings 
in (1), however? 
Hendricks (1981:61) makes a case for postulating a sort of aspect for 
German which needn't be marked on the surface, but which the rule of ellip-
sis is sensitive to. This would account for the pattern in (1). It might 
also allow the pattern in (3), if one were willing to assume that the frame 
adverbials jetzt and m)rgen were optional aspectual markers (in connection 
with the Present tense. But this additional assumption would not be a 
natural addition to Hendricks's proposed analysis, according to which 
aspect correlates with durative and frequentative adverbials--so that 
Present+ (durative) = present time reference and Present+ (frequentative) 
= future time reference. No provision is made for aspect correlating with 
various sorts of frame adverbials. 
Other aspects of Hendricks's system are less than satisfactory, as 
well. For example, the distinction in aspect is said to correlate with the 
distinction between frequentative and durative adverbials. "The only 
principle which always holds is that the aspect denoted by the adverbial 
phrase never changes." (Hendricks, 1981:34) The explicit inclusion of one 
of these adverbials in (1) would be expected to force one of the readings, 
then. But it doesn't. 
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(4) H wartet eine Stunde auf dem Mktplatz und Susanne zwei Stunden 
wait one hour at the Mtsquare and two hours 
'Harald will wait an hour at market square and Susanne two hours.' 
'Harald is waiting an hour" " " " " " " ' 
(the cross-temporal readings are more accessible, too) 
Hendricks can allow for this by relinquishing the principle that aspect 
correlates immutably with adverbial type and Hendricks (1981:87-88) fore-
sees some weakening of this principle in any case in order to account for 
other data. But then the predictions of Hendricks's postulation of aspect
require some clarification. 
There are several ways of attempting to account for the readings in 
(1), but let us first note that the pattern is not general. Consider (5). 
(5) H schreibt eine Arbeit ueber Lund Seine ueber Klopstock 
write a paper about Land one about K 
'His writing a paper about Land S one ~bout Klopstock' 
(5) is true whenever H completes a paper about Lessing in nonpast time and 
S completes one about Klopstock in nonpast time as well. In particular, H 
may be writing his now, while Sis procrastinating, or vice versa. This 
essentially structureless pattern seems to hold generalTyror all telic 
Aktionsarten. This is exactly what our semantic rule (1') of 2.3.1 
predicts (at least in conjunction with the sort of rule of conjunction
discussed in 1.5.2). It is only when we turn to atelic Aktionsarten that 
we find the pattern of two futurate or two present readings and nothing
else. (6) is a near-minimal contrast to (5): 
(6) 	Hans schreibt ueber Lessing und Susanne ueber Klopstock  
write about L and about K  
'Hans is writing about Lessing and Susanne about Klopstock'  
[both now]  
'Hans will write about Lessing and Susanne about Klopstock'  
and normally:  
; 'Hans is now writing about Lessing and Susanne will write  
about Klopstock'  
; 	 'Hans will write about Lessing and Susanne is now writing 
about Klopstock' 
Given the default principle for reference time in 2.3.2, we expect an 
asymmetry in the behavior of telic vs. atelic Aktionsarten in the Present 
tense. Moreover, we normally expect that the context with respect to which 
the conjuncts are evaluated is the same. But this would mean that we 
either assume that r=s for both activities, yielding the first reading 
above, or that we do not make that assumption. But in the latter case, if 
r#s and r=e-<s, then s<e=r, and the tense (in both conjuncts) receives a 
future interpretation. When speakers report that they understand the 
conjuncts as either both about the present or both about the future, they 
have in mind that the sentence is used either in a context in which there 
is no future reference time, or one in which there is. In this way the 
only putative evidence for an ambiguity in the Present tense is accounted 
for. 
At the same time, although we normally expect the parameters of 
evaluation to be the same, they needn't be, and certainly wouldn't be taken 
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to be the 	same if this were explicitly contradictory. By appealing to a 
rule of conjunction which allows conjuncts to be true at nonidentical 
times, we 	 may admit (3) with its cross-temporal readings. This means that 
the conclusive evidence for the nonambiguity of the Present tense can be 
derived as well. 
It may also be worth noting (a) that we didn't appeal specifically to 
the Present tense rule (l') in 2.3.1 in explaining these facts, but only to 
the 	default principle for reference times; and (b) that (3), the strong 
case against the putative ambiguity of the Present tense, would retain its 
force no matter what Present tense rule were adopted. 
2.3.6 Conclusion 
(1') is a defensible rule of interpretation for the German Present 
tense. It analyzes the tense form as unambiguous, in accordance with 
standard tests, handles the interaction of the Present tense with frame 
adverbials correctly, and allows a reasonable explanation of the 
sensitivity of the Present tense to Aktionsart. It can nonetheless only be 
regarded as correct after it has been shown that it operates satisfactorily
in interactions with other temporal expressions, to which we turn directly. 
2.4 	Duratives 
The class of durative adverbials includes tagelang 'for days,' lange 
'for a long time, 1 and drei Jahre (lan~) 'for three years.' As evidenced 
in (1), these combine freely with atel1c verbs, but not with telic verbs: 
(1) 	atel ic Er wohnte tagelang bei uns  
1ange  
drei Jahre  
He lived 	 for days with us 
for a long time 
for three years 
'He lived 	with us for days' 
I II II II II II a long time' 
11 11 	 11 11 11 
' 	 for three years' 
telic * Er erledigte die Sache 	 tagelang  
1ange  
drei Jahre  
he handled the matter for days 
for 	a long time 
for three 	years 
Note that 	the Pluperfect (2) is true just in case e is of the specified 
1ength--days. 
(2) Er 	hatte tagelang bei uns gewohnt  
he AUX for days with us live{prt)  
'He had lived with us for days'  
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)""7 	 'r 
e, days long 
Thus we see that these adverbials specify the length of event time. 
This suggests the following semantic rule: 
(3) Durative 	Rule (Preliminary Version)  
ford a durative adverbial, A ~ d{p) iff s,e,r 
1. 	e is of [d]A length 
s,e,r 
2. Vt 	Se A t Fps, , r 
The formulation (3) is deceptive in that it ignores the composition of 
the durative phrases themselves {which is not of great interest). (3) does 
allow a correct analysis of (2), ~owever, which is sketched in (4): 
(4) 	 PLUP(tagelang'(bei-uns-wohn-'(er'))) 
(5) 	Ase f PLUP(tagelang'(bef-uns-wohn-'(er' ))) iff , ,r 
e<r<s (PLUP) and 1. e is of [tagelang']As length and 
2. Vt s;:e A t Fbei-uns-wohn-' {er' )s, , r 
I.e. 	(2) is true in situations such as the following: 
(6) 
) ~ 'r s 
e, at least 2 days long 
This 	is correct. 
Let us note that tense is of necessity assigned scope over the durative 
in (4). That this is required may be seen from examples where duratives 
are used with the Present tense, e.g. in er wohnt tagelang bei uns where it 
may be used to predicate something about a nonpast interval which may 
include past subintervals. If Present tense were within the scope of 
duratives, then clause (2) of definition (3) immediately above would 
require that all subintervals of e' be nonpast--but this is clearly
impossible. The consequences of this (and its further justification) are 
resumed in 3.6. 
Before adopting (3), however, let us note an interesting interaction of 
durative adverbials with frame adverbials in sentences (7): 
(7) 	Morgen wohnt er drei Jahre bei uns  
tomorrow live he three years with us  
'As of tomorrow, he'll have lived with us for three years'  
The 	 interpretation rule for frame adverbials, (1) in 2.1, specifies that r 
fall within the time denoted by the frame adverbial, i.e. tomorrow. The 
Present tense requires that r=e. If we analyze duratives as merely speci-
fying the length of event time (as we have in (2)), then (7) would seem 
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true only in situations in which a three year period falls within tomorrow. 
But (7) is quite sensible even though no such situations exist. 
We might at this point consider revising the interpretation of frame 
adverbials. Rather than require that r fall within the time specified by a 
frame adverbial, we might require only that rend within this time. This 
would provide a correct set of truth conditions for (7). But such a rule 
would have some quite counterintuitive consequences as well, since it would 
allow that e.g. (8) would be true in a situation in which Thomas finishes 
writing his dissertation tomorrow, although he may have been writing it for 
some time. 
(8) Thomas schreibt morgen seine Dissertation 
write tomorrow his dissertation  
'Thomas will write his dissertation tomorrow'  
(8) is quite clearly false in this situation, however. It is true if, and 
only if, he writes it tomorrow, i.e. substantially begins and ends. This 
suggests that it will have to be the durative rule which receives the more 
refined analysis. 
(9) 	 Durative Rule (Final Version) 
ford a durative adverbial, As ~ d(p) iff there exists e 1 
such that 	 ,e,r 
1. 	e is a final subinterval of e' 
2. 	 e' is of [d]A length 
s,e,r 
3. 	Vt f e I A t Fps, 	, r 
(9) allows the derivation of (7) 1 s correct truth conditions: 
(10) morgen 1 (PRES{JJ'(er-bei-uns-wohn- 1 [=p]))) 
(11) A e f (6) 	 iff r~aorgen 1 ]A and A ~ PRES(JJ'(p))s, 	,r s,e,r s,e,r 
which, by the rule for the Present, holds iff 
r S[110rgen']As and e=r-<s and A FJJ'(p)s,e,r 
Now we can apply the definition in (9): 
As, e, r )= 3J 1 ( P) iff there is an e' such that 
1. e is a final subinterval of e' 
2. e' is [3J']A length
s,elr
and 3. Vt~ e' As,t,r f p 
Let us summarize the truth conditions of (10). 
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As , e, r ~ (10) iff {a) rs_ [ 110rgen 1 ] A  
s,e,r  
(b) e=r-<s 
{c) there is an e' such that 
1. e is a final subinterval of e' 
2. 	 e' is [3J']A length 
s,e,r 
3. Vt~ e 1 A5 t r er-bei-uns-wohn- 1 ' ,r 
We can sketch the truth conditions of (7) as in (12): 
(12) 	 ... 
-~-~ > 
·-.~.. -~-~~~en 'tomorrow' 
e', during e:C:subinterval of 
which er bei uns wohn- holds 
Each of the truth conditions derived in (11) seems correct, and 
together they pro vi de a sufficient guarantee of the truth of ( 7). ( 9) thus 
improves on the account of duratives in the simpler (3). 
It is worth noting that clause (3) of definition (9), like clause (2) 
of definition (3), effectively prohibits anything but atelics from 
combining felicitously with durative adverbials since only atelics hold 
generally of subintervals of intervals at which they are asserted to hold 
(1.6.1). This aspect of (3) is taken from Dowty (1979:333). It is also 
worth attending to the predictions that this treatment makes about the 
Aktionsart of propositions which include duratives. Note that if a 
proposition which includes a durative is true at i, then it is not true of 
subintervals of i. Thus, somewhat surprisingly, atelic propositions to 
which duratives are added are not atelic, but rather telic. That is, er 
wohnt bei uns is atelic, but er wohnt tagelang bei uns is telic. This1s 
an automatic consequence of Taylor's {1977) proposal on Aktionsart, given 
any reasonable position on duratives. 
We have encountered two points at which telic and atelic Aktionsarten 
semantically differ: (i) in their understood reference in temporally 
connected discourse, and (ii) in their understood reference in the Present 
tense. This account of Aktionsarten and durative adverbials predicts that 
propositions which include duratives will behave as telics in these 
situations (even though the propositions with which the duratives combine 
are atelic). Both of these predictions seem to hold, with some 
qualification. Thus the second sentence in the mininarrative below is not 
understood to be about a time which overlaps with the first. The 
nonoverlap is what we expect of telics: 
(13) Hans ging hinaus. Er war stundenlang sauer. 
went out he was for-hours annoyed 
'Hans went out. He was angry for hours.•  
This may be compared to the following, where the second sentence is 
understood to refer to the same time: 
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(14) 	Hans ging hinaus. Er war sauer.  
'Hans went out. He was angry.'  
The second prediction of the classification of propositions with 
duratives as telics can also be shown to be true, though with a trifling 
qualification. Present tense sentences with duratives do tend to be 
understood as referring to present time, much as atelicS:- Thus the 
sentence below is understood to be about the two years up to the present 
(in the absence of an established future reference time), much as the 
sentence without the durative would be. 
(15) 	 Ich arbeite zwei Jahre hier  
I work two years here  
1 I have worked here for two years'  
Ich arbeite hier  
I work here  
'I work here'  
It is interesting to note that these facts are incompatible with the 
preliminary version of the durative rule, given in (3), but fully 
compatible with the final version, given in (9). We can see this in the 
following way. Our account of the tendency of atelics to be understood as 
referring to speech time postulated that it resulted from a general 
presumption that r=s, which however would be relinquished if explicitly 
contradicted, or otherwise made implausible in the assertion (as in the 
case of telics, because of the fact that they are true of unique 
intervals). Given that e=r in the Present tense, the assertion that e is 
two hours long would imply thats is likewise two hours long--which is 
surely implausible enough to warrant relinquishing the presumption that 
r=s. Thus the proposition with the durative ought to be understood as 
referring to speech time. The facts, as we have seen, are otherwise. 
(9) does not have this flaw, however, because the event time of which 
it is asserted that e=r, and presumed that r=s, needn't be two years
long--but only the final subinterval of e'. which must be two years long. 
Since speech time may always be regarded as the final subinterval of an 
interval of arbitrary length, the actual reading of (15) is predicted, 
providing an additional bit of support for (9) over (3), and for the 
account of the telic/atelic distinction in the Present (from 2.3.3).
Let us turn to the alternative means of specifying the duration of 
event time. 
2.5 Frist Adverbials 
One specifies the duration of a telic process using adverbials such as 
in einer Stunde 'in an hour,' which I will call Frist (meaning "term within 
which something happens 11 ) adverbials here (for lack of a suitable 
designation already in use). The treatment follows Dowty (1979:333) in 
requiring that this sort of adverbial be predicated of a proposition at an 
interval such that the proposition be true of that interval, but at no 
subinterval within it (cf. 1.6.1 for the use of this condition in defining 
telic Aktionsarten). 
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(1) 	 for fa Frist adverbial 
As,e,r ~ f(p) iff {a) e is at most [f]A in length and 
s,e,r 
(b) 3!tse As,t,r ~ p 
Let me clarify innnediately that (1) is intended as a sort of garbled 
logico-English paraphrase of the truth conditions which will eventually be 
derived {at greater length) for Frist adverbials. In particular, the 
manner in which [f] specifies a length will be described by rule, and the 
requirement that th~ adverbial be true of a unique interval will be ascrib-
ed to the lexical semantics of in. (1) is provided here to display enough 
of the semantics of such phrasesto demonstrate their interaction with 
other temporal elements. 
Given this understanding, (1) predicts correctly that Frist adverbials 
do not combine with atelics felicitously. This is ensured by the second 
clause, which requires that there be a unique subinterval t satisfying p. 
As Dowty {1979:335) points out, however, there are cases in which adverb-
ials such as 'in an hour' {in einer Stunde) do combine with atelics, but 
this treatment may plausibly be extended to these cases as well. (2) 
provides the relevant sort of example: 
(2) 	Er schlief in einer Stunde  
he slept in an hour  
'He was asleep in an hour'  
If we assume either (implausibly} that time isn't dense or {plausibly} that 
we may deal with closed intervals (which contain a last moment of time), 
then (2) may be analyzed as true if it is evaluated at an interval e, the 
last subinterval of which uniquelysatisfies the radical er schlaf-. This 
predicts that the sentences will be regarded as true about an event time an 
11he 11hour long at the very end of which the in question was asleep.
On the other hand, it seems to me somewhat more plausible to posit an 
ambiguity in the Frist adverbials for reasons as follows. They have the 
above meaning, to be sure, but they may in addition designate an inchoative 
proposition with any Aktionsart. This might be formalized in the following 
sort 	of rule: 
(3) 	for fa Frist adverbial, 
1A f f(p) iff (a) there is an e which follows rafter a 
s,e,r duration of [f]A length 
{b) theYe is an e' 1 such that e' is the 
initial subinterval of e'' 
(c) As ,e' •,r Fp 
(3) 	 predicts that (2) is true evaluated at reference timer just in case 
11 he 11 slept an hour later (where there is probably an implicature to the 
effect that he didn't sleep any earlier). (3) predicts that there will be 
a felt ambiguity in combinations of telics with Frist adverbials. For 
example, (4) has two distinct readings: 
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(4) 	Wir fahren in zwei Tagen nach Lissabon  
we drive in two days to Lisbon  
'We're driving to Lisbon in two days'  
= 	 'We'll take two days to drive to Lisbon' or 
'In two days we'll set out for Lisbon' 
The second reading certainly isn't predicted by (1). In particular, it 
is compatible with the actual driving taking more (or less) than two days.
Nor could one straightforwardly account for the second reading in the same 
way that the combinations of atelics with Frist adverbials are explained 
away. This is impossible because the telic w1r nach Lissabon fahr- will 
simply be false of the last moment of the5interval of evaluation--which is too short for a complete drive to Lisbon. 
(3) also predicts that a single reading will be available where a 
second instance of the Frist adverbial is deleted under identity. This 
also seems to be the case: 
(5) 	Wir fahren in zwei Tagen nach L, und die anderen in vier  
we drive in two days to L and the others in four  
'We're driving to Lin two days, and the others in four'  
= 	 'We'll take two days and the others four' or 
'We'll set out in two days and the others Tn four 1 
but: , 'We'll take two days and the others will set out in 
four' nor 
'We'll set out in twodays and the others will take 
four' 
This pattern of readings is not incompatible with the explanation of the 
"special readings" of Frist adverbials in terms of predication about closed 
intervals, since in that sort of an explanation the conjunction would be 
evaluated at a single event time, which would then presumably condition the 
same sort of reading for both conjuncts. This assumes that a satisfactory 
explanation of the second readings could be shown to depend on the interval 
event time of evaluation, which was argued above to be unlikely. 
For these two reasons I prefer to analyze the class of Frist adverbials 
as systematically ambiguous; they have both the meanings described by (1)
and (3). 
2.6 	(Temporal} schon 
2.6.1 Preliminaries 
We can now turn our attention to the adverbial particle schon, which 
has already attracted a good deal of scholarly attention: cf. Bartsch 
(1969), Altmann (1976), Koenig (1977), Koenig (1980), Frank (1980), 
Hendricks (1980), and Hoepelman and Rohrer (1981). Although some have 
maintained that it makes no contributions to truth conditions, but only to 
the presuppositions of sentences, this is clearly wrong. 
(1) 	Thomas schreibt eine Seminararbeit 
write a paper 
'Thomas is writing a paper'  
[i.e. he is now or will later] 
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Thomas schreibt schon eine Seminararbeit  
already  
'Thomas is already writing a paper'  
In any case, none of the above treatments has noticed this 
truth-conditional contribution of schon. The first sentence is true if 
Thomas is now writing the paper or will later write it, while the latter 
requires that he be writing it now. 
The analysis of the contribution of schon to truth conditional seman-
tics is the present task; we will ignore that presuppositional component of 
schon's meaning which is resgonsible for the inference that the sentence 
holds earlier than expected. Ignoring this aspect of schon's meaning 
exposes this treatment to the objection that something is being attributed 
to truth-conditional semantics which properly belongs to conventional (or 
even conversational) implicature; I am aware of this, and will be at pains 
to avoid misattribution, but still do not wish to tackle all of the tangled 
issues of (i) accounting for conventional implicature and (ii) sorting out 
exactly what it is that schon's conventional implicature amounts to. 
Hendricks (1980) is a valuable recent source on the latter, and shows how 
difficult it is to formulate a general statement of schon's presupposition. 
2.6.2 Other Uses of schon 
In examining "other" uses of schon, i.e. those which do not fit the 
analysis to be presented below, it may be useful to know what's in store 
for schon even before I present and defend the analysis. The important 
aspect which distinguishes the temporal schon, the focus of interest here, 
from the other two sorts of uses I examine 1s summed up in the following 
preliminary version of the rule: 
Preliminary Semantic Rule for schon  
As,e,r F schon'(p) iff e.,:r and As,e,r ~ p  
This analysis maintains that the import of (temporal) schon is to specify 
that event time does not extend beyond reference time. There are, however, 
instances of the form schon which do not bear this meaning. 
There are two sorts of apparent counterexample to the analysis of schon 
proposed here. First , there are examples of the sort cited by Hoepelman 
and Rohrer (1981) such as (1) (their (28) , p.108): 
(1) 	Die Oper fing an und schon schlief Hans 
the opera began and already slept H 
'No sooner had the opera begun when Hans slept [fell asleep]' 
This constitutes a counterexample to the analysis of schon proposed here 
because the event time of Hans's sleeping begins after the reference time 
established in the first clause, i.e. e-<r. But this is clearly a special 
use of schon. This is best indicated by-the fact that schon has this 
meaning only in sentence-initial position. (1) contrasts with (2): 
(2) 	Die Oper fing an . Hans schlief schon.  
'The opera began. Hans was already asleep.'  
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The meaning of schon in (2) accords with the treatment proposed here. The 
special status of the schon in (1) may also be indicated by the fact that 
it is marked as belonging to a narrative style.
Second, there are uses of schon such as (3) in which event time clearly 
follows reference time (in this case speech time): 
(3) 	Gehe weg! -Ich gehe schon.  
go away I go al ready  
'Go away! -OK, I 1 1 1 go. '  
These uses of schon are concessive or confirmatory in meaning. They may be 
distinguished from the temporal schon in several ways. First, nontemporal 
uses of schon differ in their presuppositional import from the temporal 
schon, which always invites an inference of the following sort: 
the utterance of [an expression meaning] schon p invites the  
inference that p holds earlier than expected.  
Cf. Koenig (1977), Hendricks (1981) and Hoepelman and Rohrer (1981) for 
various, and more exact formulations and for further discussion. The 
important point here is that none of the nontemporal uses of schon share 
this conventional implicature.
Among the class of 11 concessive or confirmatory" schon's I would include 
the following, brought to my attention by Ron Hendricks, in which schon p 
means approximately 'it is now certain that p. 1 First, the context (4): 
(4) Ich habe mir sagen lassen, dass der Tom entweder nach Luebeck oder 
nach Berlin faehrt. Wenn ich ihn ueberreden koennte, nach Luebeck zu 
fahren, wuerde ich mitfahren. 
'I've been told that Tom is either driving to Luebeck or to 
Berlin. If I could persuade him to go to Luebeck, I'd go along.' 
(s) Zu spaet. Er faehrt schon nach Berlin. Morgen faehrt er ab. 
too late he drive already to B tomorrow drive he away
'Too late. He's definitely driving to Berlin. He's leaving 
tomorrow. 1 
If this were a temporal use of schon, it would counterexemplify my claim 
that e<r in such cases. But note that it completely lacks the invited 
inference of temporal schon that Tom's driving to Berlin is taking place 
earlier than expected. There is at most an invitation to infer that the 
knowledge that he is driving to Berlin is available earlier than expected, 
but this is another matter. 
Second, although nontemporal uses of schon may occur in questions, they 
may never be the focus of questions, as Frank (1980:20) notes. Suppose 
e.g. 	the speaker in (5) continued with (Sb) and was answered with (Sc). 
(Sb) 	Oder faehrt er schon nach Berlin?  
or drive he sure to B  
'Or is he driving to Berlin (for sure)?'  
(Sc) Nein.  
no (= No, he's not going to Berlin.) 
Ci No, it's not sure that he's driving to Berlin.)  
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If the schon of (5) could be the focus of the question, we would expect the 
latter, impossible meaning. Temporal schon may be the focus of a question. 
(6) 	Faehrt Tom schon nach Hause?  
drive T already to home  
'Is Tom already driving home?'  
-Nein. 
'No.' (= No, he's not driving home already. (Perhaps
later.)) 
Third, some nontemporal schon's co-occur with noch, which is never 
possible with temporal schon. 
(7) 	 Ich gehe schon noch einkaufen  
I go sure yet shop(inf)  
'I'll certainly still go shopping.'  
Fourth, they often bear a markedly falling (concessive)
intonation: 
(8) 	Er arbeitet schon  
he work sure  
'Granted, he does work.' [' •. . but he never gets anything  
done.'] 
Fifth, 	many speakers allow the preposing of temporal schon, but nontem-
poral schon may never be preposed: 
(9) 	Schon drei Stunden arbeitet er  
already 3 hours work he  
'He's been working for three hours.'  
But it would be impossible to e.g. prepose the schon in (5) and have it 
retain its confirmatory meaning: 
(10) 	* Schon faehrt er nach Berlin  
sure drive he to 8  
(The preposing of schon by itself results either in the marked sort of case 
(1), or in the sort of temporal schon which has the meaning analyzed below. 
The concessive or confirmatory meaning is lost.) And in general, any 
preposed schon is temporal, never concessive or confirmatory: 
(11) 	% Schon arbeite ich drei Stunden  
already work I three hours  
only: 'I have been working for three hours.'  
never: 'Certainly I work for three hours'  
Of these points of distinction between the temporal schon to be 
analyzed below and other schon's, only the first two are tests. The third 
point, the ability to cooccur with noch comes closer to a neceesary and 
sufficient test for the concessive or confirmatory schon, but it is 
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complicated by the temporal meaning of noch itself. Not all nontemporal
schon's bear falling intonation, and onlysome speakers of German find some 
temporal schon's felicitous in fronted position. I will not make frequent 
or extensive appeal to these points of distinction between temporal schon 
and other lexemes schon, but offer them as a caution against thinkingtnat 
the analysis below has obvious and numerous counterexamples. 
2.6.3 The Truth Conditions of Temporal schon 
The contribution which schon makes to truth conditions may be seen in 
the second sentence in (1) in 2.6.1, where schon ties event time to speech
time. The sentences are repeated below for convenience. 
(1) 	Thomas schreibt eine Seminararbeit 
write a paper  
'Thomas is writing a paper'  
[i.e. he is now or will later] 
Thomas schreibt schon eine Seminararbeit  
already  
'Thomas is already writing a paper'  
This 	tie, however, is not direct, but rather via reference time, as may be 
seen in examples where reference time is distinct from speech time, for 
example where a sentence with schon is preceded by another sentence in 
connected discourse about the past, such as the following: 
(2) !ch bin 	um vier gekommen. Er war schon da.  
I AUX at four come(prt) he was already there  
1 I came at four. He was already there.•  
The indication in the second sentence in (2) is not that his presence was 
contemporaneous with speech time, but rather that it overlapped with the 
reference time (and event time) of the preceding sentence. Rule (3) 
specifies a first approximation of the semantics of schon: 
(3) Preliminary Semantic 	Rule for schon L  
A e f schon'(p) iff e<r and A F p  s, ,r 	 - s,e,r 
Let us explicate (3). As we have seen, reference time is to be 
construed as the time from whose vantage point the event is viewed. This 
is normally provided by the context of discourse, as in (2), or it may be 
fixed by the shared knowledge of interlocutors, as in the case where (4) is 
uttered about a time known to speaker and hearer: 
(4) Er 	war schon da  
he was already there  
In discourse about nonpast time, the presumption is that speech time 
essentially functions as reference time (in the unmarked case, e.g. in the 
absence of such explicit marking as frame adverbials). 
The addition of duratives to Present tense sentences with schon is 
likewise unproblematic. Consider (5): 
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(5) Sie 	arbeitet schon drei Jahre hier  
she work already three years here  
'She has worked here for three years'  
(6) 	PRES(schon'(3Y'(sie-hier-arbeit-'))) 
(7) 	As,e,r f (6) iff (a) r=e-<s (Present) 
r=s (default r) 
(b) e<r (schon) 
(c) tnere is an e' such that 
1. e is a final subinterval of e' 
2. e' is of [3Y 1 ] -length 




Sentences in connected discourse about the past, such as the second 
sentence in (2), are evaluated not with respect to a reference time iden-
tical to speech time, but rather with respect to a reference time provided 
by the preceding discourse, in accordance with RP. In this case that 
reference time is four o' clock. 
(9) 	PRET(schon'{er-da-sei- 1 )) 
(10) 	As,e, 4 f (9) iff (a) e=r<s (Preterite)  (b) e<4 (schon)  
(c) A;,e, 4 f er-da-sei-
( 11) 
________...,~r-T""(=-r-=-e).---------+s---4) 
Note that since it must hold that e=r, the analysis does not allow the case 
in which e completely precedes r, i.e. the situation in which he had been 
there, but had left before four. (2) does not allow this reading. The 
Pluperfect, rather than the Preterite, would be appropriate in cases where 
e<r<s. 
Let us note the temporal configurations which result from the 
combination of schon with the various tenses. In particular, note that, 
for all e, r: 
(12) e<r (13) e=r 
:.e<r :.e<r 
But all the German tenses require either that e<r (the Perfect tenses) or 
that e=r (the nonperfect tenses). This predicts that schon should be 
appendable salva veritate to any German sentence . Let us first note that 
schon may indeed be added to all Pluperfects, Perfect Infinitives, and 
(futurate) Perfects with no change in truth conditions. 
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(14) 	 Ich sprach mit Hans. Er hatte Marie gesehen. 
I spoke with he AUX see(prt) 
'I spoke with Hans. He had seen Marie.' 
:. Er hatte Marie schon gesehen. 
'He had already seen Marie' 
Er gab zu, es geschrieben zu haben. 
he admitted it write(prt) to AUX 
'He admitted having written it' 
:.Er gab zu, es schon geschrieben zu haben. 
'He admitted already having written it' 
Naechsten Freitag habe er die Arbeit geschrieben. 
next Friday AUX he the paper write(prt) 
1 He 1 ll have written the paper by Friday' 
.·. Naechsten Frei tag hat er die Arbeit schon geschrei ben. 
'He'll already have the paper written by next Friday' 
As a second indication that the prediction is not without merit, we note 
that schon may be added to atelics in the nonperfect tenses without 
changing truth conditions. 
(15 ) Er i st da 
'He is there' 
Er war da 
'He was there' 
:.Er ist schon da 
1 He is already there' 
:.Er war schon da 
'He was already there' 
Finally, we note that the addition of schon to sentences with frame 
adverbials will likewise not affect truth conditions. This follows 
directly from the fact that frame adverbials only specify reference time 
and therefore have nothing to say about the relative chronology of event 
and reference time. (tn 2.6.4 we return to the examples where schon may 
not be added without affecting truth conditions.) 
It was probably with sentences such as those in (14) and {15) in mind 
that it was proposed that the only contribution of schon was to 
conventional implicature since the validity of these inferences is 
compatible not only with the meaning proposed in (3), but also with the 
hypothesis that schon is devoid of truth-conditional meaning. Positive 
evidence in favor of something like (3) must therefore take the form of 
demonstrating that schon is (truth-conditionally) incompatible with some 
temporal expressions. In this connection, note that although there are no 
tenses in German which stipulate anything incompatible with e<r, there is 
one use of the subjuctive mood, that of past anticipatory narration, which 
apparently does (in calling this 'mood' modus, I follow standard and tradi-
tional terminology, as in Heidolph et al., l981:520f; the term 'past
anticipatory narration' is my own). Consider (16): 
(16) 	 Er sagte, er wuerde helfen 
he said he would help 
'He said he would help' 
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Er verzog sich, ohne das Angebot anzunehmen. Er wuerde  
he withdrew self without the offer accept he would  
es sich ueberlegen. Die anderen diskutierten weiter.  
it self think-over the others discussed further  
'He withdrew without accepting the offer. He'd think it over. The 
others kept talking.' 
The second example illustrates the use of the this form in temporally 
connected discourse to signal an event posterior to those being recounted 
in the simple Past. Given that reference times are ordered in this sort of 
discourse, the Anticipatory must be analyzed as requiring that r<e. This 
use has a literary flavor, and the tone of prophecy, but that doesn't 
affect the point at hand, viz. that it specifies that r<e. 
The first sentence in (16} is similar in temporal import, even if more 
obviously subjunctive (the clause does not refer to his actually helping) . 
Note that the subjuctive "flavor" of this use of wuerde does not (at least 
not obviously) conflict with the conventional implicature associated with 
schon. We therefore would expect this tense/mood to combine felicitously 
with temporal schon if temporal schon has no truth-conditional meaning. 
If, on the otherliand, temporal schon has the temporal meaning hypothesized
in (3), e<r, then it should not combine felicitously with the anticipatory,
which requires that r<e. 
Let us therefore examine the combination of schon with the examples of 
wuerde in (16): 
(16') 	Er sagte, er wuerde schon helfen  
'He said he'd certainly help'  
(16') has the expected meaning of the confirmatory schon, and lacks the 
expected presuppostion of temporal schon that his helping is to occur 
earlier than expected. There is likewise no possibility of making this 
schon the focus of a question: 
(16' ')*Hat er gesagt, dass er schon helfen wuerde?  
AUX he say(prt) COMP he help would  
It seems therefore that temporal schon cannot combine with this example of 
the subjunctive mood/tense. 
Let us examine the second example in (16) as well. 
(17} 	 Er verzog sich ••• Er wuerde es sich schon ueberlegen 
'He withdrew ••• He would certainly think it over. '  
We find again the expected meaning of the confirmatory schon, and no 
conventional implicature that his thinking will take place any earlier than 
expected. The attempt to make schon the focus of a question is likewise 
unsuccessful: 
(17') 	Wuerde er es sich schon ueberlegen?  
would he it self think-over  
'Would he think it over already?' [i.e. now]  
- --
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That is, we may combine schon with the wuerde- form, but only in a 
different, more clearly subjunctive sense. The fact that the anticipatory 
sense of the form is impossible here confirms the hypothesis that the 
temporal import of schon is e<r, since it is this meaning which would 
cont7adict the mean,ngof the-Anticipatory sense of the subjunctive, i.e. r<e. 
2.6.4 schon with Telic Aktionsarten 
Weround at least three sort of evidence confirming the analysis of 
schon's meaning as e<r, so that we can proceed to further cases with a 
modicum of confidenc~. Let us recall the effect of using schon together 
with telics, as in the second sentence in (1) in 2. 1: --
(1) Thomas schreibt eine Seminararbeit 
write a paper 
'Thomas is writing a paper'  
[i.e. he is now or will later] 
Thomas schreibt schon eine Seminararbeit  
a1ready 
'Thomas is already writing a paper'  
The application of the proposed truth conditions for sentences with schon 
to the second sentence in (1) in 2.6 is straightforward . The sentence 
receives the analysis: 
(2) p FPres(schon'(er-eine-Seminararbeit-schreib-' )) 
which is evaluated in (3): 
(3) A f p iff  
S,e,r(a) e=r-<s (Present tense rule)  
(b) e<r L (schon's meaning) 
(c) A-s.e , r F er-efne-Seminararbeit-schreib-' 
These conditions hold jointly in situations such as (4) : 
(4)__--4--t---------------~ 
s ~ 
(a) and (b) in combination require that e not completely precedes and that 
e not extend beyond r. These conditions are jointly met in situations such 
as (4). The difficulty, as we noted in 2.6.1, is that such sentences are 
understood to refer to present time, and not to arbitrary nonpast time. 
Since we have found some support for the hypothesis that schon requires 
that e<r, let's not immediately discard it, but instead try to reconcile it 
with the fact that sentences such as that in (1) are understood to refer to 
present time. We introduced a pragmatic principle in 2.3.3 to explain why 
atelics are understood to refer to present time in spite of the fact that 
the Present tense requires only that they be understood to refer to nonpast 
time . We suggested there that the default value for reference time is 
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speech time, so that sentences would be understood as about speech time in 
the absence of indication to the contrary. Suppose then that this were the 
cause of the present time understanding of sentences such as that in (1).
Then we would derive the following set of truth conditions: 
{3 1 ) 	 A e f p iff 
s, 	,r {a} e=r-<s {Present tense rule) 
{b) 	 e<r (schon's meaning) 
{c) 	 r=s default value for r 
(d) 	 As,e,r f er-eine-Seafnararbeit-schrefb-' 
This set of truth conditions would require the second sentence in (1) 
to be true in situations such as (5): 
(5) ------+--------------s=e=r 
I.e. the event time of the telic would have to coincide with speech time 
for the sentence to hold. Of course, this consequence is unacceptable 
simeliciter. But it might well hold of an imperfective reading for the 
tel1c, which suggests the following modification of the semantic rule for 
schon: 
(6) 	 schon's Semantic Rule (Final Version {for stricter varieties)) 
As,e,r f schon'(p) iff e<r and 
Tf e~r, then A ~ p 
and if e=r, then A!:::~ F PROG(p). 
where 1 PROG 1 is to be given the meaning of the English progressive 
marker. 
The important point about (6) is that it licenses an imperfective reading 
for telics in combination with schon for those tenses where e=r, i.e. the 
Present and the Preterite. In doing this, it explains how the {imperfec-
tive reading of the) telic could be thought to hold of speech time, since 
it characteristic of imperfective readings {be writing the book) that they 
may hold of smaller intervals than the intervals at which perfectives hold. 
Thus, he may be writing the book from 3:00 to 3:05 even if he certainly 
cannot write the book during that time. 
(6) makes a further prediction, however, that we may find an analogue 
of the "Imperfective Paradox 11 in telics with schon. Dowty {1977) coined 
the termed 11 Imperfective Paradox" to describe the invalidity of the 
inference from Imperfective to Perfective that we see in (7): 
(7) 	 Tom was reading Finnegan's Wake  
:. Tom read Finnegan's Wake  
Tom is reading Finnegan's Wake  
.·.Tom will read Finnegan's Wake  
The prediction that German telics with schon will display an analogue of 
the imperfective paradox is not forced on us by the model theory, but it is 
nonetheless expected because it is the linguistic concomitant of allowing a 
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telic to be true of a subinterval. 
The prediction holds, as (8) documents: 
(8) Ich lernte ihn 1980 kennen. Er schrieb schon die Diss. 
I met him [met] he wrote the diss. 
1 I met him in 1980 1 'He was al ready writing his dissertation' 
:.Er schrieb die Diss (fertig) 
1 He wrote his dissertation' 
Das Orchester spielt schon den zweiten Satz 
the orchestra play the second movement 
'The orchestra is already playing the second movement' 
:.Das Orchester spielt den zweiten Satz (zu Ende) 
'The orchestra will play/is playing the second movement' 
(There is a difficulty with the data here, prompting the parenthetical 
material, to which we return below.) 
Dowty {1977, 1979:149) provides a semantics for the Progressive marker 
by first defining a function Inr from possible worlds wand times i to sets 
of possible worlds which represent the "natural possible outcomes" of w at 
I. Then the Progressive is defined as follows (ignoring complications 
which are irrelevant here): 
{9) Ae,w ~ PROG(p) iff 3 e' 2 e(Vw' Inr(w,e){Ae' ,w' f p)) 
(This definition is not legitimate in the present framework since it 
appeals to intensional semantics, which haven't been provided for. But it 
indicates the sort of definition required in a more elaborate treatment.) 
The important point for the present purposes is that this semantics allows 
that a Progressive sentence PROG(p) might be true at an interval even if 
there is no actual superinterval at which the sentence p itself is true. 
This happens whenever a natural outcome is somehow frustrated--when a book 
is begun but not finished, or when a movement is interrupted. Let us 
accept this semantics for the subinterval readings we noticed in connection 
with schon's use in the Present so that we can provide a sketch of these 
semantics. 
We had progressed to the point that the sentence Er schreibt schon 
eine Seminararbeit would be analyzed as true at s,e,r {in a situation 
without a we11 established future reference time) iff 
(10) As,s,s f PROG(er-eine-Seminararbeit-schreib- 1 ) 
i.e. in the situation in (5), repeated here: 
(5) ------.~.-c,r-=-e_=_r_________ _ _ 
(9) prescribes the evaluation of (10). (10) thus holds iff there is a 
superinterval of s, e', such that er-eine-Senainararbeit-schreib-' holds at 
e 1 in every natural outcome of the (actual) world at s. (9) foresees that 
- 73 -
er-eine-Seminararbeit-schreib- must hold in series of alternative worlds at 
superintervals of actual speech time: 
(1) 	Er schrefbt schon eine Seminararbeit  
he write already a paper  
'He's already writing a paper'  
( 11) 
---~v-s---,,e-.-----------wl 
v.. -natural outcomes 
of actual w at s 
t.,n 
Thus the original sentence (1) may hold of the the speech interval even 
though the sentence to which schon is added may never hold (in the actual 
world). 
We were led to this prediction by the noticing that Present telics with 
schon are understood to refer to speech time; given that, the assumption 
that the default value of reference time is speech time, and the 
improbability that a telic could hold exactly of the speech time interval, 
it is a short step to the hypothesis that these sentences must be referring 
imperfectively to speech time. The fact that this turns out to be the case 
should be taken to confirm the assumption that speech time is the default 
value for reference time. But more interesting in this account is the fact 
schon plays absolutely no role in the explanation of the phenomenon, even 
though it occasioned the observation, and it seems to be the reliable 
concomitant of the imperfective readingsof the telics. 
The question arises at this point as to why schon forces this present
time reading. and why (and whether) it doesn't arise without schon. 
(Addressing the first question, we might note that since the sole effect of 
schon is to order event time with respect to reference time, reference time 
ought to be readily identifiable, and the default value is there for cases 
where no other times are identifiable.) The logically prior question is 
clearly whether there are imperfective readings without schon. This 
question returns us to the data in (8), and, with qualif1cat1ons, the 
answer seems to be positive: 
(12) 	% Als ich ihn kennenlernte, schrieb er die Diss  
when I him meet(prt) wrote he the diss  
'When I met him, he was writing his dissertation'  
Some speakers insist that (12) is impossible, and that it should end as 
(13): 
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(13) ... schri eb er an der Diss 
at  
' ... ~e was working on his dissertation'  
For these speakers (who do accept (8)), schon doe5 indeed seem to be the 
license for the imperfective reading, so that the truth conditions for 
schon in (6) do seem to be fully correct. Imperfective readings are 
possible only with schon, and only in the Present and the Preterite, those 
tenses where e=r. TfiTsis just as (6) specifies (and we call (6) the rule 
for the ''stricter" variety, because this variety disallows (12)). 
For speakers who accept (12), on the other hand, other provisions for 
imperfective readings of telics must be made. For these speakers, we may 
replace (6) with the simpler (14): 
(14) A P ~ schon'(p) iff e_:.r and As Pr f pS,-,r ,., 
and the provision for imperfective readings of telics must be elsewhere. A 
first approximation might be (15): 
(15) If pis an atomic telic sentence, then Ase r F p iff 
(i) I(p,e)=l or ' ' 
(ii) e=r and Je' .=e(Vw' Inr(e,w)(I(p,e'w• }=1)) 
(As we noted above, this definition is not completely legitimate in the 
present treatment since we haven't made provision for intensional 
semantics. It indicates how we would provide for the imperfective reading 
in a more elaborate semantics.)
It is important to note that (15) does not allow that te1ics are 
generally imperfective--and that the condition for telic readings, i.e. 
that e=r in (15), might be made more restrictive. This is important 
because the distinction between telic and atelic Aktionsarten, for'llulated 
in 1.6.1, depends on telic Aktionsarten not generally holding of 
subintervals. If telics in general allowed imperfective readings, the 
distinction (as formulated) there would become rather empty. 
This concludes the discussion of the use of schon with te1ic 
Aktionsarten. The rules in (14) and (15) account for the imperfective 
reading of telics in the Present and the Preterite for those (more liberal) 
varieties which allow this, while (6) accounts for the (stricter) varieites 
in which imperfective readings occur only in combination with schon. 
I conclude then that the employment of the Reichenbachian concept of 
reference time allows a correct and quite simple formulation of this adver-
bial particle's semantics . 
2.7 Summary of Semantic Rules Presented Thus Far 
This closes the introductory sketch of the semantics of German temporal 
expressions. Chapter Three embeds the semantical sketch just presented in 
a formal fragment. We have introduced the rules below: 
From 1. 3: 
Definition: For all intervals i, j, all points of time t, t', 
1<J iff VtEi Vt' Ej t<t' (read: 'i completely precedes j') 
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Definition: For all intervals i, j, all points of time t, t 1 , 
1_:J 1ff VtEi 3t'Ej t_:t' (read: 'i does not extend beyond j') 
Reichenbach's Pragmatics (RP) (weak version} For S , S , ••. ,s a 
sequence of sentences about the past uttered in a tJmpo~ally Eonnected 
discourse: 
(i) r(Si)..: r(Si+l) 
where r(S) is the reference time of S. 
From 	1.4: 
(1) fort an interval, pan atomic proposition I(p,t)= 0 or= 1 
(2) for atomic p, models A, speech times s, event times e, and 
reference times r: Ase ~ p iff I(p,e)=l, i.e. p holds ate.
' ,r 
From 1. 5: 
Indefinite Temporal Reference 
Ase r ~ mal'(p) iff 3e'£e and Ase' r f p, , , ' 
From 1.6: 
(2) 	Preterite (final version) 
for all Al s, e, r, and p: 
Ase 	r i PRET(p) iff e=r<s and As,e,r I= p 
' '  
From 	1. 7: 
Pluperfect L 
A PLUP(p) iff e<r<s and As,e,r ~ Ps,e,r r 
From 2.1: 
Frame Adverbials 
(1) 	 for fa frame adverbial 
A ~ f(p) iff r f[ f ]A and As e r FP s,e,r 	 s,e,r , , 
where '[ f ]A ' stands for the semantic value off with 
s,e,r 
respect to As,e,r 
From 	2.3: 
Present  
(l') A ~ PRES(p) iff r=e-<s and A er Fp. s,e,r 	 5 , , 
If A = PRES(p) and pis atelic, then it is conversationally




(5) 	 ford a durative adverbial,  
A f d(p) iff there exists an e' such that  
s,e,r 1. e is a final subinterval of e• 
2. 	e 1 is of [ d ]A length 
s,e,r 
3. Vt ~ e· Ast r~ p 
' 	 J 
From 	2.5: 
(1) for fa Frist 	adverbial 
As,e,r F f(p) iff (a) e is at most [f]A in length and 
s,e,r 
(b) 3!tse As,t,r F p 
(3) 	for fa Frist adverbial, 
As ,e, r F f(p) iff (a) there is an e
1 which follows rafter a 
duration of [f]A length 
(b) 	 there is an e' 1 such that e 1 is the 
initial subinterval of e 11 
(c) As,e', ,r F P 
From 	2.6: 
(3) schon (Stricter Variety) 
A 	 f schon 1 (p) iff e<r and  
s,e,r if e-;-r, then A F PROG(p) 
s,e,r 
if e/r, then As,e,r f p. 
Notes--Chapter 2 
1. This position has its problems, however. Adverbials "off the time 
line" are occasionally used quite felicitously, as in: 
Arno kam Montag vorbei. Am Samstag war er beim Friseur  
A came Monday by on Saturday AUX(Pret) he at barber  
gewesen. Er sah noch frisch geschlachtet aus.  
be{prt) he look yet fresh slaughtered out(Pref)  
'Arno came by on Monday. He had been at the barber's on Saturday.
He still had that freshly slaughtered look.' 
The am Samsta6in the second sentence clearly doesn't refer to reference time, which,y RP, must not precede the reference time in the first sen-
tence. Am Samstag is understood to modify event time here: normally the 
sentence would be taken to mean that the haircut took place on Saturday.
This is incompatible with {1) and is in marked distinction to the 
adverbials in {5) and (6), which place an upper bound on event time. 
If we analyze the Pluperfect as requiring that e<r<s, as 
Reichenbach suggested, and retain (1) as presently formulated, we have no 
choice but to allow that there exists a second class of adverbials which 
modify e directly. In particular, in this framework we haven't the option 
of analyzing sentences such as the one above as differing from (5) and (6)
only in scope (i.e. of having the scope relations: tense(frame 
adverbial(p))), for this would imply that r in the second sentence above is 
on Saturday, and therefore that the sequence of r's isn't properly ordered 
in the sense of RP. The other, standard order of frame adv.(tense(p)) 
would imply the same and that the haircut took place before the time 
modified by am Samstag in (15). Neither of these options 1s tolerable. 
Of course, we always have the option of trying to revise radically. In 
this case, with the goal of obtaining a single principle of interpretation 
for adverbials, we should probably insist that all adverbials be taken to 
modify one index. Let's examine the possibility formalized in (1), i.e. 
where the adverbials are taken to modify r. The same sorts of problems 
arise if we take the adverbials to modify e consistently. (1) can be of 
use, as we have seen in the examination of (3)-(6). How might (1) be ap-
plied then to cases such as the one aboven We note that this is a tempor-
ally connected discourse, so that we might suppose that r{S1)~r(S?)<r{S3).But then it cannot be, as (1) stipulates, that r(S )< Monday and ~(S?)< 
{the previous) Saturday, for any time within Mond;g must extend beyond-any 
time within Saturday. Since the principle of ordering of reference times 
(RP) couldn't be relinquished without great loss, we would be forced to 
give up the claim in (1) that frame adverbials modify rand replace it.with 
the weaker claim that they only shift r. But this is just (1'), which we 
rejected earlier because it, too, is incompatible with the characterization 
of temporally connected discourse we have in (RP). It seems that in order 
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to win a unified principle of interpretation for frame adverbials, we have 
to sacrifice our characterization of temporally connected discourse. A 
Pyrrhic victory, at best. 
The required analysis must recognize a second class of temporal adver-
bials (or perhaps a special interaction of frame adverbials and the Perfect 
tenses), whose introduction and formal semantics will be postponed until 
4.2, after the Perfect tenses have been introduced. We can note even now, 
however, that a second class of adverbials would creates no new readings in 
connection with the Present and Preterite tenses because it would consist 
of adverbs which modify event time. The reference-time-modifying adver-
bials described in (1) have the same effect in the Present and Preterite 
tenses because reference and event times there are the same. It is also 
uncomplicated to restrict the occurence of the adverbials to clauses with 
Perfect tenses (since these will bear distinct features). 
2. The obvious move to take to try to preserve Baeuerle and Stechow's 
analysis in view of (10) would be to try to analyze the durative so that 
the reference to past time may be traced to its use in (10). For example, 
one might propose that a sentence with a durative is true at an event time 
just in case there is a time of the length specified by the durative which 
ends at the event time being evaluated. This analysis is formalized, and 
afsniissed, in 2.4. 
3. Connected discourses formulated in the Present tense about the 
future are much less felicitous than those formulated in the Preterite 
about the past, however. Many native speakers, when confronted with a 
sequence such as the following, spontaneously revise: 
Wir holen Claudia ab. Mit ihr fahren wir nach Koeln. -->  
" " " " Dann fahren wir mit ihr nach Koeln.  
No such revisions are ever required in Preterite narratives, however. This 
asymmetry indicates that connected discourse (such as the above, or (5) in 
the text) is different in the Present and the Preterite, and that the two 
shouldn't be conflated. The fact that such sequences are interpreted as 
describing sequences of times (where they are interpreted) may be attri-
buted to general conversational principles to the effect that one is to 
construe one's conversation partner as purposeful, and that it is more 
likely to serve a purpose to tell a single connected story than it is to 
list a series of unconnected events. 
On the other hand, some native speakers accept the minidiscourses 
without complaint, and everyone agrees on their sequential understanding, 
if pressed to interpret them somehow. 
4. Hornstein (1977), which is presented briefly in Chapter 1 above , is 
committed to regarding any nonpast tense as ambiguous. 
5. Note as well thatTt would be impossible in this system, at least 
without very extensive revision, to allow that a proposition might formally 
count as true at a subinterval at which it is, in fact, true. That is, if 
we allowed that He reads the book were true of each moment at which he were 
reading it, rather than only of the entire interval at which he reads it, 
then we would simultaneously allow that the telic proposition true at i is 
true of subinterval s i' i . The characterization of the telic/atelic -
distinction would collapse. 
Nor, interestingly enough, would there be room for allowing a proposi-
tion to count as true at a super,nterval at which it in fact holds. But 
this is the subject of 1.5.2, on the vagueness principle. 
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6. erst makes the same contributions to truth conditions, but has the 
opposite presuppositional meaning--that something is happening somewhat 
later than expected. 
7. There is a instance of the form schon used in sentences with inde-
finite Preterite sense, in which schon does not locate event times with 
respect to a past reference time, but rather with respect to speech time. 
(i) C war schon mal in Luebeck 
was already once in L  
'Chas been in Luebeck'  
We could accol'llllodate the reading in which schon locates event time with 
respect to speech time by using a rule which combined schon and mal in a 
special way (allowing that the other reading, in which reference""tfme 
equals event time, is alright). But it is worth noting that this need not 
be analyzed as an instance of temporal schon in my analysis. 
Note that schon adds nothing to the truth conditions of the sentence 
above; it is truth-conditionally equivalent to the same sentence without 
schon . 
C war mal in Luebeck  
was once in L  
'Chas been in Luebeck'  
Chapter 2.6.2 introduces several tests to distinguish temporal from nontem-
poral schon, by means of which we can show that the above is nontemporal. 
Note e.g. the ill-formedness of 
* Schon mal war C in Luebeck 
The original sentence (i) could be uttered in the absence of an estab-
lished past reference time, however, so that it might be taken as evidence 
against my claim {in the text) that (temporal) schon is inappropriate in 
the absence of an established reference time. Even if this claim is re-
jected, however, principle (2) still cannot stand. 
Suppose then that schon has a consistent semantics amounting to approx-
imately 11 schon(p) is true iff p is true as of the reference time, 11 and that 
(i) is an example of temporal schon (the tests in 1.12 notwithstanding). 
Then sentences such as (i) indicate that the reference time of sentences 
with indefinite Preterites is speech time, not event time. But this 
contradicts the definition of the Preterite in 1.5, so that (2) is wrong. 
Chapter 3: A Fragment of German 
Chapter 1 implicitly contains a number of promissory notes. In 
suggesting that German temporal reference arises from the interplay of the 
primitive temporal reference of tense and various sorts of adverbials (and 
pragmatics), the chapter foresees not only a description of the primitive 
temporal terms but also an account of their interaction. And while a 
number of temporal elements are described exactly there, their interaction 
has been specified only in the roughest of approximations. Some required 
scope relationships have been noted, but there is no account yet of how 
these arise, nor how they interact with nontemporal semantics. It is the 
task of the present chapter to provide this account, by providing a 
rigorous description of a fragment of German. This is accomplished in 
standard fashion: a set of recursive rules is provided whose combined 
effect is to define an infinite number of expressions and to assign a model 
theoretic interpretation to each expression. It is predicted that these 
expressions (under appropriate conditions) will be regarded as well formed 
in German and as having the meanings assigned by the rules. 
The choice to describe a fragment rigorously, rather than e.g. to 
provide a less exact description (as in Chapter 1), represents a choice of 
detail over scope, and an emphasis on fine structure rather than extent. 
The peril that one might adopt solutions appropriate to the fragment but 
which would prove inadequate in a more ambitious project, is ever present. 
The only safety would lie in considering all potential data, including that 
which is beyond the actual fragment. Since this is impossible, there is no 
absolute security in this matter. 
The choice to describe a fragment further necessitates a choice of 
grammatical apparatus. Rules are not written neutrally. The fragment 
below is described in Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar (GPSG}, which 
admits only context-free (CF) rules, and consequently, only context-free 
grammars. GPSG is of interest because its basic assumption, that human 
languages are context-free, is the strongest of seriously entertained by 
linguists presently. It has furthermore been persuasively argued that this 
strong hypothesis about the range of possible human languages needn't be 
obtained at the cost of complicated or inelegant grammatical descriptions. 
Two further factors actuate my choice of GPSG as grammat1cal theory. 
First, there is little work on German in this framework, and no extensive 
work on temporal phenomena at all so that the fragment to be presented 
represents new testing ground for the theory, and is therefore of some 
immediate intrinsic interest. Second, context-free rules are a sort of 
conmon denominator in linguistic descriptions. Virtually all theories use 
context-free rules at one point or another. If the rules below are worth 
using, then they can be used by grammarians o2all persuasions, since they are readily translated into other frameworks. This wouldn'J be generally 
true of the rules in any other {less restrictive) framework. 
3.1 GPSG: Formalism and Notation 
{Gazdar {1981) and Gazdar (1982) are the sources of the material in 
this section.) In place of the customary notation for syntactic rules, 
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given in (1), GPSG uses the notation in (2). Either one or two justifies
the (partial) trees in (3). 
(1) A-~ A1 ... An S -~ NP VP 
(2) [A A1 ••• An] [ 5 NP VP] 
(3) A s ~ ~ 
Al ••• An NP VP 
The rules in (2) are phrase structure rules, or PS rules. 
GPSG makes extensive and critical use of syntactic features, much as 
many other theories. Cf. e.g. Jackendoff (1977). For example, to handle 
number agreement between subject and verb, rule (2) is actually written as 
(4): 
(4) [s NP[+n] VP[+n]] 
where n ranges over singular and plural. Thus (4) effectively abbreviates 
the doubleton set of rules ,n (5): 
Transformational Grammar has criticized the use of sets of PS rules such 
astually written as (4): 
(4) [s NP[+n] VP[+n]J 
where n ranges over singular and plural. Thus (4) effectively abbreviates 
the doubleton set of rules in (5): 
<5) [s NP[+sing] VP[+sing] J 
Transformational Grammar has criticized the use of sets of PS rules such as 
(5), based on the fact that, while the two rules are obviously closely 
related, they are nonetheless two distinct rules as formalized in (5).
This glar·ing deficiency is quite absent in (4), however, which demonstrates 
that it is not a fault of PS rules per se, but rather a fault of PS rules 
which forbid the use of syntactic features. 
The use of metarules is a second important GPSG innovation. A metarule 
always has the following form: 
(6) If R1 is a rule of G, then R1' is a rule of G. 
Consider as an example--not an analysis--how a metarule might be 
employed in the description of agentless passives. We first assume that we 
have rules in our grammar of English which might be used to describe active 
verb phrases. Among these might be the rules in (7): 
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(7) [VP V NP ] 	 see a ghost 
V ] 	 die[VP 
V NP PP] 	 compare him to a bird [VP 
Given these rules, the metarule (MR) in (8) has the consequence that the 
rules in (9) are also part of our grammar. 
(8) 	 If [VP V NP X] is a rule, so is [VP V X] a rule.  
[+pass]  
(9) 	 [VP V] seen  
[+pass]  
[VP V pp] compared to a bird  
[+pass]  
We suppose that all features in the inputs of (8) are retained in its 
outputs unless specifically mentioned in the rule. In particular, the 
lexical class of the verb (which is a feature of a special type in GPSG)
doesn't change. 
The crucial difference between a rule such as (8) and a transfor-
mational rule of passive concerns the status accorded the rule in the 
derivation of sentences. Transformations map phrase structure trees into 
trees and thus apply in the course of derivations. MR's do not. Instead, 
they license PS rules on the basis of other rules. At no point in the 
derivation of a sentence is a MR applied. It is applied instead to map
(sets of) rules into (sets of) rules, thus deriving new grammars, and fs 
therefore best conceived as distinct from the rules of a gra11111ar proper.
Hence the term 11metarule 11 in the "metagrammar. 11 
A third important innovation in GPSG concerns the treatment of lexical 
classes. The rules in GPSG are numbered, so that e.g. the rules in (7) 
might bear the numbers as indicated in (10). The number may be thought of 
as a marker for a lexical class , which bears the same number; cf. (11). 
(10) 	 <l, [VP V NP]> 
<2, [VP V ] > 
<3, [VP V NP PP]> 
(11) - ~' hear, love, ••• v1 
- exist, die, 1augh,: ..v2 - compare, sen, remind, •• •v3 
Vn may be inserted only into trees licensed by rule n. This procedure may
be generalized to other lexical items. 
We noted above that MR's do not change the lexical class affected by
the rule undergoing the MR, at least not generally. This is accomplished
simply by stipulating that the number of a rule, like other features 
mentioned in the rule, is retained in the output of a metarule. As an 
example, consider the output of the MR in (8) as applied to the rules in 
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(10), given below in (12): 
(12) 	 <1, [yp V] >  
[+pass]  
<3, [VP V PP]>  
[+pass]  
The verbs in v1 and v1 may be inserted into the trees licensed by these rules, as well as tho~e licensed by the rules in {10). 
The final GPSG innovation relevant to the exposition below concerns the 
treatment of word order. PS rules specify word order and constituency
simultaneously, as is well known. Gazdar and Pullum (1981) suggest that 
these two tasks be separated formally, so that a rule such as that in (13)
be represented as in (14): 
{13) [X A B C] 
(14) 1. [X A, B, C ] 
2. A< B < C 
{14.1) says only that A, B, and C form a constituent X without saying 
whether any order is required, or, if so, which. It is thus purely a 
statement of innediate domination, ID. (14.2), on the hand, states only 
the required order of constituents. It is thus purely a statement of linear 
precedence, LP. Rules given this way are said to be in ID/LP fonnat. We 
shall employ the ID/LP format here. Since this means that nearly all the 
rules discussed will be ID statements, we shall occasionally omit the 
co11111as in statements such as {14 .1) where space or readability warrants. 
No confusion should result. 
It is very important to note that {14.2) is to be taken as statement of 
linear precedence for all instances of A, B, and C within a single 
constituent, and not merely those instances created in (14.1). The 
existence of {14.2) in a grammar thus prohibits all of the following nodes, 
even though these would be compatible with {13) in grammars without the 
ID/LP format. 
II(15) Y Y' 	 Y' I y I 
/"- /\ A ~ 
c A C B B A C B A 
The adoption of the ID/LP format thus represents a tighter hypothesis about 
the class of possible grammars. Gazdar and Pullum (1981) hypothesize that 
all human languages may be described using ID/LP format. This hypothesis 
will be explored in the fragment of German below. 
Nothing has yet been said about semantics, merely because its treatment 
isn't radically different in GPSG. In brief, GPSG accepts Bach's (1976:2) 
"rule-to-rule" theory of semantics, which foresees the semantics of complex 
expressions arising in ways which may be specified together with the rules 
responsible for syntactic combination. The rules in the fragment itself 
will amply illustrate how this is effected. Cf. e.g. 3.2, (1). 
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3.2 	German Syntax 
3.2.1 Constituents 	of the Sentence 
For the purpose of presentation, let us assume that something like PSR 
(1) 	 is correct for German (in fact, the structures specified by the rule in 
(1) are isomorphic to those in the fragment proper, in which (1) itself 
plays no role). The rule certainly generates correct syntactic structures 
and, as shall be seen, would not by itself enshrine "the nominative 
complement" too firmly: 
(1) <l, [s NP[+nom]' VP[+fin] ], VP'(NP') > 
(The third element of the rule provides the semantics as promised in 
(3.1).) (1) will aid presentation in this section because it is a familiar 
sort of rule. The alternative to a rule such as PSRl is a rule which 
simply allows that a verb and its specified complements form an S, thus 
denying any special status to the nominative NP. This is popular in the 
literature on valence theory, e.g. Helbig (1971) or Engel and Schumacher 
(1978), and we shall accept something very close to this view as well. 
Within the GPSG model there can be little doubt about the need for 
something like PSRl, however. The fact that verb phrase conjunctions exist 
indicates that verb phrases form 
constituents. 
(2) 	Karl war da und hat nach dir gefragt  
K was here and AUX about you asked(part) 
'K was here and asked about you.'  
In a PS grammar conjunctions such as (2) cannot be the product of the 
subsequent application of transformations. They may, however, be readily 
accounted for if one postulates a general conjunction schema which allows 
that any like constituents may be conjoined. Cf. Gazdar (1981:57). But 
this account would assume that the VP 1 s in (2) are constituents (and that 
their conjunction is as well), in which case something like PSRl is 
required to add Karl to complete the sentence. 
But, as suggested already, the GPSG framework is not therefore corrmit-
ted to the analysis of German as generally--or basically--of the form 
NP-VP. In fact, based on sentences such as those in (3), and arguing just 
as above, we may establish that many other PS configions may function 
as sentences.4 
(3)a. Accusative Object 
Den 	 Ahorn hat Herr Uhlmann gepflanzt und wird Herr N. 
the maple(acc) AUX Mr. U plant(part) a AUX Mr. N 
pfl egen 
culHvate 
'Mr. U planted the maple and Mr. N will cultivate it' 
b. Predicative 
Schoen war Alt-Bochum nie und wird Neu-Bochum nie werden 
pretty was old B never a AUX new B never become 
'Old B. was never pretty and new B. will never get pretty
(either)' 
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c. 	Dative Object 
Dem kannst du nicht widersprechen sondern musst du glauben 
him{dat) can you not contradict rather must you believe 
'You can't contradict him; rather, you must believe him' 
In {3a) we find the constituents hat Herr U tepflanzt and wird 
Herr N pflegen conjoined by und, and combined wi h the requireaaccusative 
object. There is no standaraaesignation for constituents of this sort: 
anticipating the analysis below, I propose to call them {c011plete) verb 
phrases lacking accusatives, abbreviated CYP/NPa. The parenthetical
11complete11 is included to distinguish them from partial verb phrases
lacking accusatives, abbreviated PYP/NPa, e.g. hat gepflanzt or wird 
pflegen. This latter sort of phrase has often been called a 11 trans1tive 
verb phrase, 11 which is always one requiring both an accusative and a 
nominative NP complement. (Complete) VP's lacking accusatives, on the 
other hand, already contain nominative complements and only require 
accusative complements to functions as sentences. 
We might have called CVP/NPacc's "sentences lacking accusatives," but 
it turns out that we will shall want to distinguish the sort of sentence 
which results from combining a with S/a from the sort of sentence which 
results when no use is made of slash categories. We reserve the term 
11 sentence II for the former, and apply the coinage 11CVP II to the 1atter. I 
prefer to designate this sort of constituent as 1 CVP, 1 because it shares 
with standard VP's (lacking only nominative NP complements) the property of 
allowing modification by temporal elements, i.e. tense and temporal 
adverbs. 'VP' is reserved for standard verb phrases, which may also be 
designated 'CVP/NPnom.' 
Similarly, the conjuncts war Alt-Bochum nie and wird Neu-Bochum 
nie werden in {b) are (coaplete) verb phrases lacking predicatives, i.e. 
CYP/PRED, while the conjuncts in (c), kannst du nicht widersprechen and 
musst du glauben are (complete) verb phrases lacking datives, CYP/NPd. PS 





(b) 	 s 
~ 
PRED CVP/PRED 








In this important respect the present GPSG analysis is not committed to the 
analysis of German as generally--or basically--of the form NP-VP. 
The evidence that German ought to be analyzed so that subjects are not 
11 distinguished complements," but rather complements much like any other, 
concerns fronting. In particular, we find the same range of frontable 
constituents in constructions with subjects as we do in constructions 
without subjects, e.g. the impersonal passive (the evidence that these are 
subjectless is summarized in 4.4 below). If we were to construe fronting 
as somehow replacing the subject with another constituent (while 
accommodating the subject elsewhere), then we should expect to find 
differences (and perhaps no fronting whatsoever) in subjectless sentences, 
since these contain no subjects to replace. In fact, however, we find 
exactly the same range of frontable constituents: 









Excel 1 ently 
For us 
Till midnight 
haben sie getanzt 
AUX they dance(prt)  
wurde getanzt 
AUX (pass)  
war nicht zu tanzen  
was not to dance  
they danced 
[ there was dancing 
there .could be no dancing 
Even more striking, we find the same marking for 11 zero-fronting 11 in 
both constructions. Zero-fronting is the name we shall use for cases where 
no element has been fronted. In each case an es appears holding the 
initial position. This is quite easy to account for if we suppose that a 
nominative complement is added to a verb phrase much like any other, and 
that a verb with its full battery of complements (a CVP) is subject either 
to fronting, in which case we get the range of data above, or to 
combination with es. This analysis predicts the parallelism below: 
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(6) Impersonal Passive Other Zero-Fronting 
Es wurde geredet
it AUX talk(prt} 
'People talked' 
Es ist der Tom gekommen
it AUX T come(prt}
'Tom came' 
a.* Dann wurde es 
then 
geredet * Dann ist es der Tom gekommen 
Dann wurde geredet Dann ist der Tom gekommen 
b. * •.•ob es 
whether 
geredet wurde. * ... ob es der Tom gekommen ist. 
•••ob geredet wurde. • •• ob der Tom gekommen ist. 
c. * Wurde es geredet * 1st es der Tom gekommen 
Wurde geredet 1st der Tom gekommen 
d. * Geredet wurde es! * Gekommen ist es der Tom! 
come(prt) AUX it 
Geredet wurde! Gekommen ist er! 
Moreover, the es of the impersonal construction es ist nicht zu 
tanzen and the es round in the few basically impersonal verbs es liegt mir 
an der Sache areexactly parallel. If we analyzed German as basically
NP-VP, so that fronting were analyzed as replacing the subject NP 
{position) with another (while accommodating the subject elsewher€), then 
the existence of this construction with es apparently indicates the need to 
provide for replacing the subject with nothing. A different account would 
be required, however, for the "nothing" we find in impersonal construc-
tions, since these constructions have no subjects to be replaced. The 
parallelism is clear, however, in the analysis which postulates a CVP. 
In fact, the analysis just sketched pedicts not only the parallels 
between personal and impersonal constructions in the matter of fronting and 
zero-fronting. it also predicts some of the exact behavior of the es we 
find in fronted position. The generalization is that this es is 11iiiited to 
matrix initial position. It appears post-verbally neither Tn declarative 
sentences (6a), nor in questions (c), nor even in exclamations (d}. But if 
es is introduced only in initial position to combine with CVP's, its 
Tailure to appear post-verbally follows immediately. The fact that this es 
fails to appear in any embedded sentence (b) follows from Fourquet's (197IT 
observation that German fronting is limited to matrix clauses. (The 
nominative/accusative neuter singular pronoun es shares none of these 
peculiar properties, as any handbook can verity:" There is therefore no 
reason to take the superficial similarity of the two words as evidence for 
the es in impersonal passives being a subject.) 
Arnim von Stechow (1979) credits Emil Drach for the first observation 
that the subject is not distinguished by privilege of occupying initial 
position, given all the other complements and modifiers which may appear
before the finite verb. Drach noticed that any of a class of these may 
appear before the finite verb--or may fail to. The case where they all 
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fail to is simply that of the "presentational" es (for this is clearly 
misguided about the grammatical function of es,1f its real purposes is 
only to hold first position}. Drach was thusapparently the first to adopt 
the view the es is not a special case of~ fronting, but rather an 
alternative used when fronting is not. 
Stechow implements Drach's law in a fragment in Montague-style 
categorial grammar (allowing rules with transformational power). His rules 
combine all the arguments and modifiers into a single SOV string, which is 
used, as is, in subordinate clauses. In matrix clauses two further rules 
apply, first one fronting the verb, and then (optionally} a second which 
fronts a major constituent. The alternative is to insert es before the 
matrix verb. Although Stechow employs transformations to do this, the 
insight is available to a nontransformational treatment as well. The task 
of 3.4 will be to formalize an analogue to Stechow's treatment in GPSG. 
This completes my justification for the postulation of a matrix a-S/a 
structure in German rather than the familiar NP-VP. There are construc-
tions where VP's play an important role in German, e.g. the complementation 
system. But we can handle these quite easily since we have a category VP 
(= CVP } in the grammatical system. 
It-~~n8Wiy (1) above, the S --> NP VP rule, which we lack. 
Before turning to the formal apparatus for describing fronting, let us 
note that we haven't yet stipulated an order for sentences of a-S/a struc-
ture, which, however are strictly ordered as given. The PSR's responsible 
for the trees in (4) will specify only constituency, not order, in the 
ID/LP format. The following LP statement provides the correct order for 
all of the envisioned rules: 
(7) X < CVP, for all X. 
3.2.2 Fronting (of Several Kinds) 
Let us note that all of the CVP's in (4) in 3.2.1 have "gaps," i.e. 
they are "missing" an accusative complement, a predicative complement, and 
a dative NP complement, respectively. These are, in turn, supplied by the 
$-expansion rule. Note further that we might have called the CVP/X an 
1 S/X 1 --either case is one of categorial (or terminological) innovation. 





where A/B denotes a phrase which only lacks a B to be an A. This is a 
slash category. 
The structure in (1) has been used in GPSG extensively, e.g. to handle 
questions and topicalizations in English. Uszkoreit (1982} has proposed 
that it also be employed to treat German fronting. His defense of this 
proposal is elegant and convincing. Slash categories are the only means 
within GPSG of treating unbounded dependencies. German fronting is poten-
tially unbounded, as Uszkoreit's sentence, (2) below, demonstrates: 
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(2) 	 In dieses Zimmer sagte er, dass er den Stuhl gestellt hat  
in this room said he that he the chair put(prt) AUX  
'He said he put the chair in this room'  
To my 	 knowledge Uszkoreit (1982) is the first to point this out.5 The 
unbounded use of fronting is not particularly common in German, but within 
GPSG it is positive proof of the need to employ slash categories in 
describing fronting. 
It is of course conceivable that several grammatical mechanisms con-
verge to create the structures in which various complements and modifiers 
may occupy the initial position in S, but I won't argue that this is so. I 
shall, however, note some facts which haven't been incorporated into 
Uszkoreit's account, even though these are certainly consistent with his 
proposal. 
First, list (3) in 3.2.1 cannot be extended very far. That is, when 
operating with structure (3), 
(3) 	 S 
SIXx ---------.------r----_ 
SIX CONJ SIX 
X may be NPacc, NPdat, PRED (and NPnom, of course), and perhaps some other 
complement types. Modifiers of all sorts are impossible values for X, 
however, as (4) might suggest: 
(4) 	* Gestern war Tom im Suero und habe ich zu Hause gearbeitet 
yesterday was Tin office and AUX I at home work(prt) 
To my knowledge, no such sentennce with preposed modifier and conjoined 
(complete) VP's is possible. Examples wi&r temporal adverbials of other 
sorts or with locatives are unacceptable. But let us take care to note 
that this has nothing to do with fronting. Gestern is perfectly appropri-
ate when moved to the fore of unconjoined VPs, as (5) demonstrates: 
(5) Gestern war Tom im Buero 
yesterday 	was T in office  
'Tom was in the office yesterday'  
Gestern habe ich zu Hause gearbeitet 
yesterday AUX I at home work(prt) 
'I worked at home yesterday' 
(4) is ungrammatical because it includes an illicit conjunction of two 
CVPITEMP nodes. The proper way t o guarantee that (4) be left out is to 
disallow this conjunction, while changing nothing about fronting. 
Second, there exists a rule which effects noncoordinate VP conjunction
in German. As (6) indicates, this can give rise to sentences in which it 
appears that fronting has operated as a movement rule. 
(6) 	Schon 5 Jahre wohne ich hier und kenne trotzdem niemanden  
already 5 yr live I here and know still no one  
'I've lived here for 5 years and still know no one'  
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The temporal adverbial schon 5 Jahre is understood as modifying only the 
first conjunct; it cannot be understood to modify both, so that (6) shares 
no reading with either sentence in (7): 
(7) Ich 	wohne schon 5 J hier und kenne trotzdem nmdn. schon 5 Jre. 
I live already 5 yrs here and know still no-one already 5 yrs
'I've lived here for 5 yrs and there's no one whom I've known 
for 5 	yrs.' 
Ich wohne schon 5 Jre hier und kenne trotzdem schon 5 Jre nmd 
I live already 5 yrs here and know still already 5 yr noone 
'I've lived here for 5 yrs and for 5 yrs I haven't know 
anyone' 
The second conjunct in (6) simply means 'I know no one now.' Thus it is 
stronger than the first putative paraphrase in (7) (since if I know no one 
now, then clearly there's no one whom I've known for five years) and weaker 
than the second (since (6) is perfectly compatible with my having had 
acquaintances which have since lapsed). The structure of these sentences 
doesn't involve coordinate conjunction. 
We turn now to a sort of fronting which has resisted treatment in 
transformational analyses. Consideration of its peculiarities will moti-
vate our formulation of basic rules in the fragment. 
3.2.3 	Phantoms and Some Recalcitrant Sorts of Fronting 
In a recent study using a large corpus, Hoberg (1981:155-181) presents 
evidence which confirms the generalization that only single major 
constituents {Satzglieder) may be fronted. As she notes, single major 
constituents may contain (i) complements (notably in the case of 
adjectivals and adverbials), (ii) modifiers, (iii) parentheticals, and (iv)
conversational particles. 
{i) Groesser als der Hans ist hier niemand  
bigger than the A is here no one  
'No one here is bigger than Hans'  
(ii) Gut "gezielt" hatte auch die iranische Regierung 
well 	 aimed AUX also the Iranian govern. 
'The Iranian government also "aimed" well' (Hoberg(1981:181)) 
(iii) 	Der President--wie denn sonst --sagte ab  
the pres1dent how Q-prt else cancel  
'The president--so what's new --cancelled'  
{iv) Seiner Tochter aber kann er kein Maerchen erzaehlen  
his daughter but can he no story tell  
'But he can't tell his daughter a story'  
These are exactly the sorts of exceptions which do "prove" rules. That is, 
they hardly challenge the generalization, and, if they are the only 
apparent counterexamples, then the generalization would appear to be sound. 
Hoberg (1981:181) nevertheless regards it as faulty in view of sequences of 
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constituents which may be fronted. The following appear in her corpus: 
(1) 	 1. Den Strafantrag zuruecknehmen kann der, der ihn gestellt hat  
the charge withdraw(inf) can he who it place(prt) AUX  
'He who brought charges can drop them'  
2. 	(Der professionelle Habitus ist der beste Schutz.) 
Professional status is the best protection. 
Auf Leben und Tod zu treffen sind nur Heilige und Amateure 
on 	 life and death to hit(inf) are only saints and amateurs 
1 0nly saints and amateurs can be mortally wounded' 
3. 	Von den Sowjets verhaftet wurde in Leningrad der deutsche ••• 
by the S0v1ets arrest(prt) AUX in L the German •.• 
'The German ••. was arrested in Leningrad by the Soviets 1 
That is, we find examples of nonfinite VP's in fronted position as 
well, either with {1.2) or without {1.3) adverbial modifiers. It is not in 
general possible to front sequences of constituents--e.g. one can never 
front the subject with the accusative object, as indeed, one can never 
front just two nominal complements of any sort. We are therefore quite 
tempted to try to preserve without qualification the generalization that 
only single constituents may be fronted. 
As (1.3) might suggest, it is not just entire nonfinite VP's which may
be fronted. For example, Heidolph et al. {1981:720-21) note that one can 
also front the verb with an accusative complement to the exclusion of its 
dative complement: 
(2) Eine Geschichte erzaehlen kann er ihr mit ruhiger Stimme 
a story tell(inf) can he her with calm voice 
'He can tell her a story with a calm voice' 
We must therefore provide for less-than-entire VP 1 s in the position before 
the finite verb. If we are to do this, and preserve the generalization 
that it is single constituents which appear preverbally, then we must allow 
that a (nonfinite) verb may form a constituent with some of its complements 
to the exclusion of others. Calling these "partial verb phrase," or PVP's, 
we 	 need a structure such as the following: 
(3) 	 s ~ 
PVP VP 
/\ ~ 
NPacc V V 
~ I I 
Eine Geschichte erzaehlen kann er ihr mit ruhiger Sti111ne 
The question arises: do these constituents play a role in unfronted 








structure of (4 ' ) 




kann ihrA \  
eine Geschichte erzaehlen 
(4'} Er kann ihr eine Geschichte erzaehlen  
he can her a story tell  
'He can tell her a story'  
I don't wish to argue that (4) cannot be a structure of (4'), but there is 
at least one reason to be suspicious of its being the only such structure. 
If it were, then (5), where the accusative NP has beenrronted alone, would 
represent a violation of the left branch constraint (cf. Gazdar, 1982:176, 
for a formulation of the left branch constraint in GPSG}: 
(5) Eine Geschichte kann er ihr erzaehlen  
'He can tell her a story'  
And the left branch constraint seems well justified in German: one cannot 
e .g. front genitive interrogative or relative words, which would be ex-
plained by the left branch constraint: 
(6) 	* Wessen hast Du Arbeiten gelesen ?  
whose AUX you- papers read(prt}  
Du hast wessen Arbeiten gelesen?  
'You read whose papers '  
(6'} * 	Ich sah Prof. X, dessen Du Arbeiten gelesen hast  
I saw whose you - papers read(prt} AUX  
Ich sah Prof. X, dessen Arbeiten Du gelesen hast 
'I saw Prof. X, whose papers you read' 
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If this is so, then we will need to account for (5) by postulating another 
possible structure, in which the accusative NP needn't be a left branch. 
(7) seems the most likely candidate for this: 





kann NPdat NPacc V 
IL\ 
ihr eine Geschichte erzaehlen 
Since I am not prepared to argue that the left branch constraint is 
irrelevant to the analysis of German, and since the structure in (7) seems 
unobjectionable, I am going to assume that we ought to provide for both 
phrase structure trees. 
This will be accomplished using a generalization of the methods 
introduced by Gazdar and Sag (1980), building on work by Bach (1982) and 
Dowty (1978). In skeleton, the procedure is as follows: rather than 
regard the VP rules such as (1) in 3.2 as basic, VP's will be built up
complement by complement, beginning with the verb alone. In GPSG this is 
done with metarules. At any stage of the derivation of a VP rule one can 
apply either of two MR's: one can regard the element added in the MR as a 
sister to the daughters of the input rule, yielding a flat structure (in
this case it is correct to regard the input rule as defining a "phantom 
category"), or one can retain the constituent defined by the input rule, 
yielding a flat structure (in which case the phantom materializes--polter-
geist-like---perhaps even in fronted position). Graphically, we have the 
two possibilities in (8). 
(8) 	 PVPn (a) VP "fl at"  
~ -->  ~ 
Y X Vx v[-finJ 
(b) VP "contoured" 
~ 




(PVP's are partial verb phrase, i.e. constituents lacking one or more of 
the complements required in standard VP 1 s. The TVP's used by Dowty (1978) 
and Bach (1982) are an example of PVP 1 s.) The fronting metarule will then 
allow that for any rule of the form (8b), there is a rule of the form (9): 
(9) 	 CVP/PVPn 
~
{Y1) NPnom (Y2) 
and this constituent may then combine with a PVPn constituent to form a 
sentence, which will then have a structure such as (10) : 
(10) s 
(3) above is an example of this sort of structure, while the VP node in (4)  
provides an example of the flat structure we see in {8a).  
It is worth noting that there is probably no convincing transformational  
solution to the problem. Consider the variants in (11):  
(11) 1. 	Auf Einzelheiten ist er nicht eingegangen  
into details AUX he not in-go{prt) 
'He didn't go into detail'  
2. 	Auf Einzelheiten eingegangen ist er nicht  
as above  
The problem for the transformational analysis is obvious: whenever the 
rule should apply, auf Einzelheiten eingegan1en either is or is not a constituent. If it is, then at least its let branch shouldn 1 t be 
frontable, and (11.1) is underivable. But if it is not, then (11.2) is 
underivable. 
A transformational solution to the problem is equally obvious: some 
sort of restructuring rule, applying optionally, is required to break up an 
existing constituent, or to create a new one. But this is only to say that 
if one insisted on a transformational solution, then one would posit a rule 
which effectively allowed alternative constituent structures, both of which 
might feed the fronting rule. I don't doubt that this is workable, but it 
is still unconvincing because it amounts to first adopting a canonical s-
tructure and then allowing it to be deformed (optionally) . {As 3.4 will 
demonstrate, this canonical order may have to be rigid at points.) 
Allowing the alternative constituent structures through distinct {but
predictable) phrase structure rules thus seems to be the most desirable 
treatment. This is predicted in a framework which eschews the added power
of transformations. 
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3.3 Basic Rules 
The presentation of the motivation for the grammar proposed will give  
way to a presentation emphasizing its formal structure in this section.  
3.3.1 Features for Complements 
We regard as part of the lexical information associated with a verb the 
specification of the number and sorts of complements it requires. Thus 
erzaehlen 'to tell, narrate' normally requires both an accusative and a 
dative object. This will be represented by means of features, so that the 
lexical entry associated with erzaehlen will include the following: 
erzaehlen, spenden, .••(1) 	 PVP-NPacc  
-NPdat  
The complement features encode the same information as the 11 slashes 11 of 
categorial grammar; thus (1) indicates that these verbs are partial verb 
phrases which require (and do not yet contain) both accusative and dative 
objects to form verb phrases. 
Since all basic verbs in contemporary colloquial require nominative 
subjects, this complement feature need not be redundantly marked. But (1)
might be more completely written: 
( 1 I ) PVP_NPacc erzaehlen, spenden, ••• 
-NPdat 
-~JPnom 
We will normally suppress the mention of the nominative complement. (The 
policy of regarding nominative complements as automatic would be ill 
advised if we were treating very formal language as well, which has 
retained a very few basic subjectless verbs, such as hungern 'hunger,' 
which requires only an accusative, and is incompatible with nominatives.) 
Once the complement has been added, the feature will be marked'+,' so 
that we obtain: 
eine Geschichte erzaehlen, eine PVP+NPacc 
-NPdat Kleinigkeit spenden, •• • 
This raises the question of the value of the feature [ NPacc] in phrases, 
e.g. lachen 'laugh,' which neither require accusative 'NP complements nor 
already have them. Unfortunately, I know of no evidence which determines 
whether this phrase is marked [+NPacc] (which might seem plausible since it 
certainly isn't "looking for" an accusative complement), or whether it is 
simply unmarked for this feature. The relevant evidence would effectively 
show whether we must distinguish syntactically between phrases alike in the 
complements they require, but distinct in the complements that they already 
contain. Since the matter seems to be empirically undecidable, and not of 
great theoretical moment, we adopt the typographically more aesthetic 
solution: the features will be left unmarked where the complements are not 
- 96 -
required. 
The entire rule condensed in (1) will be part of a list which is 
indexed by rule number, as explained in (3.1). The use of complement 
features in tandem with rule numbering may be regarded as suspicious, since 
Gazdar (1982:143145) justified the use of rule numbering partly on the 
grounds that it obviates the need for subcategorization information in the 
lexicon. Complement features reintroduce subcategorization information 
into the lexicon, duplicating syntactic information, and apparently 
nullifying the advantage of rule numbering. 
Several remarks are relevant here. First, if there is a loss incurred 
by the system which includes complement features, there is also a gain. 
Using these complement features, we shall no longer need to regard the VP 
expansion rules as basic--instead, we shall be able to predict the form of 
these rules from the lexical form of the verb, in particular, from its 
complement features. 
Second, lexical classes of verbs are not distinguished only by the 
complements they take. Verbs which take identical sets of complements may
have distinct semantic effects. For example, versprech- 'promise' and 
befehl- 'order' both require dative NP's and infinitival VP's (with zu), 
but differ semantically in that it is the subject of versprech-, but"the 
object of befehl-, that controls the VP infinitive. Rule numbers may still 
serve to d1st1nguish these classes, and thus serve a purpose. 
A third, and final remark is related to the second. If semantic 
distinctions among verb classes were somehow predictable, one might then 
dispense with rule numbering, and eliminate even this amount of apparent 
duplication of information. Klein and Sag (1981) have proposed such a 
system, and Johnson (ms.) has employed it to suggest the use of complement 
features without rule numbers. If the Klein and Sag proposal is success-
ful, then Johnson's proposed elimination of rule numbers (in connection 
with the adoption of comp}ement features) is a desirable modification of 
the system proposed here. 
There may be an implicit hierarchy in complement features, which is re-
flected in the sorts of PVPs which may be fronted. According to Heidolph 
et al. (1981:720-21), erzaehlen shows the following pattern: 
(2) 	1. Eine Geschichte erzaehlen kann er ihr mit ruhiger Stirrme 
a story tell(inf) can he her with calm voice 
'He can tell her a story with a calm voice' 
2. Seiner Tochter eine Geschichte erzaehlen 	kann er schon 
his daughter certainly 
'He certainly can tell his daughter a story' 
3. *Seiner Tochter erzaehlen kann er sie schon8  
it(acc)  
That is, in this variety we find the following PVP's with erzaehlen: 
NPacc + V NPdat + NPacc + V but: * NPdat + V 
Moreover, there seems to be a general preference for the accusative 
object over the dative object in forming PVP's. All verbs which take 
multiple objects may form constituents with their accusative objects alone, 
and with dative and accusative objects together, but less readily with 
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dative objects alone. Let us examine the rules required under the 
assumption that this pattern is indeed general. We'll then consider the 
modifications which would be needed if the generalization turns out not to 
be pure. 
It is clear that the rules which add complements to PVP's are of very
similar structure. They add complements of type X to (partial) verb 
phrases lacking complements of type X. We should therefore like to posit a 
general metarule such as the following: 
(3) 	<n, [(P)VP ••• ], F> --> <n, [(P)VP •.. X••• ], F>  
-X +X  
The derived rule may be a rule admitting further PVPs, such as the rule 
admitting NPacc +Vin (2.1) above, or it may be a rule admitting VPs, such 
as (2.2) above. It may even be a rule admitting CVP's. This depends on 
the input rule. A CVP is simply a PVP where for all complement features 
Xn, a positive value may be shown, while a VP is one which is [-NPnom], and 
which, for all other complement features Xn, a positive value is shown. 
(4) VP = PVP+Xl CVP = PVP+Xl 
+X 	 +X m 	 n 
-NPnom 
Thus the derived rule in (3) shows: '(P)VP.' 
If the judgement in (2.3) is incorrect, and a verb may in general form 
a PVP with any of its complements, then the schema in (4) is essentially 
correct. But if the judgements in (2) represent a genuine variety of 
German (cf. note 8), then (3) runs into a problem. Suppose erzaehlen has 
the features suggested in (1). Then we could apply the MR in (3) to 
derive: 
(4) 	 <n, [pyp NPacc, PVP_NPacc ], PVP'(NP') >  
-NPacc -NPdat  
But this 	yields the undesired constituent in (2.3). 
To avoid this problem, we may suppose that there is a hierarchy of 
complement features, i.e. one that might be given in a sequence such as 
(5): 
(5) Xl, X2, ..• ,Xn 
Supposing that all complement features are listed in an order such as (5), 
we subsume all the complementation MR's under the schema in (6): 
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(6) Flat Adding of Complements (FAC) 
<n, [(P)VP 	y ], F > --> <n, [(P)VP y xj ], F(Xj') > 




-X 	 -Xm 	 m 
((6) assumes that X .•• x exhaust the complements required, and that they 
are ordered as in(~).) "This would be9sufficient to rule out the undesired (2.3), providing NPacc < NPdat in (5). 
It may even turn out that soae PVPs are NPdat + V (to the exclusion of 
a required NPacc). This may also have to be accommodated. In that case, 
we clearly have to give up the postulation of a single hierarchy of comple-
ment features, as in (5). Rather, we would assume that the complement 
features of each verb are ordered (sometimes differently from one another) . 
If we again assume that the features are listed in the required order 
(under the lexical entry for each verb), then schema (6) provides the 
necessary range of metarules for adding complements to verbs to form verb 
phrases and partial verb phrases. 
Turning now from the question of how one accommodates the various 
patterns of acceptability judgements with PVP's, we note that (6) provides 
for subject verb agreement in case the complement being added is nomina-
tive. The feature [ agr] is dormant until it takes a positive value (in 
the above rule, when-the complement being added is [+nom]). The positive
value of [ agr] triggers the values of person and number to agree 
throughout-the rule in which it appears. We suppose a rule to the effect 
that: 
+agr ==> 	 Bpers.  
~numb.  
Let us note the structure which (6) assigns: it provides only for the 
"flat" structure in (8) in 3.2.3. (7) provides for the contoured 
structure: 
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(7) Contoured Adding of Complements (CAC)  
<n, [(P)VP y ], F> --> <n, [(P)VP xj, (P)VP_clitic ], F(Xj')>  
-me anom aagr  
(+X ) (+X) aagr (+X) a a a 
. 
(+Xi) (+Xi) (+X;)  
-X. ~- -Xj J 	 J . 	 . . 	 . . 
-X 	 -X -Xm 	 m m 
The feature [-me] is required to prevent the application of this rule 
to create a constituent consisting of the finite matrix verb and one or 
more of its complements. This might be introduced on the head of the node 
admitted by the rule rather than on the node itself, as above. 
The (P)VP constituent within the {P)VP on the right in (7) may not 
contain clitics such as es which must encliticize as far left within the VP 
as possible (but after the nominative). The feature [-clitic] (together
with further principles) is required to account for the following pattern 
of well-formedness: 
(8) 1. 	* Sie wollte Tom's geben  
she wanted T it give  
2. * 	Tom's geben wollte sie 
3. 	 Sie wollte 1 s Tom geben  
she wanted-it T give  
'She wanted to give it to Tom'  
4. 	 Tom wollte sie's geben  
'She wanted to give it to Tom'  
The feature [-clitic] is required because otherwise we would allow that 
geben could combine with its accusative complement es to form a PVP, in 
which case the es should appear next to its sister whether that is after 
the finite verbtas in (8.1)), or in fronted position (as in (8.2)). 
(In addition to ruling out these otherwise possible constituents, we 
will need LP statements to guarantee the position of the es in (8.3) and 
(8.4). For example, the following would be appropriate: -
+clitic < -fin 
+clitic < -nom 
These soecify that the clitic es must precede nonfinite verbs and 
nonnominative complements in its constituent. Cf. Vater (1979) for 
ordering 	constraints among the pronouns.) 
The other features in (7) are used above as they are in (6). With  
these syntactic mechanisms in mind, we can examine several basic rules:  
- 100 -
<7. I V ]. V' >[VP  
-f1n  
<3, V 1, V'>[PVP  
-f1n  
-NPacc  
<-1, V ] • VI>rPVP  
-f1 n  
-NPdat  
<5. V J. V' >rPVP  
- fin  
-NPgen  




<7, V ], V'>[PVP  
-fin  
-PPau f  




<9. V J. V'>[PVP  
-fin  
-PRED  
_s_<:_h_l_a ff'n, 111_c_h_e_ry_, 
cx1st1eren, ... 







warten, hoffen, achten •... 
bitten, betruegen, 
benei den, •.. 
sein, bleiben, werden, .•. 
There are, of course, as many basic rules as there are subcategori-
zation classes of verbs {though these may be eliminable if semantics is 
predictable, as noted above). I've neglected verbs subcategorized for 
duratives, locatives, directionals, most preositional phrases, modifiers 
{e.g. sauber-, dreckig-, kaputt-, fertig-, etc. machen) 1 als 'as' + 
modifier {fungieren, felten, etc.), andeven most verbs s""iiocategorized for 
combinations of thee ements which have been examined. It is to be hoped 
that the classes examined exhibit principles which extend to the unexamined 
ones. 
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Several comments on the form of the BR's are in order. First, the 
proposal to specify the choice of preposition using on a feature on the 
prepositional phrase, e.g. [+um], is what is intended in the notation 
[+PPum], and is due to Gazdar (1982:141-2), who points out that preposi-
tions which verbs require differ semantically from those which occur 
freely. There are further points in favor of this treatment of preposi-
tions, as well . Thus, although it might be neater to subcategorize verbs 
simply as [-PP], and then let the exact choice of preposition depend on the 
verb, this will not work in general. The empirical generalization this 
would have to be based on is false: some verbs are subcategorized for more 
than one preposition. Cf. e.g. von X schwaermen 'to talk excitedly about 
X' and fuer X schwaermen 'to idolize X, to be giddy about X. 1 (Similar
examples may be found in English. Cf. wait on vs. wait for . (It is 
technically possible to account for the lexical conditioning in the 
semantics by assigning "impossible" meanings to incorrect V + PP 
combinations--but this would be entirely ad hoc.)
Second, the BR's above admit only [-finTTP)VP's, i.e. ones which 
aren't yet interpreted (or marked) for tense. Tense isn't introduced until 
the VP level for semantic reasons. Cf. the discussion in 3.7.2 on the need 
for this. The BRs (and the complement-adding MRs) operate on untensed 
elements, which must nonetheless later bear tense marking and tense 
interpretation.
Third, BRs (2)-(9) together with the MR's allowing the Flat Adding of 
Complements allow the derivation of a number of ID statements for which no 
appropriate LP statements have yet been formulated. The following,
absolutely standard generalizations about German word order, are the most 
important: 
(9) 	1. v+fin < x  
+me  
2· X-verb < v-fin 
3. 	 x < v+fin  
-me  
The finite verb in a main clause is always first in its constituent (9.1); 
all nonfinite verbs follow all nonverbal elements in embedded clauses 10(9.2); and finite verbs follow everything else in subordinate clauses. 
The last LP statement requires some refinement in view of clauses such as 
(10), but this 	will not be pursued here. 
(10) .. •dass er lange hat schlafen muessen . 
COMP he long AUX sleep(inf) must(prt)  
' .•• that he had to sleep for a long time . '  
(9.1)-(9.3) are provided here to illustrate somewhat more exactly the 
GPSG strategy of separating ID and LP statements and the strategy of the 
present fragment which derives some "flat" VP rules with a large nu~ber of 
constituents. It is worth noting that (9.1)-(9 . 3) are not yet appl1cable
within the present fragment, since there is no provision yet for tensed 
verbs . (That is, we have been assuming the following division of features: 
---------
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{ 11) 	 +verb 
-fin +fin 
~ ~ +prt +1nf +pres +pret 
Finite verbs are marked for tense, person, and number. Nonfinite verbs are 
either infinitives or participles. We treat only Perfect participles in 
this work.} 
Fourth {and related to the third comment}, some statement(s} on the 
order of the nonverbal elements are required. Some of these statements are 
not difficult to provide; we can state reliably e.g. that 
NP< PP 
But the order of nominal complements is more flexible. Lenerz {1977) is 
the most careful of studies on this issue, but it is beyond the scope of 
the present work to investigate how the relevant {still quite complicated) 
principles might best be expressed in ID/LP format. Indeed, given the 
pragmatic factors (e.g. theme, emphasis) to which Lenerz and others have 
made appeal, one surely does not wish to commit oneself to any purely
grammatical account of the order of these elements. 
It is probably nonetheless worth noting that the standard remarks about 
the order of German noun phrases may readily be expressed as LP statements. 
That dative NP's precede accusatives amounts to 
NP+dat 	 < NP+acc 
-pro 
while that accusative pronouns precede dative pronouns may be stated: 
PRO+acc < PRO+dat 
If these were the correct generalizations about nominal complements fn 
German, we might simply list them. But Lenerz (1977) and Vater (1979) note 
that things are more complicated . This will not be pursued here. 
Fifth, it should be noted that nothing has yet been said about separ-
able prefix verbs. These are treated in the next section. 
Here are two examples of the application of the complement adding MR to 
BR { 6): 








3. 	 <6, [VP NPdat, NPacc, V ], V'(NPa')(NPd')> 
-fin 
Anticipating the rule introducing Present tense, this PSR will admit 





I 	 ~ 
erzaehlt der Tochter 
The verb phrase that is actually used in a sentence such as er erzaehlt 
der Tochter eine Geschichte will be a CVP/NPnom, but it will consfst of the 
same elements as the above. 
(14) 1. 	<6, [PVP NPacc, V ], V'(NPa')> {={12.2)) --> (via 
-fin CAC-MR)
-NPdat 
2. 	 <6, [VP NPdat, PVP_fin ], PVP'{NPd')>  
-fin -NPdat  
These two rules have been derived here in order to suggest how the 
present system can eventually provide a generation of (2.1), repeated here 
for convenience; 
(2.1) Eine Geschichte erzaehlen 	kann er ihr  
a story tell{inf) can he her  
'He can tell her a story'  
We return to 	this below (in 3.4} . 
3.3.2 	Separable Prefix Verbs 
Separable prefix verbs display prefixes which appear before their 
associated verbs stems in nonfinite form (and in [-me] contexts} and at the 
end of the [+mc]VP when the associated verb is in finite form. The pattern
below is general; 
eine Geschichte 
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Er kommt bald an .•. ,dass er anko11111t Er ist angekonnnen 
he come soon on COMP 	 AUX 
'He arrives soon' 1 ••• that he arrives' 1 He arrived' 
It's important to note that there are two classes of verb prefixes in 
German: separable and inseparable. Verbs with inseparable prefixes displ~ 
no behavior syntactically distinct from unprefixed verbs, so that both 
appear in the basic rules in 3.3.1. Cf. BR 6, which introduces not only 
verschreiben, erzaehlen, and beweisen, but also the unprefixed gebhn, 
schenken, and spenden. The present section concerns exclusively t e other 
class of prefixed verbs, those with separable prefixes.
My strategy of analysis for these verbs will first be defined 
negatively: the verbs will not be introduced by the same basic (syntactic) 
rules which admit the unprefixed verbs, nor will they be syntactically 
derived from these rules. I acknowledge that the prefixed verbs are 
related to unprefixed stems, but maintain that this is a lexical 
relationship, at least in general. The idea that the relationship between 
verb and prefix is lexical explains the often unpredictable (syntactic and 
semantic) relationship between an unprefixed verb and its prefixed 
counterpart. 
But even if the relationship is lexical, it certainly is not purely 
morphological, as the possible separation of verb and prefix by several 
phrases demonstrates (they appear at opposite ends of the VP). The treat-
ment accommodates the fact that the prefix and stem have relatively 
independent syntactic behavior by allowing them to be introduced under 
separate syntactic nodes. This requires a somewhat novel view of the 
interaction of lexical insertion and semantic composition, but no new 
apparatus. -
The best method of further explaining the analysis is to examine some 
rules introducing separable prefix verbs. Examples of these: 
<10, 	 [yp PREF, V ], PREF+V 1 > : an-kommen, weg-gehen,  
-fin an-fangen, •.  
<11, 	 [pyp PREF, V ], PREF+V 1 > aus-nuetzen, fort-jagen, 
-fin 	 zu-lassen, ..• 
-NPacc 
<12, 	 [PVP PREF, V ], PREF+V 1 > : bei-wohnen, bevor-stehen, 
-fin 	 zu-laecheln, ..• 
-NPdat 









<15, [PVP PREF, V ], PREF+V'> ein-gehen, hin-weisen, 
-fin 	 auf-passen, ... 
-PPauf 
<16, 	 [PVP PREF, V ], PREF+V 1 > auf-fordern, ein-laden,  
-fin an-stiften, ...  
-PPzu 
-NPacc 
<17, 	 [PVP PREF, V ], PREF+V I> auf-treten, aus-sehen, .•.  
-fin  
-PRED 
The novelty here is that prefix and verb are semantically interpreted 
as a unit, which is why the prefix/verb combinations are written together 
in the lists of verbs on the right side above. These are the lexical 
entries for the purpose of semantics. Let's note that there is no 
intrinsic difficulty with this proposal: there is a finite number of prefix 
+ verb combinations, so that we can list them in the lexicon. There will 
be lexical rules which will reduce the number which must be learned 
independently, but in principle, they might all be learned this way.
The major semantic advantage is that the analysis is not committed to 
predicting the meaning of prefixed verbs as a function of the meanings of 
the prefix and unprefixed stem. The meaning is predictable in many cases, 
but counterexamples remain. Schmeissen and werfen 'to throw' are 
cognitively synonymous, i.e. true of the same pairs {or triples) of objects 
in all possible situations, although they differ in stylistic level, while 
vorschmeissen 1 to throw to the front' and vorwerfen 'to reproach' or 1 to 
throw to the front.• Similarly, ~ucken and schauen 'to look,' but 
ausgucken 1 to look out• and aussc auen 'to look out' or 'to appear'; 
kriegen and bekommen 'to get, receive,' but unterkriegen 'to take care of, 
accommodate' with *unterbekommen, and kleinkrie~en 'to beat, take the 
starch out of 1 with *kleinbekommen . We accommo ate this lack of 
compositionality by assigning the meaning to the prefixed verb directly, 
rather than via a function based on the meaning of the prefix and stem. 
This is the sense of PREF+V' in the rules above. 
This limited predictability of meaning is, of course, expected of word 
formation. It is usually taken as evidence that a construction is lexical, 
and it legislates against any syntactic introduction of separable prefixes. 
(It would also seem to weigh a~ainst introducing separable prefixes by MR 
in the GPSG framework though Im not aware of any explicit principle 
forbidding MR's from effecting noncompositional semantic changes, and I 
could imagine requiring that rules be compositinal while allowing that 
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metarules might not be.) 11 
A stronger argument against the syntactic treatment (and the MR 
treatment) of these prefixes is the fact that prefixed verbs do not derive 
their subcategorizations from their unprefixed stems. If prefixes were 
added in the syntax we would expect the effect on subcategorization to be 
predictable. Sometimes it is, as when subcategorizations don 1 t change, 
e.g. in the case of erzaehlen 1 to tell' and nacherzaehlen 'to retell,' 
which both take accusative and dative objects. But wohnen 'to reside 1 
requires a locative, while beiwohnen 'to be inherent 1n, or to attend 1 
requires a dative. Similarly, ad libitum. The present treatment foresees 
no necessary connection between the subcategp21zations of prefixed and 
unprefixed verbs derived from a single stem. 
The above arguments are intended establish that at least some separable
prefixes must be introduced lexically. This is not to say that no rules 
exist which derive prefixed verbs syntactically,llnly that there are 
prefixed verbs which are not so derived. There may exist a large number of 
(regular) rules introducing prefixed verbs with predicted meanings--but 
these will not account for all prefixed verbs. 
The only novel aspect of the present treatment is that it must allow 
that some items be lexically inserted even though they are not semantically 
interpreted. Neither the prefixes nor the verb stems, both of which appear 
under syntactic nodes, are interpreted semantically. Instead, their 
combination is. This means, in turn, that although they must appear in the 
lexicon, there is no reason for these lexical items to be assigned a 
meaning in the lexicon. 
This means that the lexicon must contain, e.g. in connection with BR 
14, repeated here, the entries immediately below. 
( 1 ) 
<14, [PVP PREF, V ]. PREF+V 1 > : vor-werfen, zurueck-bringen, 
-fin nach-erzaehlen, ... 
-NPacc 
-NPdat 
{2) Samele Lexicon  
V V PREF+V  
-pref +pref 
+14 +14 +14 
bring- 0 nach 0 nach+bring- nachbr1ng-'
erzaehl- 0 vor 0 nach+erzaehl- nacherzaehl- 1 
werf- 0 zurueck 0 nach+werf- nachwerf- 1 
This use of empty lexemes is novel, to my knowledge, but it involves no 
new syntactic (or lexical) apparatus. 
We should take note of one controversial use that will be made of the 
semantics here. Let 1 s first note that prefixes and verbs are inserted 
freely into trees by the BR 1 s above. Not every prefix and every verb stem 
is eligible for insertion into every tree, of course, since the verb and 
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prefix nodes bear features specifying which lexical items are admissible. 
Since prefix and verb stem are both lexical items, they are both marked by 
the rule number, which indicates subcategorization class. This may best be 
seen by examining a tree, such as (3), which is admitted by a rule based on 
BR 11, and two applications of complement-adding metarules (the actual rule 
and derivation appear below): 












jagt alle fort 
Only lexical items from class 11 are eligible to be inserted here under 
either lexical node. I don't see any difficulty in allowing that PREF may 
also bear this feature, since it is also a lexical item to be inserted 
directly below an expanded node. Notice that the prefixes found among the 
verbs in class 11 include fort-, aus-, and zu- (and many others). These 
cannot be combined randomlywfth ill of thestems in this class to create 
well-formed separable prefix verbs, however. Thus we have fortjagen, 
ausnuetzen, and zulassen but not *fortnuetzen, *zunuetzen, and *zujagen.
Nothing in the tree in (3) disallows these, however. There are two ready 
solutions to this problem. 
The solution implicit in the BR's in (1) is that in interpreting the 
combination of verb and prefix (while allowing the free generation of any 
verb with any prefix), we filter out nonexistent combinations. The starred 
examples above are still generated, but uninterpretable. their unaccepta-
bility is explained as a case of semantic anomaly. Thus we appeal
(minimally) to a semantic filtering. 
As a second possible solution, we might multiply categories. We might, 
for example, replace BR 11 with (4): 
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{4) 
<11 ), [PVP PREF, V ], PREF+V'> zu-lassen, zu-machen, •• 
-fin  
-NPacc  




As a lexical item inserted in the expansion of BR ll{zu), both the 
prefix and the verb would bear the feature +ll(zu), which could only be 
expanded (in the case of the prefix) as zu. This sort of system would work 
to prevent unwanted combinations of preffi and verb stem, but because this 
latter treatment involves the multiplication of categories, I take the 
former to be preferable; it has been adopted here. If there were reason to 
avoid appeal to semantic filtering entirely, the latter treatment would be 
available. 
Before deriving VP rules, we have to say something about the LP rules 
which will be used to order separable prefixes at the end of VP's. Here, 
as above, there are two possibilities, depending on whether we wish to 
guarantee that separable prefix and verb stem alw~s form a constituent in 
nonfinite and nonmain clauses. 
The striking fact that the prefix and verb always appear together in 
these clauses, and that nothing may interrupt them suggests that we ought 
to guarantee that they appear in a single constituent in these sentences. 
To do this, we must first guarantee that we do not derive VP rules simply 
by using the complement adding MR's on the BR's in (1). The simplest way 
to do this is via feature: we add the feature [+pref] to the BR's with 
separable prefix, and we require that the complement-adding rules operate 
on [-pref] PVP's. Then we just need rules to change [+pref] to [-pref],
while creating the desired constituent, e.g. the following: 
{5)  
<n, [{P)VP V,PREF ], F> --> <n, [(P)VP (P)VP+pref ], F>  
+pref -pref  
-fin  
<n, [(P)VP V,PREF ], F> --> <n, [(P)VP (P)VP+pref ], F>  
+pref -pref  
-me  
The first rule requires that prefix and verb form a constituent in 
nonfinite clauses, the second in nonmain clauses. We note that although 
the prefix and verb stem form a constituent in the derived rules, they do 
not constitute a word. This has empirical consequences which we cannot 
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pursue here. 
Finally, we need a rule to wipe out the [+pref] feature in finite main 
clauses as well, in order to license the use of the complementadding MR 1 s 
in these cases as well. This is the task of (6): 
(6 ) <n, [(P)VP ... ], F> --> <n, [(P}VP ... ], F>  
+pref +me  
This rule, in distinction to those in (5), does not prescribe that the 
prefix and verb form a constituent. Instead, they are sister constituents 
in the (P)VP to which further sister may be added via the flat adding of 
complements. 
To provide for the ordering of separable prefixes vis-a-vis their 
sisters, let us assign the features +verb, -noun, +pref, and -fin to the 
separable prefixes. Then let us recall the LP statements (9.1} to (9.3) in 
3.3.1, repeated here for convenience: 
(7) 	1. v+fin < x  
+me  
2· X-verb < v_fin 
3. 	 X < V+f.,n  
-me  
(7.2) predicts that prefixes will be found at the end of VP's (after 
nonverbal elements), which is exactly the pattern noted. We verify the 
pattern again in (8): 
(8) Arno jagt 	 alle fort 
A chase all PREF  
'Arno chases everyone away•  
Given (7.3} we expect to find prefix and verb, in that order, at the end of 
subordinate clauses. This is also correct, as (9) documents. 
(9) ... dass Arno a11e fortjagt 
COMP 
' ..• that Arno chases everyone away' 
If to the existing LP rules we add (10): 
(10) PREF < v-mc 
then we expect to find the prefix and stem, in that order, at the end of 
verb phrases in subordinate clauses even when the verb is nonfinite. This 
is also true. Cf. (11): 
(11) ..• dass Arno alle fortgejagt hat 
AUX 
'that Arno chased everyone away• 
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The treatment just sketched is complicated since it would involve an 
extra feature, and several new MR's. It has the advantage, however, of 
having the fixed prefix+ stem constituent, which cannot possibly be 
interrupted by the subsequent introduction of modal or auxiliary verbs, or 
anything else. These may present a problem in some extension of the 
fragment described here, so that we may wish eventually to return to the 
alternative just sketched. 
On the other ~and, it's enough for the purposes of the present fragment 
to add (10) to the existing rules. That is, (7.2) has the consequence that 
prefixes appear at the end of VP's, while (7.3) guarantees that finite 
verbs follow prefixes in subordinate clauses, quite irrespective of the 
constituent structure of the VP 1 s involved. We still need (10) to obtain 
the order in (11), but again, there is no need to appeal to a verbal 
constituent. 
We'll tentatively adopt this (latter) treatment of verbs with separable 
prefixes. The first was sketched in detail, first because I wanted to 
demonstrate that it is not beyond the capacity of this approach to provide 
for the constituent in question, and second because there may be German 
constructions in which it is required. For example, (12) has not been 
incorporated into the present fragment, but it is suggestive that the 
finite auxiliary appears before the prefix: 
(12) 	 ... dass Arno alle hat fortjagen koennen 
COMP A all AUX away-chase can  
' ... that Arno could chase everyone away.•  
The finite auxiliary has a good deal of freedom in subordinate clauses 
with two or more nonfinite verbs, but it never interrupts the prefix and 
verb stem. 
To conclude this section, let us examine some VP rules derived from the 
BR's introduced here. 
(13) 	 <11, [PVP PREF, V ], PREF+V'> BR 
-fin  
-NPacc  
<11, 	 [VP NPacc, PREF, V ], PREF+V'(NPa')> FAC 
-fin 
Anticipating the rules introducing tense and applying the relevant LP 
rules (repeated below for convenience), we derive the VP rule in (14): 
(7.1) 	v+fin < x  
+me  











Ijagt 	 all e fort 
This is the structure of the VP in (8), though of course (8) actually
contains a CVP/NPnom. In case the feature [-me] is instantiated, another 
LP rule becomes relevant (repeated below for convenience), and we derive 
the VP rule in (15): 
(7.3) 	x < v+fin  
-me  





NP ace 	 PREF V 





alle 	 fort jagt' 
This is the structure of the VP in (9). 
3.4 Fronting Formalized 
The treatment of fronting, which was discussed extensively in 3.2.2 and 
3.2.3 above, can now be formalized. To provide for fronting from dependent 
clauses, noted in 3.3.2, we will employ the apparatus for unbounded 
dependencies introduced in Gazdar (1982), that of derived "slash" 
categories. For all of the rules in the grammar, defining membership in 
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categories a, and for all of the major constituent (i.e. frontable) 
categories 8 in German, we define the derived categories a/8: 
Derived Categories Metarule 
<n, [a ...w... ], F> --> <n, [a/S •.. w/a ••. ], AX*T{S)F> 
In addition to this, we must provide for basic expressions in each of the 
categories 8/8. These will all be phonologically null, and interpreted by 
the distinguished variables x*T(S): 
Traces 
<99, J, x*T(s)>t818 t 
Finally, we provide a linking rule to add the topicalized elements to 
sentences: 
Linking 
<100, 	 Ls x_fin, CVP/X+fin ], CVP/X'(X' )> 




The general strategy employed here has been presented, but several 
of the details of the Fronting MR merit further discussion. First, 
fronting is at least normally limited to main clauses, as Fourguet 
(1971:159) pointed out. This is reflected in the feature [+me] on the 
linking rule. Note at the same time that elements from subordinate clauses 
may be fronted to this matrix initial position because the system of 










~in dieses Zimmer I I COMP CVP/DIR 
sagte er /
dass ~ 
NPn NPa DIR/DIR V 
ID
er den Stuhl t stell te 
The details of (1) are not included in the present fragment (nor is 
complementation of any sort), but the tree illustrates the principle 
formalized in the Derived Categories Metarule that slash categories admit 
further slash categories, potentially extending the length between the 
topicalized element in first position and its expected untopicalized 
position beyond a single clause. 
Second, there are nonfrontable elements, most notably finite verbs and 
clitics, e.g. the pronoun es and the 11 conversation" particles denn, doch, 
schon, and ja. Separable prefixes likewise do not undergo front,ng.-----;"li"is 
is likewisereflected in features in the linking rule. 
Third, the formulation of the semantics in the derived rule presupposes 
that the semantic place of the constituent to be fronted, a, has been 
filled by a variable of the appropriate type, x*T(B)" 'T(a) 1 denotes the 
semantic type of the syntactic term 1 B. 1 
Fourth, this analysis accommodates the well-known fact that only single 
constituents may be fronted. 1~oberg (1981), a large corpus study, 
confirmed this most recently. This arises from the fact that there is no 
provision in the Derived Categories Metarule for more than a single missing 
element. Apparent sequences of constituents which may be fronted, such as 
Eine Geschichte erzaehlen in (2.1) in 3.3.1, are analyzed genuine 
constituents and therefore spurious counterexamples. Since the analysis 
allows that these unusual constituents may arise only when complements are 
added one at a time to the verb, it predicts that apparent sequences of 
fronted constituents will always contain a nonfinite verb, the exact 
generalization noted by Hoberg (1981:181) about these elements. 
In addition to these clear empirical advantages of the present 
analysis, we may add that it is reasonably parsimonious about fronting. 
Nonfinite partial verb phrases are fronted by the same mechanism that 
fronts other constituents, namely the Linking rule above. Finally, we may 
note that the analysis makes a number of further predictions about partial 
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verb phrases, notably about their conjoinability. For example, the 
analysis predicts that eine Geschichte erzaehlen may function as a consti-
tuent not only when it's fronted, but in nonfronted position, such as in 
(2), 	as well: 
(2) 	Er hat ihr eine Geschichte erzaehlt  
he AUX her a story tell(prt) 
'He told her a story'  
The 	 analysis predicts then e.g. that this may be conjoined with like 
constituents, which it in fact may: 
(3) 	Er hat ihr ein Buch geschenkt und eine Geschichte erzaehlt 
he AUX her a book give{prt) and a story tell{prt)
'He gave her a book and told [her] a story' 
Of course, this might be analyzed {even in this system, but especially .in 
others) as a sort of nonconstituent conjunction. 
Before concluding this section, an example of the application of the 
rules involved in fronting: 
(4) 	 <11, [pyp PREF, V ], PREF+V'> BR 
-fin  
-NPacc  
<11, [VP NPacc, PREF, V ], PREF+V'(NPa')> FAC 
-fin 
<11, 	 [CVP NP+nom' NPa, PREF, V ], PREF+V'(NPa'}(NPn')> FAC 
-fin +agr.  
+agr  
To this we apply the derived categories metarule to obtain a main 
clause rule: 
<11, 	 [CVP/NPa NP+nom' NPa/NPa, PREF, V ], 
-fin +agr AX*T(NP}{PREF+V 1 }(x*)(NPn 1 }>
+agr. 
+me 
{Note that we have tacitly included the meaning of NPa/NPa in the semantic 
rule above, rather than the NPa/NPa' that the rule actually calls for. The 
inclusion is justified, however, given BR 99, the Traces rule above, and it 
makes the formula easier to read.) 
Anticipating the rules introducing tense and applying the relevant LP 
rules (repeated below for convenience), we derive the CVP rule in (5): 
(7.1) 	v+fin < x (from 3.3)  
+me  







V NPn NPa/NPa PREF 






jagt er t fort 
The above subtree will be useful in connection with Linking Rule 
instantiations such as the following: 
<100. 	 [s NPa, CVP/NPa ]. CVP/NPa'(NPa'}>  
+me  
Together they admit the tree below: 


















Jagt er t fort 
Dich jagt er fort 
you chase he away
'You, he'll chase away' 
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Ignoring the introduction of tense, we derive the following formula 
from the semantic rules associated with the Linking rule and the Derived 
Category rule above: 
~x*T(NP)(fort+jag-')(x*)(er') (dich') 
which, applying lambda conversion, we see is equivalent to: 
fort+jag-'(dich')(er') 
This indicates that the fronting mechanisms are operating as desired. 
3.5 The Analyses of Jean Fourquet 
As pointed out in 3.4, the present analysis of fronting owes to Jean 
Fourquet (1971:159) the dependence of fronting on clause type. But 
Fourquet's general approach to analyzing the German clause as left-branch-
ing is also the nearest parallel to the postulation of the (phantom) PVP 
constituents advocated here. Fourquet (1971:159) postulates structures 
such as the following: 
(1) der Koenig 
G3 














The present proposal differs in allowing flat VPs as well as the 
contoured ones such as (1). But the conceptionnere is indebted to 
Fourquet. 
3.6 Two Strategies for the Treatment of Temporalia {in GPSG)
Although there might be any number of formalizations of the granwnar of 
tense and temporalia in GPSG, they will all do one of two things. Either 
the treatment will allow the free generation of the various tenses (most
likely in connection with maximally free feature instantiation), or it will 
not, but will instead find some mechanism of introducing the various tenses 
in some specia l way. In the first case, we simply allow any of the 
features which mark tense to be used in any rule, and take care e.g. that 
the meanings we assign in the lexicon to those verbs marked [+pres] differ 
from those [+pret]. A rule interpreting the tense feature might be all 
that is required on this view, or, alternatively, one might describe the 
systematic relationship between the various tenses using a rule of tense 
marking, but in this case it would be a lexical rule. This approach has 
the advantage of treating tense at the level at which is marked--on the 
lexical unit verb. 
In the second case, we introduce tense by syntactic rule, which seems 
more in keeping with its very regular and productive use. 
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Not GPSG alone, but in fact every framework faces this decision. The 
choice will depend both on semantic scope relationships and on the shape of 
tense marking in a particular language. For example, if tense were marked 
with a sentence or VP adverb in some language, no one would feel 
compunction about introducing tense at that level. In a language such as 
German (or English), however, where tense is marked morphologically, one 
would be inclined much more toward a treatment of tense as a lexical 
category--a feature of, or an operation on, words. A lexical treatment of 
tense would amount to the free generation of tense syntactically. 
The formulation of the BRs in 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 has removed the suspense 
from the present narrative: it should be clear that I have opted for the 
second alternative. All verbs are introduced here as nonfinite--but are 
deformed systematically by later rules to exhibit tense marking. There is 
a serious limitation to the first strategy which prompted this choice and 
which will be presented here. In fact, I argue for a somewhat more general 
conclusion: in any semantically cmposftfonal framework tense must be 
introduced at the VP level (or later), barring the use of structures 
intermediate to syntactic constituent structure and semantic interpreta-
tion. 
By some lights, this is a surprising result. Since tense in German is 
marked morphologically, one is inclined (as noted above) toward a lexical 
treatment. Indeed, according to the Generalized Lexicalist Hypothesis 
(LaPointe (1980:230)), a lexical treatment of German tense is required, not 
merely desirable: 
Generalized Lexicalist Hypothesis: No syntactic rule can refer to an 
element of morpological structure. 
The GLH would allow lexical rules {LaPointe's "Lexically Restricted 
Frames") to refer to adjacent lexical items in syntactic trees, but would 
not allow them to refer to phrasal nodes such as the node dominating 
duratives. (Cf. 3.7.1 for BRs introducing duratives.) Any framework 
incorporating the GLH will therefore either eschew compositionality or will 
be committed to a level of structure between syntax and semantics. 
LaPointe's own theory adopts the first alternative--in its extensive 
references to properties of "logical form." Consult LaPointe (1979) for 
details of his proposed system. The import of the argument below is that 
such references are unavoidable once the GLH has been adopted. 
The Generalized Lexicalist Hypothesis is therefore incompatible with 
semantic compositionality (without the postulation of structure interme-
diate to syntax and semantic composition). It also points to a larger 
issue. The GLH formalizes what might be called "Halle's morphology," which 
refuses to recognize a distinction between derivational and inflectional 
morphology. This section of the chapter shows the need--within 
semantically compositional frameworks--of reintroducing one important 
component of the inflectional/derivational distinction, viz. the need for 
syntactic rules to be able to refer to inflectional (but not derivational) 
morphology. 
3.6.1 Tense as a Verb Operator
Suppose then that the BRs did not admit only untensed VP's, but that 
they allowed e.g. that Present or Preterite forms appear as well. Since we 
accept the degree of semantic compositionality which Bach (1976) terms the 
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rule-to-rule hypothesis, we require that a mode1theoretic interpretation be 
assigned to the constituent admitted by these rules. Let us examine one 
such rule, in order to illustrate the problem concretely. 
{1) <2, Cyp V ]. ff)+pres VP+pres  






We argued in Chapter 1 that the meaning of the Present tense can be 
appropriately rendered by the tense logical constant PRES. We should 
therefore represent the meaning of the constituents introduced by BR 2 in 
{1) in the following way: 
{2) lxPRES(V'{x)) 
The difficulty arises in consideration of optional temporal modifiers, such 
as the durative stundenlang. As noted in 2.4, duratives must be assigned 
narrower scope than tense. Modifiers are introduced via MR's in GPSG, 
which suggests the following sort of MR for duratives: 
(3) <n, Cyp ••• ], F> --> <n, Cyp ••• DUR ••• ], w> 
The difficulty lies in replacing the 'w' with a coherent semantics. Any
attempt to provide the semantics in {3) will have to be able to reach 
within the Present tense operator in (2) and will thus be noncompositional 
(if the verb is already tensed). Nor can the formulation of the 
noncompositional rule be straightforward. We could not e.g. simply write: 
find the tense operator in F and insert the durative operator immediately 
to its right. Nor could we simply look for the first such operator--there 
may be more than one, as in the case of a conjunction: 
(4) ••• dass sie lange sangen und tanzten. 
COMP they long sang and danced  
' •.. that they sang and danced for a long time'  
The required fonnulation is clear enough: the durative operator must be 
inserted immediately to the right of the tense operators associated with 
the main verb(s) of the verb phrase. The rule is thus not only noncompo-
sitional, but it requires as well that (some) syntactic features be re-
tained in the semantic interpretation (viz. an indication of which verb(s) 
are main verb{s)). This is an unlikely looking violation of the principle
of autonomy of components. 
One solution to this problem would be to postulate a level of structure 
between syntactic constituent structure and semantic composition. This 
might be the level of "functional structure" in Lexical Functional Grammar 
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(LFG), for example. Halvorsen (ms) presents a semantics for LFG which 
composes model theoretic interpretations from functional structures (once 
these have been composed from syntactic phrase structures). Tense is 
factored out of verbs in functional structure (Halvorsen (ms: 2-3)), so 
that there should be no difficulty in accounting for the correct interpre-
tations of tense even if one treated tense as a verb operator, in LFG. The 
question to be pursued here is whether one can assign f~e correct interpre-
tation without using an additional level of structure. 
It is worth pausing to review the general lines of the above argument. 
Some temporal features, e.g. tense, are marked directly on verbs. If one 
allows all the VP rules to generate all the possible morphological forms of 
verbs, then tensed forms will be among them and will require interpreta-
tion. Optional elements, e.g. temporal adverbs, will not be present, 
however, and so will not be incorporated in this first step of interpre-
tation. Instead, they will be added to interpretations in which tense is 
already represented, and, given the way in which semantic interpretations 
are normally constructed, they will automatically be assigned wider scope 
than tense. This yields a dilemma: either all morphological features are 
interpreted as having narrower scope than all optional elements (which is 
false in the case of tense vis-a-vis duratives and frequentatives) or 
mechanisms must be developed which can restructure the natural scope 
relations. But this is always noncompositional and often messy. One can, 
however, avoid the dilemma by relinquishing the free generation of all 
tensed forms in basic rules. 
All of this indicates quite strongly that tenses should be introduced 
after the introduction of duratives, i.e. at the VP level or higher. 
Carlson (ms.) makes the same point based on the need to assign tense scope 
over some noun phrases, which assumption Enc (1981) has at least seriously 
challenged.
There is one remaining unexamined assumption in this argument, however, 
which ought to be considered: the argument assumes, namely , that duratives 
etc. must be analyzed as VP modifiers, and not as complements (semantics a-
rguments) of verbs. Couldn't duratives be reanalyzed as required comple-
ments for whom a place would automatically be held in semantic interpreta-
tion, so that the scope relations could be an automatic consequence of the 
the lexical meaning of the verb 
Excursus: On Duratives (and Frequentatives) as Complements to the Verb 
At first blush one might very well think so. For the sake of preci-
sion, let's provide some formal flesh to this proposal. Briefly, it 
foresees that will be subcategorized to take, in addition to its customary
nominal or adverbial complements, at least one temporal adverbial. The 
BR's must be modified appropriately. For example, (8) in 3.3.1 would read: 
(5) <2, [VP V ], V'> 
-TEMP 
: schlafen, lachen, .•. 
V ], V'><3, [PVP 
-TEMP 
-NPacc 
lieben, treffen, bauen, .•• 
Duratives and Frist-adverbials will be added via the usual MR's for adding 
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complements, CAC-MR and FAC-MR. There must of course be a zero element in 
each category, so that we may regard the complements as present even while 
they remain inaudible. The semantics of the basic verbs (and VP's built up
from them) would also have to be adjusted. In place of then-place pred-
icates which until now have been associated with basic (P)VP's, we should, 
for each such predicate, define an n+l-place predicate, with the new place
reserved for a temporal adverbial. Suppose for example that for every 
n-place predicate v associated with a basic (P)VP, we define an n+l place
vT with the following semantics: 
(6) As,r,e ~ vT{x0)(x1) ••• {xn) iff As,r,e F x0{v(x1) .•• {xn)) 
Note that thfs effectively gives elements of the complement category
{interpreted by x0 above) narrower scope than all other temporal ele-
ments--since the others will be added as sentence operators to atomic 
sentences such as vT(x }(x ) .•• (xn).0 1
Tense would then be added as a MR on lexical verbs. (This relinquishes 
the free generation of tensed forms, but it retains a lexical treatment. I 
don't see how a "free generation" treatment could work.) It would have to 
have the 	effect of deriving (7) from (5). 
{7) <2, Cyp V ], AXTEMP AY PRES{vr'(x)(y})> 
-TEMP  
+pres  




Crucial is the feature [-TEMP] here, which ensures that some temporal 
adverbial--perhaps null in realization--must be added to (2} and (3), and 
(given the semantics) that it must be quantified in within the scope of 
tense. 
The complement-adding MRs may then be applied to derive the rules in 
(8) = 
(8) 	<2, Cyp TEMP, V ], AyPRES {VT I (TEMP I )(y)) >  
+TEMP  
+pres 
= AyPRES(TEMP'(V'(y))), semantically 




= AXAyPRET(TEMP 1 (V 1 (x)(y})}, semantically 
The required scope relations have been realized in (8). 
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This has been achieved, however, at the cost of the introduction of new 
semantical apparatus, the predicates 'v ,' and new syntactic mise en scene, 
the null .realization of indefinite tempbral adverbials (to account for the 
optionality of these adverbials once they have been given the status of 
complements). In addition, since we analyze optional adverbials as comple-
ments, we can no longer regard optionality as proof of modifier status. 
Thus an interesting empirical claim has been relinquished as well. 
If this were not enough to bias one against the analysis of tense as a 
verb operator, rather less tractable problems arise when one considers the 
iterability of these temporal adverbials. Duratives and frequentatives are 
not limited to a single occurrence per clause as BR's 2 and 3 above might 
suggest: 
(9) 	Schon zwei Jahre besucht er uns jede Woche eine Stunde  
already 2 years visit he us every week an hour  
'He has visited us an hour every week for two years'  
Er hat uns zweimal eine Woche lang jeden Tag vier mal angerufen
he AUX us two-time a week long every day four time call 
'He's called us four times a day for a week twice' 
This is particularly inappropriate under the view that duratives and 
frequentatives function as members of the same category (cf. 2.4-2.5). In 
that case the sentences in (9) represent three and four iterations of the 
single category TEMP. 
But even a single iteration is an irreparable embarassment for the view 
that these are complements. Iteration is not only regarded as uncharacter-
istic for complements, it presents formidable technical problems as well. 
Since complements do not in general iterate, the admission of one iterable 
category would require a split in syntactic treatments--one for standard 
complements, one for iterables. We work ourselves into a semantic cul de 
sac as well because the addition of a temporal adverb to a verb should, 
uncler the complement view, yield a unique predicate--just as every function 
should yield a unique value when applied to a particular argument. But 
applying the function represented by the verb besuch- to its putative
durative argument seems to yield two functions--one which takes two NP 
arguments to form a proposition, and one which takes the NP arguments and a 
frequentative argument {and possibly another durative and then possibly 
still another frequentative argument). There isn't a recognizable sense in 
which this could be regarded as functional application.
There does not seem to be a plausible way to maintain an analysis of 
duratives {and frequentatives) as complements to the verb, and therefore to 
save the analysis of tense as a verb operator. 
3.6.2 Tenses as Phrasal Operators 
The analysis of tenses as verb operators looks even worse when one 
considers that there is a straightforward syntactic treatment of the scope 
relations between tense and duratives. We write the BR's so that no tensed 
elements can be introduced, i.e the BR's admit only constituents whose 
verbs are not semantically tensed. Ouratives, and other elements with 
scope narrower than tense are admitted via MR's which operate exclusively 
on untensed rules (in this case, simply those marked [-fin]). Tense-intro-
ducing MR's change this feature to [+fin], ensuring that duratives etc. 
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cannot subsequently be introduced. Finally, those elements whose temporal 
scope seems wider than tense, e.g. frame adverbials, are introduced via 
MR's which operate on tensed rules. In each case, the semantics associated 
with the rule simply attaches an appropriate operator, so that the meaning 
of the derived rule is obtained compositionally. 
If we e.g. introduced tense as a VP operator, following Bach, the meaning 
would simply be AXOPERATOR'(VP'(x)), where VP' is the meaning of the 
constituent which would have been introduced by the input rule. Bach 
(1980) suggested the use of the lambda operator in the above fashion as a 
means of introducing tense and aspect in order to reconcile the apparent 
sentence scope of tense (and aspect) operators with the fact that they
regularly appear on verb phrases. His remarks apply equally well to German 
with the minor adjustment (within the present framework) that we introduce 
tense not on VP's, but on CVP's, in order to be able to introduce tense 
even where we find no VP (=PVP_NPnom>' i.e. on impersonal constructions 
such 	as the impersonal passive (discussed in 3.2 above). 
As semantically elegant as the VP (or CVP) analysis might be, it 
appears nonetheless to run into a syntactic problem. There are subconsti-
tuents within the VP which bear tense marking--which would seem to indicate 
that tense ought to be introduced at the level of these constituents (or 
lower). In order to demonstrate the difficulty, we shall state the 
tense-introducing MR on CVP's: 
(1) 	Tense MR  
<n' [CVP . . . ] ' F> --> <n, [CVP •.. ], PRES(F)>  
-fin 	 +fin  
+pres  
<n, 	 [CVP • . . ] , PRET (F) > 
+fin 
+pret 
The operators PRES and PRET have the semantics described in 2.3 and 
1.6, which will notoe repeated here. The Head Feature Convention (HFC) 
ensures that the feature [+pres] will be passed from the CVP node to the 
lexical head of the CVP constituent, the verb. The lexicon then provides 
possible forms for the feature bundles: 
(2 } 	 verb e.g. verb  
+n (subcat. class) +2  
+pres (tense) +pres  
+x person +3per 
±singular +sing  
In this example, these would include schlaeft, lacht, and existiert. (Cf. 
BR 2.) The lexicon thus provides the correct morphological form in toto, 
leaving no work for late "spelling rules." This ensures that theproposal 
respects Brame's "spelling prohibition," and is consistent with the 
hypothesis of a limited interface between grammatical components. 
----------
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The fact that there are subconstituents within the CVP which regularly
exhibit tense marking {viz. verbs) may be felt to show that tense is 
therefore a verb category rather than a verb khrase category. It shows no 
such thing, however. The fact that tense mar ing is not on CVP's, but on 
verbs, just as person and number marking is on verbs, does not prevent 
tense from having important ramifications beyond the verb, just as person 
and number marking does. This is agreement in the case of person and 
number marking and semantic scope in the case of tense. The HFC ensures 
that a feature required on CVP's automatically make its way onto the word 
it is to mark. The HFC allows that tense may be introduced at the CVP 
level {by MR) but realized as specific verb features {and ultimately,
particular shapes of verbal stems). There is thus no discrepancy between 
the proposal that tense be accounted for via a CVP MR and the existence of 
elements within the CVP where tense marking is consistently realized. 
The case for analyzing tense as a verb operator does not improve with 
the observation that the subconstituents which bear tense marking are 
conjoinable, and therefore all the more robustly constituents. Finite 
verbs are eminently conjoinable: 
(3) ... dass sie alles sahen und beschrieben 
COMP they all saw(3p) and described(3p)  
1 ••• that they saw and described everything'  
( 3 I ) 	 51 
COMP 	 CVP  
-me / 	 ~ 
dass 	 NPnom VP 
-sing 	 +fin 
+3p 	 +pret 




/ 	 +fin 
+pret 
all es 	 -me 
+3pl 





sahen 	 beschrieben 
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Nor 	 is there any difficulty accounting for the conjunction node in 
(3'), though again there might appear to be at first blush. It is simply 
an instance of the conjunction schema--which allows the conjunction of any 
two 	 identical category labels, including nonbasic ones, as in this case. 
If the existence of subconstituents with tense marking doesn't prove
that tense ought to be introduced below the CVP level, nor does the 
existence of conjoined subconstituents with different tense. These 
examples 	are very easy to find for VP's: 
(4) 	Er kam gestern und geht morgen 
he came yesterday and goes tomorrow  
'He came yesterday and will go again tomorrow'  
(4) may be derived via tensed CVP rules to which the Derived Category 
Metarule applies, resulting in the definition of a CVP/NPn category. 
Not all conjunctions of differently tensed (P)VP's would be so tract-
able, however. The examples I have examined of such conjunctions all seem 
dubious to native speakers, but some do not seem impossible: 
(5) 	 .•• das Buch, das ich dir wegnahm und jetzt zurueckgeben will 
the book RELPRO I you away-took and now back-give want 
' .. • the book that I took from you and now want to give back 
[to 	you]' 
The derived category metarule is of no help here because the conjoined 
phrases are lacking several complements, rather than one. If examples such 
as these are well formed, then tense must be introduced via a MR on 
(P)VP's, rather than just CVP's, as (1) specifies. This is unproblematic: 
in this case duratives etc. would be introduced as optional modifiers via 
MR's on [-fin] (P)VP's). The important point is that BR's are [-fin], that 
duratives are optionally introduced only into [-fin] (P)VP's, and that 
tense introduction changes the [-fin] PVP to [+fin]. 
3.7 Metarules for Temporalia 
3.7.1 Duratives and Frist Adverbials 
Given the fact noted in 2.4 and 2.5, that duratives and Frist 
adverbials such as in einer Stunde have mutually exclusive meanings, we see 
no need to put them 1n separate syntactic categories--even though they 
appear in complementary distribution. Both may be regarded as elements of 
the category of temporal adverbs, TEMP, while their distribution may be 
explained semantically. This suggests the following rules: 
(1 ) 	<200, [TEMP DUR], DUR'> 
<201, [TEMP FRIST], FRIST'> 
As indicated in 3.6, these may be introduced into [-fin] CVP's via a MR: 
(2) 	 <n, [CVP ••. ], F> --> <n, [CVP ••• TEMP •.• ], TEMP(F)>  
-fin  
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There are lexical primitives in the class of duratives: 
(3) 200: sekundenlang, minutenlang, ••• ,lange, ewig, .•. 
These must be assigned meanings which combine with propositional meanings 
in such a way as to guarantee that the truth conditions of sentences with 
duratives are derivable. For example, the semantic interpretation of 
sekundenlang is that function 
(4) s-1 such that for any proposition p, and any model A and times 
s,e,and r:  
Ase j= s-l(p) iff there is a e 1 such that  , ,r 1. e is a final subinterval of e' 
2. e' is at least two seconds long 
3. Vi£.e' As,i,r F p. 
Cf. 	 the examples of duratives in 2.4. 
There are also nonlexical elements in the category of duratives. Any
NP denoting a duration can function as a durative, e.g. n Sekunden 
(lang), n Minuten (lang), etc. The grammar of these is spec1f1ed in (5): 
(5) 	for any NP denoting a duration (in A), the following rule fs 
available:  
<202, [DUR NPacc (lang) ], d(NP 1 )>, where d(NP 1 ) is that  
function, 	which, for any model A, proposition p, and times s,e, and r 
Ase r F (d(NP'))(p) iff there is a e' such that 
' ' 1. e is a final subinterval of e' 
2. e' is at least [NP']A long 
3. Vi£e' As,i,r F p. 
(5) may seem to illicitly appeal to a semantic well-formedness condition in 
specifying that BR 202 is applicable only to NP 1 s denoting durations. It 
may just as well be formulated so that the syntax is blind to semantics: 
clause (2) of the definition of d(NP') then rules out the interpretation of 
NPs which do not denote durations. 
It seems that there are no lexical items in the category of Frist 
adverbials, but (6) provides for phrases in this category. 
(6 ) 	 <2o3 , [FRIST pp+inFRIST ], PP'> 
<204, [pp PREP+inFRIST NP+dat ], PREP 1 (NP 1 )>  
+inFRIST  
204: in 
in is the only element in lexical category 204. It is furthermore seman-
Tically distinct from locative (and other) instances of in. The lexical 
semantics of in is responsible for the truth conditions or these adverbials 
(which were sketched, and defended, in 2.5 above). Its meaning is defined 
only for those cases in which it combines with NPs denoting durations. Its 
combinations with other NP's are anomalous (but subject to misinterpreta-
tion because of the homophonous prepositions). 
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(7) 	 in ' is that function f which takes as arguments 
duf~~fa~s and yields as values propositional operators, so that 
for any duration d, proposition p, in all models A at all times 
s,e, and r: 
A F(in'(d))(p) iff e is at most din length and 3!is.e 
s,e,r such that A ~ p.s,i,r 
Cf. 	 the discussion in 2.5. 
Further sorts of narrow scope temporal adverbs might be introduced in 
the same manner. The strategy should be clear from these two examples,
however, so that we might best turn to rules introducing other temporal 
elements in order to see how the entire system is coordinated. The 
nonperfect tenses were introduced in (1) in 3.6.2 and needn't be repeated 
here. (These were singled out for syntactic reasons--they involve no 
auxiliary verbs, unlike the Perfect tenses.) 
3.7.2 Frame Adverbials (that Modify Reference Time) 
The MR in (1) introduces frame adverbials (of the sort that modify 
reference times) into the current fragment: 
(1) 	Frame MR  
], F> --> <n, [ ... FRAME ... ], FRAME'(F)> <n' [CVP  
+fin  
These adverbials are thus introduced semantically as propositional oper-
ators (as 2.1 suggested might be needed), while they fall under the CVP 
node syntactically. The feature [+fin] disallows the addition of frame 
adverbials to structures which haven't incorporated tense. Its inclusion 
on the left side of (1) effectively guarantees that frame adverbials have 
wider scope than tense, which accords with the discussion in 2.1 of the 
semantics of frame adverbials vis-a-vis tense. The class of frame 
adverbials includes the primitives gestern, heute, and morgen. These must 
be included in the lexicon: 
(2) 	 FRAME : gestern, heute, morgen, .•. 
The semantic interpretation of these lexical primitives will of course also 
be provided in the lexicon. We will treat their semantics much as we do 
the semantics of more complicated expressions. In general, frame 
adverbials may be said to be associated with a time interval; e.g. morgen 
is associated with the day after speech time, etc. (In such simple cases 
we are even tempted to say that it simply denotes the time interval.) To 
describe the semantics of this sort of frame adverbial, a rule like the 
following suffices: --
(2') 	the semantic interpretation of morgen, used as a frame adverbial, 
is that function FRAME(110rgen 1 ), such that for any model A, 
proposition p, and times s,e, and r: 
As,e,r ~ FRAME(110rgen 1 )(p) iff r=.[110rgen 1 ]As,e,r and As,e,r ~ P· 
- lU .. 
Similarly for the interpretations of heute, festern, etc. This is, of 
course, the way these frame adverbials werenformally described in 2.1 
above. 
(2') is the rule we shall adopt, even though it would certanly run into 
difficulties with other sorts of frame adverbials. Since unfortunately not 
all frame adverbials are as specific as morgen, it is peculiar to regard
them as associated with a time interval. Consider, for example, an jedem
Samstag 'on every Saturday. 1 This would have to be associated in one way
or another with times that fall within every Saturday; the times involved 
clearly would not constitute an interval, and worse, they could not even 
effectively be dealt with as a set of points of time (without some 
extensive apparatus), since this tack would not distinguish 'every 
Saturday' from 'one Saturday.' And in such a case, it won't be possible to 
assign an interval to [aa-Samstag]A e •s, , r 
Dowty (1979:325f) provides a method for dealing with frame adverbials 
of this sort, but we won't attempt to generalize it for use in this work 
since, as noted above, we don't attempt to include propositions about 
iterated events in this work. It is, moreover, clear that any such attempt
to generalize Dowty's method for application here would require careful 
accommodation of the concept of reference time: it would be unreasonable to 
conceive of there being a set of reference times included in the model as 
temporal parameters only in order to then be used in connection with 
propositions about iterated events. 
We shall therefore content ourselves with the approximation in (2'), 
and continue with the semantics of other elements in this category,
including nonbasic elements. Nonprimitive expressions in this category
include am Montag, um vier Uhr, in der Woche nach Weihnachten, im Dezember, 
and in 1983. These demonstrate the need for rules such as the following: 
(3) 	<211, [FRAME PREP+an NPdat ], a"r'(NPd')> 
a"1,' is the meaning of the temporal an, distinct from the locative. Its 
semantics are as follows: -
(4) 	 a"1,' is that function which takes as arguments days and has as 
value, for every day d, in every model A, and with respect to 
every proposition p, and times s,e, and r, that function f such 
that 
As,e,r ~ f(p) iff r~d and As,e,r Fp. 
The combination of the temporal an with an expression which does not denote 
a day is semantically undefined ,n (4). It may be regarded as ill formed 
(since it is therefore anomalous). It should be noted that (4) does not 
specify how certain NP's come to denote days; that they do may be taken as 
a reasonable starting point, however. ((4) very definitely does not p-
resuppose that NP's denote days nonindexically. We may easily allow that 
NP's are interpreted with respect to any or all the parameters s,r, ore. 
The first two are clearly required.)
The syntax of {3) is remiss in not providing an account of the an/am 
allomorphy. This is a fairly complicated matter, however, as the pattern 
in (5) might suggest: 
- 128 -
(5} 	 an dem Tag (emph.} an dem Montag (emph.}  
am Tag am Montag  
an dem Tag (unemph.} * an dem Montag (unemph.}  
Cf. 	Schaub (1979} and references there for a more complete discussion of 
these issues. We will not concern ourselves further with the matter here. 
an will simply be written as am before the names of the days of the week. 
- We proceed similarly for the other prepositional phrases which function 
as frame adverbials. For example, um: 
(6} 	 <212, [FRAME PREP+um NPacc ], tar'(NPa'}> 
...,.. is that function which takes as arguments times of the day 
and has as value, for every time T, with respect to every A, p, s, e, and 
r, that function f such that: 
As,e,r ~ f(p} iff rE {i l 3t 'ET and t 1 £i} and As,e,r f p. 
The definition presupposes that T may denote a time of day--that is, the 
same time on every day. It is unlike other temporal constants used thus 
far in that it doesn't denote a specific time, such as 2 pm on Sept. 26, 
1983, but rather 2 pm on every day. 
Var is somewhat more interesting in that it takes durations as argu-
mentsand yields frame adverbials as values. To define the semantic 
effects of var, we first need to define the notion of interval bound by a 
and b, (a,b,: 
Definition. For a and b intervals such that a<b 
(a,b) = {t!Vt1EaVt2Eb(t1<t<t2}}(read: the interval between a and b) 
As the definition stands, (a,b) might he either an open or a closed (or 
half-open, or half-closed} interval, depending on a and b. This will pley 
no role in the use of the concept here. 
Below is then the rule introducing var, and its lexical meaning: 
(7} 	 <213, [FRAME PREP+vor NPdat ], vorT 1 (NPd 1 )> 
vor • is that function which takes durations as arguments and has 
as value, f6r every duration d, and every A, p, s, e, and r that function 
f such that 
As e r }= f(p) iff r E{t it<s and (t,s) is length d } & As l- p
' ' 	 ,e,r r 
(vor is also interpreted to locate event time, in which case its 
semantlc rule is somewhat different. Cf. 4.2 for an explication of this.) 
To see the import of BR 213, we examine the derivation below. We assume 
that zwei Stunden is a dative NP, and that it denotes the duration two 
hours. 
(8} 	 <213, [FRAME PREP+vor NPdat ], vorT'(NPd' )> 
The 	 rule in (8} admits the subtree below: 
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vor zwei Stunden 
This will be assigned the interpretation below (by the semantic part of the 
ru1e i n ( 8 ) ) : 
vorT'(zwei-Stunden') 
Since zwe1-Stunden' is by assumption the duration two hours, the above is 
equivalent to that function f, such that, for all A, s,e,r, and p: 
As,e,r I= f(p) iff rE { t lt<s /\ (t,s) is two hours in duration } and 
As,e,r F P· 
The effect of adding frame adverbials to verb phrases in combi nation 
with tense and other sorts of temporal adverbials is illustrated in the 
following section, 3.8 . 
Before closing this section, we should note how combinations of frame 
adverbials will be treated. This is quite straightforward semantic, and 
involves only one minor additional rule syntactically. To begin, let us 
note that one way of introducing combinations of frame adverbials is quite 
straightforward. We simply apply the Frame Adverbial MR iteratively. The 
following is quite legitimate: 
(10) <2, Eyp V ], V'> : schlaf-
-ffn 
<2, 	 [CVP NP+nom' V+agr ], V'(NPn')> FAC MR 
-fin +agr 
<2, 	 [CVP NP+nom' V+agr ], PRES(V'(NPn'))> Tense MR 
+fin +agr (3.6.2} 
+pres 
<2, [CVP FRAME1, NP+nom' V+agr ], FRAME1(PRES(V'(NPn'}))> 
+fin +agr Frame MR 
+pres 
<2, 	 [CVP FRAME 1, FRAME2, NP V ]+nom' +agr ' 




The notation above is nonstandard: the subscripts have been added to 
clarify the workings of the metarules. They are not required to preserve 
semantic scope relationships, and they are certainly not standard practice 
in GPSG. 
The final rule in the above derivation justifies the subtree below: 
CVP 
+fin 
NPn FRAME 1 FRAME 2 V  
+agr  +fin ~ +pres 
PREP NPacc 
+um 
I ~ \  
Hans morgen um diese Zeit schlaeft 
Using the semantic part of the final rule above, we can verify that itera-
tive application is indeed properly provided for. We examine the sentence: 
(11) ... dass Hans morgen um diese Zeit schlaeft 
COMP tomorrow at this time sleep(pres) 
' •.. that Hans will be sleeping tomorrow at this time' 
We assume that diese Zeit denotes the hour of the day as of speech time 
(more exactly, the set of times each of which includes a time whose hour of 
the day conincides with speech time). Then the semantic interpretation of 
(11) may be determined as follows: 
(1 1') Ase r ~ (11) iff
' . 
As,e,r ~ (Wtr'(diese-Zeit' )){110rgen 1 (PRES(schlaf-'(H))))  
iff  
r E{ i lt'E[diese-Zeit']A e and t' ~; } s, , r 
and As,e,r f 110rgen'(PRES(schlaf- 1 (H))) 
iff 
3t' E[diese-Zeit']A and t'sr and r Sday followingss,e,r 
and As,e,r FPRES(schlaf-'(er')) 
iff 
II II II II II II II II II II II II 
and e=r-<s and Ase r ~ schlaf-'(H) 
, ' 
- 131 -




The iterative application of the Frame Adverbial MR thus amounts to 
multiple modification of reference time, and presents no semantic 
difficulties (as asserted in 2.1 above). We note here again that the 
relative scope of the adverbials is irrelevant. This may be seen in the 
above derivation: had we evaluated 110rgen'(~(diese-Zeft'))(p) rather than 
(U11-y-(diese-Zeft 1 ))(110rgen'(p)), we would have to switch the order of the 
first two conjuncts in the final line of the derivation above, but there 
would be no change in the set of conjuncts. 
There is, however, a syntactic inadequacy of the treatment thus far, 
namely the failure to allow such multiple frame adverbials constituent 
status, which is required to generate sentences such as the following: 
(12) 	Morgen um diese Zeit schlaeft er  
tomorrow at this time sleep(pres) he  
'He 1 ll be sleeping tomorrow at this time'  
We may introduce such compound frame adverbials with the following rule: 
Compound Frame Adverbial MR  
<214, [FRAME FRAME1, FRAME2, ..• FRAMEn ],  
~p(FRAME1(FRAME 2( ... (FRAMEn(p}} •.• )))>  







morgen um diese Zeit
' 
This might have been used e.g. in connection with the rule derived in the 






NPn FRAME V  
+agr +fin  ~ +pres 





Hans morgen um diese Zeit sch1aeft 
The interpretation of this structure, prescribed in the same rule, is 
straightforward, once BR 214 is incorporated. 
FRAME(PRES(V'(NPn'))) 3rd rule in (10) 
FRAME= Ap(110rgen'((UT11y-(diese-Zeit'))(p))) BR 214, 210, 212 
Ap(110rgen 1 ((~(diese-Zeit 1 ))(p))) (PRES(schlaf-'(H))) 
morgen'((un,-(diese-Zeit'))(PRES(schlaf- 1 (er')))) 
The above formula is exactly that whose truth conditions were derived in 
(11 ') above, except that the relative scope of morgen' and 
~(diese-Zeit') has been reversed. But since the relative scope of frame 
adverbials is immaterial to truth conditions (as noted above), this means 
therefore that the above formula is equivalent to the one evaluated in 
(11 1 ), which seems correct. 
This concludes the discussion of temporal adverbials. It will be 
resumed in 4.2 and 4.3, and the interaction of temporal particles and 
temporal adverbials will be taken up in 3.9. 
3.8 Some Derivations 
In order to best appreciate the effects of the rules introduced in 3.7, 
some derivations should be examined. Beginning with BR 15, we apply the 
Flat Adding of Complements MR (FAC-MR) and the Tense MR: 
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(1) <15, [pyp PREF, V ], PREF+V'> --> (FAC-MR) 
-fin  
-PPauf  
<15, 	 [yp PP+auf• PREF, V ], PREF+V'(PP')> --> (FAC-MR)  
-fin  
<15, 	 [CVP NPn, PP+auf' PREF, V+agr ], PREF+V'(PP')(NPn')>  
-fin +agr  
--> (TEMP-MR) 
<15, [CVP TEMP, NPn, PP+auf• PREF, V+agr ],  
-fin +agr TEMP'(PREF+V'(PP')(NPn'))>  
--> (TENSE-MR)  
(2) <15, [CVP TEMP, NPn, pp+auf• PREF, v+agr ], 
+fin +agr PRET(TEMP'(PREF+V'(PP')(NPn')))> 
+pret 
To this we apply the Derived Categories Metarule, obtaining: 




Ignoring the relative position of the NPn/NPn trace, the LP rules allow 
only two PSR's to be associated with this last ID statement, one of which 
is provided with (4). The relevant LP rules are repeated in (3) for 
convenience. (Recall that prefixes are nonfinite verbs in feature 
specification.) 
(3) 	 V < X+fin  
+me  





(Given our LP statements thus far, the prepositional phrase might have 
preceded the temporal adverbial in (4); ignoring the NPn/NPn trace, there 
is no other possibility.) The linking rule schema includes: 
<100, [~ NPn CVP/NPn ], CVP/NPn'(NPn)>  
.:> +agr +agr +me 
The following tree is thus allowed: 














Er passte stundenlang auf sie auf  
he watched for hours on them PREF  
'He watched them for hours'  
BR 100 and (2) above allow us to derive the semantics associated with (5),
represented by (6): 	 · 
(6) AZ*T(NP)(PRET(TEMP'{aufpass-'(sie' )(z))) (er') 
From BR 200 we know that TEMP' = DUR' {= stundenlang'). We may also 
simplify the A-expression in (6), to obtain (7), whose truth conditions are 
derived in (8): 
(7) PRET(stundenlang'(aufpass-'{sie')(er'))) 
(8) 	 A ~ (7) iff e=r<s and Ase r rstunl'(aufpass-'(sie')(er))










stundenlang auf sie auf 
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iff e=r<s and there is an e• such that 
1. e is a f1nal subinterval of e 1 
2. e•/ 15 at 1east two hours 1 ong 
?. Vi~e· As,i,r ~ aufpass- 1 (sie 1 )(er 1 ) 
The sentenr~ in (5) holds then in the following sort of situation: 
(9) 	 time of 1 his watching them• 
) ~  
e'. at least two hours long 
The tree in (5) employs the English-like subject-predicate word order, 
but we might just as easily have derived a sentence with a different 
11 fronted 11 constituent. This would be accomplished by applying the Fronting 
MR, somewhat differently to (2) above; this may yield (10), which 
complements (11), another instance of the linking schema: 
(10) 	 <15, [CVP/PPauf TEMP, NPnom, PPauf/PPauf, PREF, V+agr ], 
+fin +agr 
+pret 
AX*T{PPauf)(PRET(TEMP'(PREF+V 1 (x)(NPn 1 )) ) )> 
(11) 	 <100, [S PPauf, CVP/PPauf ], CVP/PP 1 (PP 1 )> 
+me 





+pret/~ 	 +3s 
PREP 	 NP ace +15 ·r 	 I V NPnom TEMP PP/PP PREF 





passte er 	 stundenlang t auf 
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Auf sie passte er stundenlang auf 
on them watched he for hours PREF  
'He watched them for hours'  
(13) 	 lxT(PPauf) (PRET(stundenlang'(aufpass-'(x)(er')))) (sfe')  
PRET(stundenlang'(aufpass-'{sie' ){er')))  
(13) 	 is identical to (7), so that the sentences thus analyzed are 
provably equivalent. 
We might equally well have applied the Fronting MR's to the CVP rule in 
(2) to create (14), and have instantiated the fronted schema as in (15), 
both of which may combine to admit the tree in (16), whose semantics are 
di sp1ayed in (17) : . 




(15) 	 <100, [5 TEMP, CVP/TEMP ], CVP/TEMP 1 (TEMP 1 )>  
+me  
(16) 	 s  
+me  
~/TEMP
TEMP +me  
+fin  
/ +pret  
+15  
DUR +3s  
/ 	 V/~/TEMP PREF 
stundenlang 	 +fin +3s +ace +15 
+pret ~
+15 PREP NPacc 
+3s +auf 
I 	 /
passte er auf 	 sie t auf 
Stundenlang passte er auf sie auf 
for hours watched he on them PREF 
'He watched 	 them for hours' 
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(17) 	 AXT(TEMP)(PRET(x(aufpass-'(sfe')(er')))) (stundenlang')  
PRET(stundenlang'(aufpass-'(sfe')(er')))  
Since (17) is identical to (7) and (13), it is obviously equivalent to 
the sentences analyzed in (5) and (12). 
It is worth examining a sentence with peculiarly German temporal
modification. 
(18) 	Morgen sind wir zwei Jahre hier  
tomorrow are we two years here  
'We'll have been here two years as of tomorrow'  
The derivation of the rules responsible for (18) begins with BR 9 (from
3.3.1), to which first the predicative and nominative are added via the 
FAC-MR, second the durative via the TEMP MR, third tense via its MR, and 
finally the frame adverbial also via MR: 
(19) 	 <9; Epyp V ], V'> --> (FAC-MR) 
-fin  
-pred  
<9, Eyp PRED, V ], V'(PRED')> --> (FAC-MR) 
-fin 
<9, [CVP NPn, PREO, V+agr ], V1 (PRED 1 )(NPn')> --> 
-fin +agr (TEMP-MR) 
<9, [CVP NPn, TEMP, PREO, V+agr ], TEMP'(V'(PRED')(NPn'))> 
-fin +agr 
--> (TENSE-MR) 




<9, [CVP NPn, FRAME, TEMP, PRED, v+agr ], 
+fin +agr 
+pres 
FRAME 1 {PRES{TEt4' 1 {V'(PRED 1 )(NPn'))))> 
The Derived Categories MR may be applied to obtain: 
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<9, [CVP/NPn NPn/NPn, FRAME, TEMP, PRED, V+agr ], 
+fin +agr 
+pres 
AX*T(NP)(FRAME 1 (PRES(TEMP 1 (V'(PRED 1 )(x))))> 
~hich 	may be used in conjunction with the Linking rule schema: 
<100, 	 [s NPn CVP/NPn ], CVP/NP'(NP'}>  
+me +agr +agr  
BR 202 (from (5) in 3.7.1) will also be put to use: 
[DUR 	 NPacc] 
as will a lexical entry from (2) in 3.7.3, and a rule allowing hier to be 
used predicatively, to admit the following tree: 



















morgen zwei Jahre hier 
Wir 	 sind morgen zwei Jahre hier 
we 	 are tomorrow two years here 
1 We 1 ll have been here two years as of tomorrow' 
Combining the semantics specified in (19} with those in BR 100, we predict
the interpretation of the tree (20) as in (21), the truth conditions for 
which are derived in (22): 
(21) 	 AX*T(NP)(110rgen'(PRES(2-J 1 (sei-'(hier 1 )(x)))) (wir')  
110rgen'(PRES(2-J 1 {sei- 1 (hfer 1 )(wir 1 ))))  
- 139 -
(22) Ase r ~ (21), by (2') in 3.7.2, iff 
' ' r is a ~ubinterval of the day followings and 
Ase PRES(2-J'(sef- 1 (hier 1 )(wfr 1 )))
' ,r 
By the definition of 'PRES 1 in 2.3.2, the latter conjunct holds iff 
e=r~s and As,e,r F 2-J 1 (sei- 1 (hfer 1 )(wir 1 )), 
i.e. by 	 (5) in 3.7.1 iff 
e=r~s and there is an e' such that 
1. e is 	a final subinterval of e' 
2. e' is at least [2 Jahre]A long 
3. Vi£e 1 A . I= sei- 1 (hfer 1 )(wfr 1 )
St l Ir 
Thus the sentence in (20) is true in situations such as the one sketch-
ed in (23): 
(23) 	
's \Vo/)v the day after s 
1 
I 
e 1 , at least two 
years long --·' 
The fragment thus accommodates these distinctly German temporal con-
structions quite readily. Similar, even more complicated temporal modi-
fication is analyzed in 4.2. Alternative applications of the fronting MR's 
(cf. 3.4) would allow us to derive any of the following sentences (in a 
fashion analogous to the derivations in (10)-(12) and (14)-(16) above): 
(24) 	a. Morgen sind wir zwei Jahre hier  
tomorrow are we two years here  
'We ' ll heve been here two years as of tomorrow'  
b. Zwei 	 Jahre sind wir morgen hier 
c. Hier sind wir morgen zwei Jahre 
All of these will be assigned the same truth conditions, as a glance at the 
semantics of the Derived Categories MR and the Linking Schema may verify.
A final example illustrates the treatment of Frist adverbials. We 
begin, as always, with a BR (in this case (13)), to which the MR adding 
complements, the TEMP-MR, and the Tensing MR all apply: 
(25) <13, [PVP PREF, V ], PREF+V'> --> (2 x FAC-MR) 
-fin  
-NP gen  
<13, [CVP NPn, NPgen, PREF, V+agr ], PREF+V 1 (NP 1 )(NPn')> 
f . +agr- , n 
--> (TEMP-MR) 
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<13, [CVP TEMP, NPn, NPg, PREF, v+agr ],  
-fin +agr  
TEMP 1 (PREF+V 1 (NPg 1 )(NPn 1 ))> 
--> {Tense MR} 
<13, [CVP TEMP, NPn, NPg, PREF, v+agr ], 
+fin +agr 
+pret PRET(TEMP 1 (PREF+V 1 (NPg')(NPn 1 )))> 
Let us also recall BR's 201, 203, and 204, repeated here for con-
venience: 
(26) <201, [TEMP FRIST], FR'> 
<2o3, [FRIST pp+inFR ], PP'>  
+dat  
<204, [pp PREP+inFR NPdat ], PREP 1 (NP 1 )> in 
+inFR  
+dat  
The rules in (26) justify the subtree in (27) and, together with the 
lexical entry for in (in (7) in 3.7.1), assign the meaning in (28} to its 










in einer Stunde 
+FR 
in einer Stunde  
in one hour  
1 in an hour'  
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{28) {assuming that e1ne Stunde denotes the duration of one hour) 
in 1 {e1ne Stunde 1 ) is that function, which, for all models A,  
propositions p, and times s, e, and r:  
Ase r ~ {1n'(e1ne Stunde')){p) iff e is at most one hour long and  
• ' 	 31iSe A . ~ p.s, 1, r 
Applying the Derived Categories MR to the rule in (25), and choosing
the correct instance of the Linking schema, we can show (29): 
(29) 	 s  
+me  
NPnom +me 
+3s 	 +3s 
/ +fin  +pret +13  
V NPn/NPn NPgen TEMP PREF 





I 	 +inFR +dat 
er 
t der Situationwurde ~ 
PREP NPdat 
?nFR~ 
in einer Stunde 
3.9 The Syntax of Temporal Schon 
Temporal schon is one of a small class of adverbial particles, includ-
ing noch and erst, which may appear either alone as VP adverbs or in 
construction with another temporal adverbial. The following may be taken 
as representative of schon's syntactic range: 
(1) 	 a. Er war schon da  
he was already there  
'He was already there'  
b. Schon stundenlang war 	er da 
for hours  
1 He'd been there for hours [already]'  
c. 	(%) In schon zwei Stunden konmt er  
in two hours come he  
'He'll come in just two hours'  
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d. Schon morgen ko111T1t er 
tomorrow  
'He's coming tomorrow'  
To provide for examples such as (la), the syntax clearly must allow the 
independent introduction of schon into VP rules. The following rule 
accomplishes thfs: 
Particle MR 
<n, [CVP X ], F> --> <n, [CVP PART X ], PART'(F)> 
PART : schon, noch, erst 
The second line is essentially a lexical insertion rule: it stipulates that 
the lexical primitives on the right are members of the category PART. The 
meaning of schon (and erst) was presented in 2.6; the meaning of noch will 
be the subject of 4.3.-nie Particle MR then provides for introduction of 
particles into CVP rules (and thus CVP subtrees) as immediate daughters of 
CVP. The sort of rule derivation which this foresees is exactly parallel 
to that employed in the introduction e.g. of duratives, which was 
illustrated in derivation (1) in 3.8. We therefore forego further 
illustration here, and we merely assert that this pair of rules will allow 
the generation of setences such as (la). Schon and the other particles 
tend to appear earlier in VP's, but since they do not seem to be 
constrained to appear at only certain points, no further LP rules would 
seem to be required in connection with the particle MR. (As noted in 2.6, 
many speakers resist fronting schon independently, so that it may not 
appear in isolated preverbal pos1t1on for these speakers. But this is a 
matter of constraining the Fronting MR appropriately, and it doesn't call 
for additional LP rules.) 
We note that the Particle MR does not stipulate that the CVP rule to 
which the provision for particles is to be added be finite, or that it be 
nonfinite. This reflects the fact that there is no essential scope rela-
tionship between schon' and the tense which will eventually interpret the 
finite VP. (N.b. There is no essential scope relationship in the present 
semantic theory; there almost certainly is in many others.) 
The fact that schon appears wi.th other words before the finite verb in 
(lb)-(ld) indicates that it is part of a constituent with those words. 
Further syntactic rules are required to provide for the existence of such 
constituents. We handle the simplest case, (ld), first. 
Particle+ Frame Adverbial MR  
<n, [FRAME F ], F'> -->  
<n, [FRAME F, PART], Ap(F'(PART'(p})}>  
The order of elements in constituents admitted by the rule above is free; 
in addition to (ld}, we find: 
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(2) 	Morgen schon kommt er 
Er kommt morgen schon 
Er kommt schon morgen 
Thus no further LP rules will be required.
Using the Particle+ Frame Adverbial MR, we provide a derivation of 
(ld), beginning with the lexical insertion rule for basic frame adverbials, 
which we number BR 210 here: 
<210, [FRAME X ], X'> : morgen, ••• ((2) in 3.7.2) 
<210, [FRAME X,PART ], Ap(X(PART'(p)))> Part a Frame Adv. MR 
The above rule justifies the existence of the preverbal constituent. We 
also need a rule admitting the VP: 
<2, [VP V ], V'> from 3.3.1  
-fin  
<2, [CVP NPn, V+agr ], V1 (NPn 1 )> FAC-MR  
-fin +agr  
<2, 	 [CVP NP+nom' V+agr ], PRES(V'(NPn'))> Tense MR 
+fin +agr  
+pres  
Given this, the Frame MR ((1) in 3.7.2) allows that: 
<2, [CVP FRAME, NPn , v+agr ], FRAME(PRES(V'(NPn')))>  
+fin +agr  
+pres  
And 	 the Derived Categories MR that: 
<2, [CVP/FRAME FRAME/FRAME, NPn, V+agr ], Af{f{PRES{V'(NPn' ))))> 
+fin +agr 
+pres 
Finally, BR 100, repeated here for convenience, admits the required S 
node. 
<100, [, FRAME CVP/FRAME ], CVP/FRAME 1 {FRAME 1 }> ((2) in 3.4) 
~me 
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The above rules combine to admit the following tree:  
s 
FRAME CVP/FRAME  
+me  
PA~"' +fin  
I ADV +pres  +3s  +2 








The meaning assigned to this tree may be calculated using the 
semantics sections of the same rules: 
CVP/FRAME 1 (FRAME 1 ) 
lf(f(PRES(konn- 1 (er)))){Ap(morg 1 (schon(p)))) 
lp{110rg 1 (schon(p)))(PRES(koa- 1 (er))) 
morg'(schon(PRES(komn-'(er)))) 
This may be evaluated using -the semantic rules of earlier sec-
tions. 
Ase r F morg'(schon'{PRES(konn-'(er')))) iff 
' ' r ~ the day fo 11 owing s and 
Ase ~ schon'(PRES(komw-' (er')))
' ,r (cf. (2') in 3.7.2) 
and the latter iff 
e<r and A L PRES(kOIB-'(er')) (by 2.6 1 s analysis of schon')- s,e,r r 
and the last iff 
r=e-<s and A I= konm- 1 (er') (by {1 1 ) in 2.3) s,e,r 
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Thus {ld) has the follwing set of truth conditions: 
Ase r f (ld) iff r~the ~ay followings and e<r and r=e-<s 
• • and A k<Mm- 1 (er 1 ) -s,e,r 
,'s ·~  
the day followings 
The analysis of the combination of schon + frame adverbial seems 
successful enough that we might apply its principles to the combination of 
schon + durative and schon + Frist adverbial, exemplified in (lb) and (le),
respectively. This is the task of the following rule: 
Particle+ Temporal Adverbial MR 
<n, [TEMP X ], F> --> <n, [TEMP X, PART], Ap(F(PART 1 (p)))> 
This MR assigns particles scope within temporal adverbials, and places the 
particle as a sister to the other constituents within the composite con-
stituent. The scope of particles is thus specified to be narrow in the 
case of both rule combining particles with other temporal adverbials. The 
scope of schon vis-a-vis duratives or Frist adverbials is not crucial--
either order might have been used in the interpretation schema in the rule 
on the right. Specifying that the particle is to be a sister constituent 
of the other elements of the temporal adverbial is crucial, however, if we 
are to be able to generate the order exemplified in (le), in schon zwei 
Stunden. If the MR had stipulated a constituent of [X TEMP PART], this 
order could not be generated. 
Not every order of elements within this constituent is grammatical. We 
find instead the following pattern: 
schon in zwei Stunden  
% in schon zwei Stunden  
* 	in zwei schon Stunden  
in zwei Stunden schon  
The fact that the third order is excluded may be seen from the formulation 
of BR 204, the syntax part of which is repeated here for convenience: 
[pp PREP+inFRIST NP+dat]  
+inFRIST  
There is simply no provision for material to be added within the NP. If 
the order in schon zwei Stunden, (le), is to be excluded as well, the 
simplest way would be to adopt the constituent structure [X TEMP PART]. 
In fact, however, it is excluded in the present formulation of the rules as 
well, because BR 203 introduces the prepositional phrase beneath the node 
FRIST, which BR 201 introduces beneath the node TEMP. To admit phrases 
with this structure, we would actually have to revise the present system of 
rules in favor of MR introduction. This revision would retain BR 204 
(repeated above), and introduce it under TEMP in virtue of a MR such as 
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this: 
<n, [pp ], F> --> <n, [TEMP ••. ], F>  
+inFRIST  
{There might be an intermediate step as well, if the category FRIST is to 
be retained.) Since the status of examples such as {le) is in doubt, this 
revision will not be adopted here. We merely note here that none of the 
patterns of grammaticality judgements present insuperable descriptive 
problems. 
The derivation of actual examples using the Particle+ Temporal 
Adverbial MR proceeds exactly parallel to the derivation of examples using 
the Particle+ Frame Adverbial MR, illustrated above. 
Notes--Chapter Three 
1. Cf. however, Uszkoreit (1982). 
2. As matters stand, at any rate. Of course, other theories may be 
more restrictive in matters of admissible categories and features, uses of 
categories and features, admissible semantic rules and primitives, or 
morphological or lexical structure, etc. They might then reject some of 
the rules below. 
3. Nor is it true if we attend not only to the rules, but also to their 
specification in metagrammar. This will become clear below. 
4. The sentences in (3) below are acceptable to most, but not all (of 
the nine) native speakers asked. Here, just as at many other points, it 
seemed best to work with the more liberal judgements. This is justified by 
the subtlety of the fronting construction, which is subject to a good deal 
of poorly understood pragmatic conditioning (and which is taken up briefly 
below in the text). This would explain the unacceptability of many gramma-
tical sentences. The native speakers perhaps couldn't readily imagine 
pragmatically appropriate situations. The emphasis on the more liberal 
judgements may also be especially justified because many of the native 
speakers asked were university-level teachers of German; they tended to 
adopt a decidedly pedagogical tack in responding. 
5. But cf. Keenan (1975) and Kawashima (1980} on the unboundedness of 
German Wh-movement, which likewise is often regarded as clause-bounded. 
6. One runs the risk of leaving the relevant (acceptable) examples 
around the next Fra~ebogen, of course, and the risk is especially acute 
using this sort of ata, on which cf. note 4. Should such data be forth-
coming, the rules of conjunction might be made more general, as the text 
will point out. 
7. Johnson (ms.) develops the proposal in Nerbonne (1982c) to use 
complement features in describing the syntax of the German VP, extending
the system proposed there to include auxiliary verbs. 
8. It turns out that all native speakers consulted accept (2 .3) (and 
(2.1} and (2.2)) and therefore differ from the judgements in Heidolph et 
al. (1981). In general, this work is so carefully done that I would 
hesitate before assuming that the judgements there are simply wrong. The 
system required to deal with the variety which accepts all of the sentences 
in (2) i s, however, also simpler (by the assumption of a hierarchy of 
complement features) than one which disallows (2.3) and accepts (2.1) and 
(2.2). No hierarchy is needed to account for all the judgements I can 
verify. The data ought to be checked, therefore. 
9. For the judgements reported in Heidolph (1981:720) at least one such 
hierarchy is required, even if it turns out that it isn't valid for all 
verbs (in which case several would be required). I speculate that the 
hierarchy in (5) (whi ch at least reflects how readily the different 
complements combine with verbs to form PVP ' s) is just Lenerz's (1977) 
unmarked order of constituents--in reverse. On this point, cf. Lenerz 
(1977:39f). 
10. Uszkoreit (1982) uses a similar set of LP statements, which, more-
over, inspired the present one, but he does not include a parallel to 
(9.2), and instead lets the feature [+me] mark only finite verbs in main 
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clauses. Then (9.2) is just an instance of 
X < v-mc 
i.e. Uszkoreit can replace (9.2) and (9.3) with a single LP statement. 
This 1s possible because his syntax does not foresee instances where 
auxiliary or modal verbs occur as coconstituents with participles or 
infinitives. They are rather analyzed as verbs in VP+ V structures, i.e. 
coconstituents with VPs. But (i) auxiliaries and (ii) modals may be 
coconstituents with main verbs: 
(i) 	Geschlafen haben duerfte er wohl nicht±  
sleep{prt) AOX{inf) might he well not  
'He certainly couldn't have slept±'  
(ii) 	Schlafen muessen hat er  
sleep(inf) must(prt) AUX he  
'He had to sleep'  
If this possibility were restricted to infinitive auxiliaries and modals,  
then again, one needn't reject Uszkoreit's LP rules. (Moreover, some  
addition would be required to either set of LP statements.) But finite  
verbs behave similarly:  
(iii) ... ,dass sie das Buch gelesen hatten und besprechen 




••• that they had read the book and wanted to discuss it' 
The order of elements within the conjunct gelesen hatten is accounted for  
by (9.3), similarly for besprechen wollten.  
11. Uszkoreit (1982) included a MR introduction of separable prefixes  
in a paper on various word orders.  
12. Shortly before this was finished, I received draft materials, not 
clearly intended for publication or quotation, which propose a treatment of 
separable prefixes within GPSG where the relationship between prefix and 
stem is syntactic when the two are. separate, and lexical when together.
The paper first introduces the prefix via a word formation rule, which is 
consistent with limited predictability in subcategorization, but which 
nonetheless--in this case--is said to have a purely compositional 
semantics. This is the source of the prefix-verb combination found 
everywhere except in main assertion clauses (in all those places where 
prefix-verb is indeed always written as a single word). But the prefix and 
verb may also be introduced syntactically, in which case the same 
compositional semantics is employed (and required!), and (some of) the 
subcategorization facts are explained semantically. This would have the 
consequence that the example used in the text, bei-wohnen (requiring a 
dative), would be ill-formed if it appeared with the locative required by 
its stem, wohnen, because its meaning, bei 1 (wohn- 1 ) has nonsensical value 
when applied to any locative argument (or it has no meaning at all). This 
means that the ill-formedness is syntactic whenever bei-wohnen appears in 
nonfinite form or outside of main clauses, and semantic when bei-wohnen 
appears (separated) in main clauses. This seems awkward, but tenable. 
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Untenable, on the other hand, is the account of bei-wohnen's 
well-formedness with dative NP's. Recall that rules derfved by metarule 
inherit the subcategorization class of the rule they are derived from. 
This means that no rule derived from wohnen will be subcategorized to take 
anything but locative PP's. There will be no provision for the dative NP's 
required by beiwohnen. 
Similarly untenable is the supposition that the meaning of the 
separable prefix verb is derived compositionally from the prefix and the 
verb, as the text argues, and as the comparison of wohnen and residieren, 
both 'to live, reside,' with beiwohnen 'to be inherent in' and* 
beiresidieren. The difficulty in the metarule introduction of the 
separable prefix is that it relies on the semantics to filter out 
unwarranted combinations, so that if it blocks bei'(residier-'), then it 
will also block be1'(wohn-'), since wohn-' = resfdfer- 1 • 
13. Hoberg (1981:181) notes apparent counterexamples to this striking 
generalization. These are interesting, but clearly involve other factors. 
Her two examples are the following: 
Mit den Huehnern ins Bett gehen sie dort 
with the chickens to bed go they there 
'They go to bed with the birds' 
Mit dem Pfeil, dem Bogen, durch Gebirg und Tal kommt der Schuetzer  
with the arrow the bow through hill and dale comes the archer  
gezogen  
drawn 
'The archer comes, marching, with bow and arrow, over hill and dale' 
I suggest that the first is a (semifrozen) lexicalization and that the 
second, which is stylistically quite marked, involves some sort of grouping 
into a manner adverbial. Thus neither would be relevant to the discussion 
in 3.2.3. 
14. It is possible to save the analysis technically by adding one or  
more indices to the model especially for reference by duratives (and fre- 
quentatives). For example, the sentence below  
Er studiert schon zwei Jahre 
he study already 2 years
'He's studied for 2 years' 
might be analyzed as true at indices s,r,e,d (read 'd'as 'durative 
reference') iff 
(i) the event time e is the length required by the durative and 
(ii) the durative-less sentence is satisfied at s,r,e,sub-d 
where the d has been changed to sub-d to indicate that the tenseless 
sentence radical will be expected to exhibit the subinterval 
property--i.e. that the proposition will be expected to be true not only of 
its event time, but also of every subinterval thereof. This is obviously a 
technical trick to save the verb operator analysis. It annihilates the 
notion that indices ought to be contextually prominent (so that speakers
and hearers might reasonably have access to them). I can't say that it 
wouldn't work, however. 
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15. Brame (1978) is the source of the spelling prohibition. Cf. Gazdar 
et al. (1981:6) on its status within GPSG. 









But we aren't concerned with this here. Cf. Gazdar (1981) for details on 
the structure of coordination. 
Chapter 4: Extending the Fragment 
4.1 	The Perfect Tenses 
4.1.1 The Forms of the Perfect 
As part of the ;nflectional paradigm of each German verb, we find the 
following analytic Perfect forms: 
(1) 	Aux(Pres)-Perfect Participle er hat geschlafen 
Aux(Past)-Perfect Participle er hatte geschlafen 
Aux(Inf) -Perfect Participle er muss geschlafen haben 
If we cared to analyze werden as a future auxiliary, then a further element 
in the paradigm is predictable: 
(2) Aux(Fut) -Perfect Participle er wird geschlafen haben 
But Vater (1975) argues correctly that werden functions just as the other 
modals semantically and should not be regarded as a future tense. We may 
therefore concentrate on the forms in (1). Not all verbs use haben as the 
Perfect auxiliary; the alternative is sein, but the choice between the two 
has no temporal import. Moreover, therefs no gener11 way to predict the 
choice of auxiliary, either temporally or otnerwise. For this reason, we 
will allow that the choice of auxiliary verb is lexically marked. 
A sample paradigm for each of the auxiliary verbs: 
(3) 	 Present hat geschlafen hat  
Past hatte geschlafen hatte  
Infinitive geschlafen haben haben  
(4) 	Present ist gestorben ist  
Past war gestorben war  
I nfi niti ve gestorben sein sein  
We often refer to the Past Perfect as the Pluperfect, and the Present 
Perfect simply as the Perfect. 
4.1.2 The Meaning of the Perfect Tenses 
Truth conditions for sentences involving each of these tenses may be 
readily formulated in the present framework. 
(5) 	As,e,r FPERF(p) iff (i) if s~r, then 3e'~r As,e' ,r ~ p 
or (ii) if -(s~r), then e=r<s and As,e,r ~p. 
i.e. 
( i ) 	 and as in:  
s r e r  
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(6) Naechsten 	Freitag hat er den Brief geschrieben  
next Friday AUX he the letter write(prt)  





(7) 	Er hat den Brief geschrieben  
he AUX the letter write(prt)  
'He wrote the letter'  
Before co111T1enting on this interpretation of the Present Perfect, we list 
the meanings assigned to the Past Perfect and the Perfect Infinitive. 
(8) 	As,e,r ~ PLUP(p) iff e<r<s and As,e,r ~ p. 
i.e. 
e r s 
as in: 
Susi hat Rolf gesprochen. Er hatte den Brief geschrieben.
S AUX R speak(prt) he AUX the letter write(prt) 
'Susi spoke to Rolf. He had written the letter.' 




Er gab zu, den Brief geschrieben zu haben. 
he admit(past) the letter write(prt) to AUX 
'He 	 admitted having written the letter.' 
The analyses of the Perfect Infinitive and the Pluperfect are not 
parti~ularly controversial, so that very little will be said here about 
them. The Pluperfect is exactly Reichenbach's (1947:297) version, which 
was further defended in 1.7.1, and the Perfect Infinitive has been examined 
for the sake of displaying the entire paradigm. It will not be incorpor-
ated into the fragment, just as no other multi-clausal constructions have 
been. The analysis of the Perfect, on the other hand, is subject to 
dispute. 
Let us first note that in (Sii) the meaning of the Perfect does not 
differ from that of the Past, describing past time. Thus the following 
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inference is expected to hold: 
(10) PRET{~) 
:. 	PER (p) 
We predict then that the Perfect can replace the Preterite {or Past 
tense--the.se terms are used interchangeably here) without affecting truth 
value. The replacement might of course affect any of a number of other 
things, such as e.g. style, and in particular the well-known preference for 
the Preterite in narrative. But the inference seems valid in every case. 
Case {Si) anlayzes the use of the Perfect to describe future time. 
Three aspects of (i) should be noted carefully. First, it only licenses 
the future use of the Perfect in contexts where reference time is in the 
future, e.g. those in which future frame adverbials are present. To 
appreciate this condition, we examine an example of the Perfect with a 
future frame adverbial. 
The rule interpreting frame adverbials is repeated here for 
convenience: 
(11) for 	fa frame adverbial, pa propositionb  
As,e,r I= f(p) iff r~[f]As and As,e,r I p  
We would thus assign (6) the analysis (12): 
(12} naechsten-fre;tag'(PERF(er-den-Br1ef-schreib-')) 
By (11}, this holds in A at s,e,r iff r falls within the time denoted by
naechsten Freitag and PERF(er-den-Brfef-schre;b-') holds in A at s,e,r. 
Since next Friday clearly lies in the future with respect to s, we must 
apply clause {i) of the Perfect interpretation rule (5), which yields that 
{12) iff (13). 
(13) r s [f]As and 3e'<r and er den Brief schreib- holds ate' 
( 14) ----+------.--------...------~> s V 	 07' 7 
e', time of V 
writing next Friday 
The requirement n (Si) that the future use of the Perfect be limited to 
situations with future reference time explains the distinction between (15) 
and (16). 
(15) 	That es bis jetzt nicht geschrieben, aber naechsten Freitag
AUX it till now not write(prt) but next Friday 
hat er es sicher geschrieben. 
AUX he it surely write(prt)  
'T hasn't written it yet, but he'll have it written by Fri.' 
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(16) That es bis jetzt nicht geschrieben, aber er hat es sicher 
geschrieben. 
The second conjunct in (15) has a future reference time, as evidenced by 
the future adverbial, naechsten Freitag. The event time, i.e. the time of 
his writing, must precede this reference time, but it may still be in the 
future, as sketched in (14). This is compatible with the first conjunct, 
i.e. his not having written it to date. No such future reference time is 
specified in the second conjunct of (16), which, moreover, must be expected 
to share the reference time of the first conjunct. This is the time 
denoted by jetzt, speech time. (7) specifies that this second conjunct be 
true iff the atomic proposition holds at some past event time, but this 
contradicts the first conjunct of (16), and the sentence is nonsensical. 
The second important aspect of (Si) to note is that it is not exactly 
Reichenbach's Future Perfect, reproduced here as (17). It is instead 
compatible with both (17) and (18). 
( 17) 	----------\s e r 
(18} 	~--------"'e s r 
That the present analysis is correct is evidenced by the possibility of 
sentences such as (19): 
(19) 	 Ich weiss nicht, ob er es geschrieben habe.  
'I don't know whether he has written it [already].  
Naechsten Freitag hat er es aber sicher geschrieben. 
next Friday AUX he it but surely write(prt)
But by next Friday he'll surely have it written.' 
The analysis (7i), in claiming that the Perfect may represent
(unambiguously} situations (17) and (18), contradicts Hornstein's 
{1977:522) claim that natural language tenses always represent at most one 
structure such as (17} or (18). Comrie (1981) makes this point quite 
generally against all interpretations of Reichenbach which, like 
Hornstein's, insist on an exhaustive specification of s, e, and r for each 
temporal expression. 
A third noteworthy aspect of (Si) is that it provides the correct 
semantics for the Perfect when used in temporal conditional sentences such 
as (20}: 
(20) Sie 	gibt es dir, wenn sie es geschrieben hat  
she give it you when she it write(prt} AUX  
'She'll give it to you when she's written it.'  
In this case it is reasonable to assume that the future reference time is 
given by the matrix clause. Note that the event time of the conditional, 
i.e. 	the time of writing, must precede the reference time, i.e. the time of 
giving. This accords nicely with (5i). 
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The divisfon of (5) into clauses (i) and (ii) reflects (intentionally)
Admoni (1970:185) and his judgement that the Perfect is both a relative and 
an absolute tense. His relative tense is represented here by (Si), which 
depends on reference time, while his absolute tense is reflected in clause 
(ii), satisfied whenever event time preceeds speech time. At the same 
time, we should emphasize that the present treatment does not have to be 
regarded as holding that the Perfect is ambiguous, neither in the sense of 
representing various lexical items, nor in the weaker sense of representing 
a single lexical item with disjunctive clauses in the semantic rules (the 
disjunction used in (5) is inessential and may be replaced by conjunction, 
if this is preferable). We may regard the two clauses of the semantic rule 
as simply context dependent variants. Thus the present treatment contrasts 
with that of Baeuerle (1979: 79), who regards the Perfect form as represent-
ing ambiguously either Preterite or Present Perfect meaning. 
Baeuerle adopts this position in order to maintain an otherwise 
compositional analysis of the Perfect paradigm. His analysis exploits a 
seductive aspect of this paradigm, given in (3) and (4) above, which has 
escaped comment thus far. Both haben and sein, the Perfect auxiliary 
verbs, exist independently in the language:-Tnd their Present, Past and 
Infinitival forms are identical whether they are used as Perfect auxiliar-
ies or otherwise. This is the significance of the second columns in (3) 
and (4) . Baeuerle's hypothesis involves analyzing all of the Perfect 
tenses as compound tenses, composed of a single Perfect marker , the parti-
ciple plus auxiliary stem, to which the various tense or infinitival 
markings may be added. If his hypothesis could be verified, then the three 
elements of the Perfect paradigms in (3) and (4) need not be analyzed as 
three novel tenses, but rather may be seen as the combination of one 
Perfect aspect with three independently required tenses . We could then 
reduce a six element paradigm to a three element one with the Perfect/Im-
perfect distinction seen as orthogonal to the three-way tense distinction. 
(5)-(9) above cl!rify what it is required of the semantics of 
Baeuerle's proposal . Note that (Si), (8) and (9) all require that event 
time precede reference time. We take this to be the contributi on of the 
Perfect aspect in all the Perfect tenses. This might be formalized as it 
is in (21) : 
(21) 	 As,e,r FPer fect Aspect (p) iff 3e'<r and As,e' ,r f p 
Note the use of the existential quantifier on the right side of (21). This 
formulation is requi red to treat the future use of the Present Perfect, but 
it predicts that all of the Perfect tenses are to be interpreted indefin-
itely rather than dei ctically (and definitely). This is not clearly 
correct in either the case of the Perfect Infinitive or the case of the 
Past Perfect (both of which I have argued allow definite reference to 
time--cf. 1.7.1), but it i s very clearly incorrect about some uses of the 
Present Perfect with past time reference. The Present Perfect is normally 
used deictically . Thus (22) may be used to speak about a contextually 
salient past time, and its negation (22') may be interpreted as denying 
that (22) held at that time. 
(22) 	Er hat gelacht  
he AUX laugh(prt) 
'He laughed'  
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(22') 	Er hat nicht gelacht 
he Aux not laugh(prt)  
'He didn't laugh'  
This could not be described using (21). Any attempt to treat the Perfect 
tenses compositionally must, therefore, grant some special status to the 
Present Perfect. Its use in both definite and indefinte reference to time 
demands special treatment. Baeuerle effects a distinct treatment by
a1lowing the Present Perfect form to function as an analytic realization of 
the normally synthetic Past tense. 
The need to posit a second, special and noncompositional meaning for 
the Present Perfect should count rather heavily against the overall attempt 
to analyze the Perfect tenses compositionally. We are talking, finally, 
about a three-element paradigm: the admission that one of the three doesn't 
combine as predicted is serious. 
Ignoring this gap (and the fact that the tenses are not uniform 
vis-a-vis definiteness of interpretation), the compositional paradigm is 
fairly straightforward. We simply have to guarantee that the Past requires 
that reference time be past, and that the Present requires that reference 
time be nonpast. If we suppose that tense has wider scope than Perfect 
aspect, then the rest of the semantics in (5) through (9) follows. 
But this is just to say that the semantics may be coherent on the 
compositional view. It is another matter to show that any positive virtue 
adheres to this treatment. There is, after all,no great gain in simplicity 
in reducing a six-element paradigm to a three-element one with an 
additional aspect distinction and one exceptional element. 
What evidence might be brought to bear on this decision The most 
convincing semantic argument in favor of the compositional view would be to 
show that there are elements with scope intermediate between tense and 
Perfect aspect . We should like to find an element which would adopt the 
position of X in (23): 
(23) PRES(X(PERFECT-ASPECT(p))) 
this would confirm the compositional hypothesis quite to anyone's satis-
faction. Hendricks (1981:34) suggests that duratives have exactly this 
scope, citing (24) (his (4)) as proof: 
(24) E hat diese Schlange schon lange getoetet 
AUX this snake already long kill(prt) 
'This snake has been dead for a long time now, and E killed 
it' 
Schon lange in combination with Present tense always specifies that the 
sentence modified has held 'for a long time now' (as 1.10 demonstrated). 
If the Perfect denotes the state resulting from Erika's killing the snake, 
then the temporal semantics of (24) follows from the compositional view 
where schon lange has the scope of X in (23) . 
The example is flawed, however, in that schon lange doesn't function 
here as a durative. No clear example of duratives can replace lange here, 
as (25) indicates: 
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(25) 	* E hat dfese Schlange schon tagelang getoetet
zwei 	 Stunden 
for days 
two hours 
If (25) is at all interpretable, then only in the sense that the act of 
killing, not its results, lasted the specified length of time. Tnus lange
in (24) doesn't mean 'for a long time,' but rather 'a long time ago.' 
Baeuerle (1979:79) cautiously suggests that the compositional treatment 
provides an approach to the semantics of the Perfect in sentences such as 
(26): 
(26) 	 Seit zwei Stunden hat er seine Jacke ausgezogen  
since two hours AUX he his jacket off-take(prt)  
'He took his jacket off and he's had it off for two hours'  
In (26), as in (24), the adverbial is understood to specify the duration of 
the state resulting from his removing his jacket. This might naturally be 
captured by assigning seit zwei Stunden the scope of X in (23). We might
then explain how it is that the adverbial functions here exactly as it 
would in a Present tense sentence and not at all as it would in a Past 
tense sentence (which the treatment formulated in (Sii) would seem forced 
to predict) . 
The real explanation for this , and the source of error in the above 
argument, lies in the fact that (26) is simply a Present tense sentence, 
and not a Perfect at all. Ausgezogen haben is a lexically compound, but 
nonperfect infinitive. The best proof of this is the fact that it has the 
paradigm of a Present tense form; in particular, it forms a regular 
Pluperfect, ausgezogen gehabt hatte. This may be used in sentences such as 
(27). 	 . 
(27) 	 Als ich ihn beim Abendessen traf, hatte er seine Jacke  
when I him at supper met AUX he his jacket  
schon eine Stunde ausgezogen gehabt.
already a hour off-take(prt) have(prt) 
'When I met him at supper, he'd had his jacket off for an 
hour' 
This 	form is anomalous under the view that ausgezogen haben is (exclusive-
ly) a Perfect form (though it may, in sentences other than (26) and (27),
represent a genuine Per fect). For this reason, (26) is deceptive.
The construction in (26) is the product of a lexical rule of limited 
productivity. Its lack of productivity can be demonstrated directly by
attempting to substitute other verbs, e.g. genaeht haben 'to have sewn,' or 
verb-object combinations, e.g. mir das Geld ge,eben haben 'to have given me 
the money' for ausgezogen haben bzw. seine Jae e ausgezogen haben in (26). 
Note that these examples come from the same (telic) aspectual class as the 
original ausziehen, but that most of them are nonetheless (i) ungrammatical 
or (ii) understood differently, viz. so that the action is understood to 
have lasted hours. This is the sort of irregularity one expects of a 
lexical construction but not of a tense form, since tenses are normally 
regular in formation and meaning. 
- 158 -
The construction is not limited to participle+ haben, but rather is 
possible with other adjectives and predicatives, as (28) illustrates: 
(28) 	Er hat es an on  
ausgezogen off  
noetig necessary (i.e. he needs it)  
gern dear (i.e. he likes ft)  
etc.  
Moreover, since past participles may be used as adjectives in construction 
with sein 'to be,' there is likewise a Present tense construction which has 
exactlythe same form as those Perfects which take sein as auxiliary. An 
example of one of these is provided: 
(29) 	Er ist seit zwei Stunden abgefahren  
he AUX since two hours away-drive(prt) 
'He drove away and he's been away for two hours'  
The existence of these genuine Present tense forms which are homophon-
ous with Perfects may be a source for the lingering intuition among speak-
ers of German that there is something "immediate" or "present" about the 
Perfect, at least in contrast to the Past. For example, Gelhaus (1969:14) 
defines the Perfect as "a continued cormiand over a completed action" ("ein 
nicht abgeschlossenes Verfuegen ueber ein abgeschlossenes Tun"), much like 
Wackernagel's (1904) definition of the Greek Perfect as a form describing 
past actions "deren Wirkung im oder am Object in der Gegenwart fortdauert." 
There is no reflection of this intuition in the rule of Perfect interpre-
tation (Sii) above, but it may be the sense of the homophonous Present 
tense constructions (and the meaning in (Si)) which Gelhaus and others have 
articulated. 
There are apparently then no temporal items with scope intermediate 
between tense and Perfect aspect, and there seems to be no semantic evi-
dence for a compositional treatment of these forms. 
There is, moreover, some weak evidence for a noncompositional view 
arising from the "special uses" of some tense forms. Latzel (1974) has 
noted that a small class of German verbs, including sein and the passive 
werden may be used in the Preterite to speak of future time. This is 
illustrated in (30): 
(30) 	Warte, bis er hier war = Warte, bis er hier gewesen ist 
wait until he here was wait until he here be(prt) AUX 
'Wait until he's been here' 
Warte, bis er hier ist 
wait 	until he here is 
'Wait until he's here' 
The important point for the present purposes is that the Preterite form in 
(30) clearly has the expected Perfect meaning, i .e. it replaces neither 
what would be tense, nor what would be aspect on the compositional view, 
but, apparently, the single Perfect element. This indicates that the 
Perfect is treated as a single element for the purposes of this substitu-
tion. 
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4.1.3 The Syntax of the Perfect 
The Perfect tenses, like the nonperfect tenses, will be admitted via MR 
on nonfinite (complete) verb phrases. This treatment is not forced on us, 
but there are several reasons in favor of it, the most important of which 
is preserving the parallelism between the Perfect and the nonperfect 
tenses. Since the Present and the Past tenses are admitted via MR on 
nonffnite CVP's, the Perfect and the Pluperfect ought to be as well, at 
least until some reason to the contrary is forthcoming. 
A second reason is that the CVP is the smallest phrasal constituent on 
which Perfect marking is regularly found. If the Perfect were introduced 
on constituents smaller than VP's, we would expect to find these conjoined 
in ways such as the following: 
.•• dass er der Organization alles versprochen hat und nichts gibt 
But it seems t~at these are not well formed, even if they are easily 
interpretable. 
A third and final reason is that this treatment allows us to recognize 
the participial verb together with its complements as a constituent to the 
exclusion of the finite auxiliary. This would not be expected if the 
Perfect were introduced below the CVP level. There is ample evidence that 
the participial VP's exist. They may appear before the finite verb, as in 
(1), and they may be conjoined, as in (2): 
(1) 	Seiner Tochter ein Maerchen erzaehlt hat er  
his daughter a story tell(prt) AUX he  
'He told his daughter a story'  
(2) Er hat ein Buch 6ekauft und ein Kapitel davon gelesen he 	 AUX a book uy(prt) and a chapter it-of read(prt) 
'He bought a book and read a chapter of it' 
The following MR introduces the Perfect at the CVP level. It assumes 
that verbs are lexically marked +sei- if they require sein, rather than 
haben as Perfect auxiliary, since-;--as was pointed out at the beginning of 
4.1, the choice of auxiliary verb is not completely predictabl~. It 
assumes that the participial form of verbs and verb phrases is available as 
input to the Perfect-introducing MR, and that this form has not been 
assigned any temporal interpretation. In a larger fragment, this 
assumption might well be relinquished, so that we might try to extract a 
common area of meaning among adnominal participial phrases, Perfects with 
finite auxiliaries, and even other constructions (perhaps the passive) 
which share the use of the participial form. But this would require 
investigation which I haven't undertaken. 
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Perfect MR 
<n, LcvP ••• v... ], F> --> 
+prt 
asei-
<n, [+perf •••AUX •..v+prt··· ], PERF(F)> 
+fin +n 
asei- asei-
<n, [ 1 .•. AUX .••v+prt··· ], PLUP(F)>+pup 
+fin +n 
asei- asei-
To appreciate the mechanics of this rule, we must keep in mind both the 
Head Feature Convention and the fact that the auxiliary will be the head of 
the output rule. The feature [asei-], mentioned on the left side of the 
MR, will be passed to the auxiliary verb on the right side courtesy of the 
HFC. (Strictly speaking, the feature [asei-] needn't be mentioned on the 
CVP node of the right side of the above rule since it merely repeats a fea-
ture from the left side. It has been repeated above to make the mechanics 
of the rule more transparent. The feature needn't be made explicit on the 
left side of the rule, either, if the convention were adopted that all VP 
nodes must be marked either plus or minus [asei-] • But I take it that its 
inclusion on the left side above does make therule easier to read.) Since 
the auxiliary verb is the head of the construction admitted by the right
side of the MR, the features [+perf] and [+plup] will find their way onto 
the verbs from the phrasal nodes. This will ensure that the correct 
auxiliary, i.e. haben or sein in the case of +perf and hatte or war in the 
case of [+plup]. The feature [+fin] has been added on the right~de to 
provide for the correct verb form and to license the operation of the Frame 
Adverbial MR (which is restricted to operating on [+fin] CVP rules in order 
to keep straight the scope of frame adverbials and tense. 
Note that the above rule adds the auxiliary verb as a sister to the 
other constituents in the CVP. This is required if we are to be able to 
apply the Fronting MR to extract elements from the Perfect CVP, which must 
be guaranteed if we are to account for sentences where constituents withfn 
the CVP are fronted (without allowing thereby violations of the left-branch 
condition), e.g.: 
Hans habe ich nicht gesehen 
H AUX I not see{prt}
'I didn't see Hans' 
Of course, if we are to allow that the participial CVP's themselves are 
constituents (to account for (1) and (2) above}, we must provide for an 
alternate constituent structure as well, in which the auxiliary verb is a 
sister to the entire complex of participial verb and complements. The 
following rule accomplishes this: 
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Perfect MR (Contoured) 5 
<n, [CVP •• • ], F> --> <n, [+perf AUX CVP+prt ], PERF(F))>  
+prt +fin asei-
asei- asei-
<n, [+plup AUX CVP+prt ], PLUP(F)> 
+fin asei-
asei-
No rule has been provided for Perfect infinitives. There are at least 
two reasons for this. First, the fragment doesn't include modals or basic 
verbs (such as schein- 'seem') which introduce infinitival VP 1 s, and 
second, the syntax of the Perfect infinitives may be distinct since both 
fronting and conjunction shows that participles do form constituents with 
Perfect auxiliaries. We needn't concern ourselves with this complication.
There is a suspicious similarity between the pair of rules immediately 
above, which accounts for the contoured VP's in Perfects and the earlier 
pair, which admitted flat VP's. Johnson (ms.) suggests a means of 
collapsing the two pairs of rules, but the issue will not be pursued here. 
Perhaps the best method of further clarifying the rule would be a 
demonstration of its application. 
4.1 .4 A Sample Derivation 




The above is one instantiation of BR 10; others allow the feature 
[-sei-], but none of these will be compatible with weg-geh-. Yet another 
possibility would use the feature [-prt], but this would preclude the 
subsequent application of the Perfect MR . Note that there is no semantic 
reflection of the fact that the above rule admits participles rather than 
e.g. untensed stems. The semantic interpretation of the Perfect form is 
effected when the auxiliary is provided for (using the Perfect MR). To the 
above rule we apply first the FAC MR, to obtain a CVP, then the Pluperfect 
MR: 
<10, [CVP NPn, PREF, V ], PREF+V'(NPn')>  
-fin +agr  
+prt 
+sei - '  
+agr  
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<10, [CVP AUX, NPn, PREF, v+prt ], PLUP(PREF+V'(NPn'))> 




Since the feature [+fin], which was added by the Pluperfect MR, is 
incompatible with the input feature [+prt], the latter is not among the 
features of the output CVP. Note that it has been retained on the V, 
however, since the Perfect MR specifies so. 
The above rule may be manipulated further by e.g. the Frame Adverbial 
MR: 
<10, [CVP AUX, NPn, FRAME, PREF, v+prt ],  





to which the Derived Category Metarule applies to obtain: 
<lO, [CVP/NPn AUX, NPn/NPn, FRAME, PREF, V+prt ],  





which may be employed in the actual generation of a tree. Let us note that 
the LP rules in (9) in 3.3.1 prescribe that (i) the finite auxiliary must 
be first in the CVP constituent, (ii) the [+verb] items PREF and V[+prt] 
must follow the [-verb] FRAME, and that (3) in 3.3.2 prescribes that (iii)
PREF< V[-fin]. These combine to yield the rigid order of elements as 





















war t gestern weg gegangen 
(1) 	Hans war gestern weggegangen 
H AUX yesterday away-go(prt)  
'Hans had left yesterday'  
This structure is assigned the following semantic interpretation: 
AX*T(NP)(gestern'(PLUP(weg-geh-'(x)))) (Hans') 
gestern'(PLUP(weg-geh-'(Hans'))) 
whose truth conditions may be derived straightforwardly: 
Ase Fgestern'(PLUP(weg-geh-'(Hans'))) iff , ,r 
r9 [gestern'] A and As, e, r I= PLUP {weg-geh-' (Hans' ) ) 
the latter conjunct of which holds iff 
e<r<s and A L weg-geh-'(Hans')s,e,r r 
We can then sum up: 
As e r ~ (1) iff r .s-[gestern' ]A and e<r<s and 
, , As 1= weg-geh-(Hans'),e,r 
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Hans goes  
The above set of truth conditions certainly represents one reading
of (1), but it just as certainly does not represent another--the 
reading in which Hans left yesterday. The derivation of this reading 
is the subject of section 4.2. 
4.2 Adverbials which Modify Event Time 
In order to accommodate the reading of (1) in 4.1.2 in which Hans 
left yesterday (rather than the one in which he had left as of yester-
day), we must recognize a further class of temporal adverbials. Since 
the cl ass is apparently co-extensive with the cl ass of frame adver-
bials which modify reference time, the simplest way to introduce these 
is via MR: 
(1) 	e-Frame MR  
<n, [FRAME .•. ], f> --> <n, Le-FRAME ... ], E(f)>  
where for all models A, speech, event and reference times s,e, 
and r, and all propositions p, Eis that function which takes as 
arguments functions f such that L 
A5 e ~ f(p) iff rc..x and A r p, ,r s,e,r  
and yields f~nctions E(f) as value such that L  
Ase r 1 (E(f))(p) iff e£X and A i p. , , 	 s,e,r 
The above semantic definition is easiest to understand if one keeps in 
mind that every frame adverbial is associated with a set of times X. The 
function E merely switches the parameter within the model to which the 
associated set is compared. In the basic rules defining the semantic 
effects of frame adverbials, such as (2') or (4) in 3.7.2, the associated 
set X i s always compared to the reference time parameter in the model of 
evaluat ion. E switches that so that Xis to be compared to the event time 
parameter. 
(1 ) assumes that all frame adverbials specify a set of times among
which reference time must fall. In fact, of course, some of the rules 
(such as BR 210) specify intervals i within which reference time is 
specif i ed to fall (as a subinterval). But it would be equivalent to view 
those rules as specifying the set 
{t]t s i } 
among which reference time would be expected to fall. We will proceed as 
if these rules were so written. 
It is not an accidental feature of the present treatment that it 
recognizes two perfectly overlapping categories of adverbials, though it 
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may be regarded with some suspicion. Since the tense logic we are employ-
ing distinguishes event and reference times, and frame adverbials must be 
analyzed as modifying one or the other, the double class is forced on us 
once it is recognized that the adverbials are understood as modifying 
either time. In a treatment where reference time and event time were not 
formally distinguished, so that only two indices were employed, one would 
surely try to exploit some sort of scope relationship to avoid the postu-
lation of the two classes (losing the possibility of explicating deictic 
uses of the Perfect, however). In defense of the overlap, we might note 
that this is not an unusual circumstance. Past participles in both German 
and English mark the perfect tenses, the passive voice, deverbal adjectives 
and the adnominal modification of verb phrases. Present participles 
similarly play a variety of roles. Thus both of these elements belong to a 
variety of completely (or nearly completely) overlapping classes. 
In addition to the above rule, which defines the membership and seman-
tic effects of event time adverbials, we need an additional rule which 
provides for the introduction of these adverbials in larger constituents. 
This is the task of the following MR: 
(2) e-FRAME Introduction MR 
<n, 	 [CVP X ], F>  
+prt  
--> <n, [CVP X, e-FRAME ], e-FRAME'(F)> 
Note that the MR applies only to participial CVP's, ensuring in parti-
cular that there will never be an introduction of event time modifying 
adverbials into nonperfect CVP's. This is not strictly necessary, since we 
could just as well allow the rule to apply very generally, but there is no 
use for the event time modifiers in nonperfect VPs: in nonperfect tenses, 
e=r, so that modifiers of reference time indirectly specify event time as 
well. Separate modifiers that contradicted each other would also be 
admissible, since we could easily explain why they are contradictory, but 
since they would contribute nothing beyond confusion and since the gain in 
simplicity would be mi nimal, we might just as well not admit them. 
The rule is otherwise straightforward, so that we can turn to an 
illustration. We begin with the same BR used as illustration in 4.1.4. 




from 	which we derive a CVP in t he usual fashion: 
<10, 	 [CVP NPn, PREF, V ], PREF+V 1 (NPn 1 )> 
f 





to which we now apply the above MR introducing event time modifying 
adverbials: 
<10, [CVP e-FRAME, NPn, PREF, v+ t ], e-FRAME(PREF+V'(NPn'))> 




and the Pluperfect MR: 
<10, [CVP AUX, e-FRAME, NPn, PREF, V+prt ],  
+agr +lO +fin  
+plup +sei-
+sei- 
+agr PLUP(e-FRAME(PREF+V'(NPn')))>  
In addition the rule introducing thee-FRAME adverbial must be derived. 
The BR introducing basic frame adverbials is the input to thee-FRAME MR: 
<210, [FRAME Adv], Adv'> : gestern (2) in 3.7.2 
<210, [e-FRAME Adv], E(Adv')> (1) above 
These, together with the familiar rules responsible for fronting, justify 
















war t gestern weg gegangen 
(1) 	Hans war gestern weggegangen  
H AUX yesterday away-go(prt)  
'Hans had left yesterday'  
This structure is assigned the following semantic interpretation: 
AX*T(NP)((E(gestern'))(PLUP(weg-geh-'(x)))) (Hans')  
(E(gestern'))(PLUP(weg-geh-'(Hans')))  
whose truth conditions may be derived straightforwardly: 
As,e,r f (E(gestern'))(PLUP(weg-geh-'(Hans'))) iff 
e [gestern'\ and As,e,r ~ PLUP(weg-geh- 1 (Hans')) 
-by the definition of E in (1) above 
the latter conjunct of which holds iff 
e<r<s and A Fweg-geh-'(Hans')s,e,r 
We can then sum up: 
Ase r F(1) iff ec.[gestern']A and e<r<s and 
' ' As,e,r ~ weg-geh-(Hans 1 ) 




This may be compared to the derivation of the same sentence, (1) in 
4.1.3. 
We shall examine one further derivation because it exemplifies well how 
differently German temporal modification may proceed (in contrast to 
English). As we saw in BR 213 in 3.7, prepositional phrases using vor are 
potential frame adverbials, so that they therefore may be interpreteato
modify reference time. The metarule in (2) above shows how they may also 
be interpreted as modifying event time. Those two rules thus account for 
two of the readings of the sentence below: 
{3) 	 Er war vor einer Stunde gegangen 
he AUX one hour go(prt)  
'He had gone as of an hour ago' - reference time modifier  
'He had gone an hour ago' - event time modifier  
But there is a third reading, too, in which his leaving took place an hour 
before reference time: 
(3') 	Ich suchte ihn gestern. Er war aber vor einer Stunde  
I sought him yesterday he AUX but one hour  
gegangen  
(go)prt  
'I looked for him yesterday. But he had gone an hour earlier.' 
To capture this reading, we need to introduce a second lexical item vorT , 
whose grammar closely resembles the already present vor1 (which wirr- -r 
henceforth be referred to as vorT-s' to avoid confus1onJ. 
(4) 	 <218, [e-FRAME PREP+vor NPdat ], vorT-r'(NPd')> 
vorT r' is that function which takes durations as arguments and 
has as value; for every duration d, and every A, p, s, e, and r that 
funct i on f such that 
A5 er~ f(p) iff e t t<r and (~,r) is length d  
' ' and A F p s,e,r 
The substantial distinction between the semantic rule above and the one 
as~ociated with vorT_ is that the latter measures time from speech time 
while vor above me~sures time from reference time. We will forego 
demonstrat,~g a simple application of BR 218 at this point, and proceed 
with an example calculated to show how different German temporal reference 
may 	 be (in comparison to English). 
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We begin with the derivation below. We assume that zwei Stunden is a 
dative NP, and that it denotes the duration two hours. 
(5) <218, [e-FRAME PREP+vor NPdat ], vorr-r'(NPd')> 






vor zwei Stunden 
This wfll be assigned the interpretation below (by the semantic part
of the ru1e i n ( 4 ) ) : 
vorT-r'(zwei-Stunden') 
Since zwei-Stunden' is by assumption the duration two hours, the above 
is equivalent to that function f, such that, for all A, s, e, r, and 
p: 
{7) As e r ~ f(p) iff eE{t t<r and {t,r) is 2 hrs in duration} 
' ' and As,e,r F p. 
This will be employed in connection with the following VP rule: 









<3, [CVP NPn, NPa, V ], V'(NPa')(NPn')> FAC  





<3, 	 [CVP NPn, NPa, e-FRAME, V ], e-FRAME'(V'(NPa')(NPn'))> 




<3, [CVP NPn, NPa, PART, e-FRAME, v+prt ], Particle MR (3.9) 
f . +agr- 1 n 
-sei-
+agr 	 PART'(e-FRAME'(V'(NPa')(NPn')))> 
<3, AUX, NPn, NPa, PART, e-FRAME, V+prt ], Perfect MR (4.1)[CVP +agr 	 .+fin -se,-
+perf +r  
-sei-
+agr 	 PERF(PART'(e-FRAME'(V'(NPa')(NPn'))))> 











In additon to this, we'll appeal to the following instance of BR 100: 
<100, [S FRAME CVP/FRAME ], CVP/FRAME'(FRAME')>  
+me  
and to BR 214, introduced in 3.7, which was shown there to admit the 
constituent morgen um diese Zeit as a frame adverbial, with the meaning: 
(9) 	 lp((u"'r'(diese-Zeit 1 ))(110rgen'(p))) 
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which. for a given p. holds iff: 
rE {i l3t'E[diese-Zeft']A and t' Ei } and A ~ 110rgen'(p) iff s 	 s,e,r 
3t'E[dfese-Zeit 1 ]As and t' s. rand rs.day fqllowing sand  
A t= p. s,e,r 














+um +ace +F 
I ~ 
um diese Zeit 
AUX FR/FR 
+3 











hat t er die Stadt schon vor 2 St. verlassen 
(10) Morgen um diese Zeit hat er die Stadt schon vor zwei Stunden 
tomorrow 	at this time AUX he the city already 2 hours 
verlassen 
1eave(prt) 
'As of tomorrow at this time he'll have left the city, and he'll 
have been gone for two hours' 
To calculate the meaning of this, we simply apply the meaning of the 
CVP phrase to the meaning of the compound Frame adverbial: 
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(11) 	 AX*r(FRAME)(x(PERF(PART 1 (e-FRAME 1 (V 1 (NPa 1 )(NPn'))))))(FRAME') 
FRAME 1 (PERF(PART'(e-FRAME 1 (V 1 (NPa 1 )(NPn'))))) 
= {Ap{(lfflr'(diese-Zeit 1 ))(110rgen'(p)))(PERF{schon 1 
{vorT (zwei-Stunden)(verlass-'(die-Stadt' )(er' )))))-r  
= (way- 1 (diese-Zeit'))(110rgen'(PERF(schon 1  
(vorT (zwei-Stunden)(verlass- 1 (die-Stadt')(er' ))))))-r 
(9) derived the truth conditions arising from the first part of this: 
As,e,r~ (11) iff  
t'E[diese-Zeit']A e and t's r and r ~day followings and L s, ,r 
As,e,r r PERF{schon 1 
(vorT (zwei-Stunden)(verlass- 1 (die-Stadt')(er 1 ))))-r 
We now apply the semantic rules interpreting PERF and schon' to the latter 
part of the above; since we are to interpret PERF where there is a future 
reference time, this part of the truth conditions will be met iff 
3e'<r a(ld e'<r and  
A e' F (vorT-r(zwei-Stunden)(verlass-'(die-Stadt')(er'}))) s, ,r 
(7) above stipulates the effect of vor (zwei-Stunden) so that we may
i0111ediately derive further that the latt!r part of the above holds iff 
e'E{tlt<r and (t,r) is two hours ~n duration} and  
As,e' ,r F verlass-'(die-Stadt')(er')  
We may now derive the full set of (temporally interesting) truth 
conditions of (10): 
3t'E[diese-Zeit']A
5 
,e,r and t' <; rand r £;day followings and 3e'<r 
and e'~r and e'E {t l t<r and (t,r) is 2 hrs long} and 
As,e' ,r ~ verlass- 1 (die-Stadt' )(er') 
Thus 	 (10) is true in situations such as the following: 
1 s -	 th i s time ':'e I - heleaves whls \ime 
·~ ....-------~-_Yttoomm,orrow 
(e',r) - 2 hr. long 
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4.3 	Noch 
frocfi" is in some sense a complement to schon. It seems to be an exact 
complement to schon in presupposition. If (1) invites the inference that 
Hans is here somewhat earlier than expected, (2) suggests that he is a bit 
later than expected. 
(1) 	Hans ist schon hier 
is a 1 ready here  
'Hans is already here'  
(2) 	Hans ist noch hier 
still  
'Hans is still here'  
Cf. Koenig (1977) and (1981) and Hendricks (1981) for a more exact 
formulation of the presuppositional content of noch. 
Like schon, it clearly has a broad range of meaning, not all of which 
may be subsumed under a single semantic rule. Most importantly, we shall 
wish to distinguish temporal from nontemporal uses of noch. My treatment 
of the temporally interesting noch follows Hoepelman arict'lfohrer (1981) 
closely. 	 --
4.3.1 Nontemporal noch 
The most important nontemporal use of noch is one in which it means 
'additionally.' Cf. (1): 
(1) Ungeschickt 	ist sie auch noch  
clumsy is she also additionally  
'On top of everything else, she's clumsy'  
This, and presumably other nontemporal uses of noch, as well, may be 
distinguished from temporal uses of noch in mucfithe same way that temporal 
and nontemporal uses of schon are distinguished. 
First, nontemporal uses lack the invited inference that the proposition 
to which noch applies holds earlier than expected . (1) makes e.g. no such 
suggestio;,.-second, nontemporal uses may not be the focus of questions: 
(2) 	1st sie auch noch ungeschickt --Nein  
'Is she [noch] clumsy ' no  
I No, it is not additionally that she is clumsy.  
= No, it is not still the case that she is clumsy. 
(or: = No, she isn't clumsy any more.)  
Third, some speakers accept the fronting of temporal (i1T111er) noch while 
no one allows the fronting of nontemporal noch. 
(3) 	 Immer noch kann man den echten bayerischen Stil finden 
still can one the real Bavarian style find 
'One can still find the real Bavarian style' 
There is a problem with applying these tests to noch, however. 
Consider the use of noch in (4): 
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(4) 	Hans kommt noch 
come 
'Hans will come yet' 
(4) does not suggest that Hans is coming somewhat later than expected and 
is absol utely impossible in fronted position: 
(4') * Noch kolTlllt Hans 
Thus (4) is a nontemporal use of noch according to the first and third 
tests. The second test is inconcTusrve: 
meaning we attribute to ,t, and in fact, it adds little more than a sense 
(5) Kommt Hans noch? 
'Will Hans come yet?' 
--Nein. 
--No. 
= No, he won't come. 
Whether we can regard noch as the focus of the question depends on the 
of indefiniteness in (4). 
Whether the use of noch in (4) ought to be regarded as "temporal" or 
not may be purely terminological, since it in any case cannot have the same 
semantics as the noch in (1) in 4.3. We formulate the semantic rule for 
this use of noch Tri""16): 
(6) 	As,e,r f noch'(p) iff 3!e '(r<e'and 3r '(As,e• ,r' F p)) 
This is Hoepelman and Rohrer's (1981) (doch) noch, so-named because it is 
always replaceable with doch noch. I do not maintain that this is 
nontemporal, only that it is distinct from the use of noch in (1) in 4.3, 
whose semantics are formulated in 4.3.2. --
Note that in requiring that there be a unique event time at which pis
to hold, we limit the applicability of this expression to telic 
Aktionsarten, following Hoepelman and Rohrer (1981). In allowing that 
noch'(p) be true if pis true at any e and r, we allow that this noch might
combine with any tense. --
4.3.2 	Immer Noch 
Hoepelman and Rohrer also note that uses of noch in sentences such as 
(1) in 4.3 allow that noch be replaced with immernoch. They maintain that 
this noch combines only with atelics (Hoepelman and Rohrer, 1981:112), but 
(1) 	wouTcI seem to counterindicate this: 
(1) 	Das Orchester spielt noch den zweiten Satz 
the orchestra plays still the second movement 
'The orchestra is still playing the second movement' 
I suggest therefore that a slightly better way to view the affinity of noch 
ft)r atelics is to view noch as inducing an imperfective reading--just a-s-
schon does. --
Similarly, just as schon specifies that event time doesn't extend 
beyond reference time (1nto the future), noch specifies that event time 
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doesn't extend beyond reference time into the past. Thus we first define: 
; 1~_; 2 	iff Yt1Ei 1{ 3t2E; 2(t2_:)) 
and 	we require that: 
Immer NFch 1 s Semantics  
As,e,r noch(p) iff e~r and if e=r, then As,e,r ~ PROG(p}  
and if e~r, then As,e,r ~ p.  
We note that this semantic rule licenses an imperfective reading of telics 
in combination with noch in the nonperfect tenses (where e=r), exactly as 
the semantic rule forschon does (in 2.6.3). This seems to be justified, 
as (1} indicates. 
We note that since for all intervals i, i, if i = i, then 
i 1 ~ i 7 • Since the nonperfect tenses, i.e~ th~ Prese~t an~ the Preterite, 
require that e=r, we expect the addition of noch, requiring that e>r, not 
to affect truth value in these tenses. SimirarTy, the use of the -
conditional tense/mood in anticipatory narration, requiring that r<e (cf. 
the discussion in 2.6.3), ought to be always compatible with noch. These 
predictions seem to be true: 	 --
(2) 	Er i st da He's there  
.'.Er ist noch da. : . He's still there •  
Er war da. He was there.  
;. Er war noch da. : .. He was sti 1 l there.  
Er ging nachdenklich weg. Er wuerde sich das ueberlegen. 
he went pensively away he AUX self it over-think 
'He went away thinking. He would mull it over.' 
•·• Er wuerde s 1 ch das noch ueberl egen. 
'He would mull it over yet' 
Note that if i < 1 , then i -> i • This means that the Prefect 
tenses, which requ1re t~at e<r, \houltbe incompatible with immer noch. 
The semantic rule for immer noch thus predicts that the following will be 
unacceptable: 
(3) 	 Er hatte den Film [immer] noch gesehen  
he AUX the film * sti11 see(prt)  
'He had seen the film, too'  
.. 
* 	 Bis naeschsten Freitag hat er die Arbeit immer noch 




The first sentence in (3) is fine under the interpretation of noch as 
1 additionally'; the addition of immer, forcing the temporal interpretation 
of noch, makes the sentence ill formed. The second sentence is peculiar 
(though it 1 s fine without (immer) noch). I suspect that it might be 
acceptable in a context where the serise of 1 additionally 1 were clearer. 
4.3.3 	The Syntax of Noch 
Since noch is an""e'Tement of the category of particles, along with schon 
and erst, lts'"syntax has already been specified in the Particle MR (3.9) 
and ~combination of Particle+ Frame MR and Frame+ TEMP MR (both in 
3.9). Further derivations here would only repeat those in 3.9 (and 4.2).
One facet of noch 1 s grammar is interesting, however. Let us recall the 
MR which introduced Particle+ Temp.Adv. constituents: 
Particle+ Temporal Adverbial MR 
<n, [TEMP X ], F> --> <n, [TEMP X, PART], Ap(F(PART 1 (p)))> 
This MR assigns particles scope within temporal adverbials, and places
the particle as a sister to the other constituents within the composite 
constituent. The scope of particles is thus specified to be narrow in the 
case of both rule combining particles with other temporal adverbials. The 
scope of schon vis-a-vis duratives or Frist adverbials is not crucial--
either order might have been used in the interpretation schema in the rule 
on the right. With noch, however, it turns out that the scope is 
important. --
To see this, consider the combination of noch with duratives. Given 
the rule above, zwei Jahre 1 (noch'(p)) would be the expected meaning of 
sentences containing the constituent noch zwei Jahre. Given the semantic 
rule for duratives (2.4), this holds when: 
Jahre'(noch'(p)) iff there is an e 1 such thatAs,e, r f zwei 
1. e is a final subinterval of e' 
2. e' is [zwei Jahre']A in length and 
1
3. Vi s-e' As, i, r F nocn ( p) 
But (3) in turn holds iff for every relevant i, i~r and p holds. Thus we 
derive: 
As,e,r F zwei Jahre'(noch'(p)) iff there is an e' such that 
1. e is a final subinterval of e' 	 -
2. e' 	is [zwei Jahre']A in length and 
3. Vic.e'(i>r and A • I= p).- s, 1 ,r 
(We ignore the imperfectivity issue here.) 
For the most part, this extra constraint resulting from noch is 
inconsequential, since the exact delineation of r is often l~up to 
pragmatics. But note that if r is specified elsewhere in the sentence, 
then there may be no s,e,r satisfying the above conditions. consider in 
this connection (1): 
(1) 	* Morgen ist er noch zwei Jahre da  
tomorrow is he yet 2 years there  
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Other rules guarantee that this is assigned the meaning: 
(2) 	110rgen'(PRES(zwei Jahre'(noch 1 (p)))) 
and 	 (2) 1 s truth conditions are straightforwardly derived: 
(3) 	Ase r ~ (2) iff rf [morgen']A and e=r-<s and 
, , A zwei Jah~' (noch 1 (p))s,e,r 
and the last holds iff 
there is an e' such that 
1. e is a final subinterval of e' 
2. e' is [zwei Jahre']A in length and 
3. v;ce'{i~r and As,i,r Fp). 
But there can be of course no such e•. Any interval stretching two years
prior tor must contain subintervals which are wholly prior tor and 
therefore in violation of clause (3). 
This explains the distinction between (4) and (1), and between the two 
sentences in ( 5) : ' 
(4) 	Morgen ist er schon zwei Jahre da  
tomorrow is he already two years there  
'He'll have already been here two years as of tomorrow'  
(5) Gestern war er schon zwei Jahre da 
yesterday 	was 
'He had already been here two years as of yesterday' 
* Gestern war er noch zwei Jahre da 
Unfortunately, the above explanation works only when noch and the 
durative phrase are given the indicated scope relation. Trnoch had wider 
scope than the durative, the explanation would collapse. ThlsTs 
unfortunate because it would be quite easy in the present system to derive 
a sentence with this scope relationship--by simply introducing the durative 
and the particle independently, fn that order. One way to block this 
is by revising the present system so that particles and temporal adverbs 
could only be introduced together, (or by using VP features to encode the 
presence of particles) but this revision would take us rather far afield, 
and one would want to have a good deal of confidence in other aspects of 
the system proposed here before undertaking it. 
4.4 Passives 
This section examines the Passive, and formulates rules for its genera-
tion. 
The German Passive has both personal and impersonal variants, as (1)
and (2) respectively exemplify: 
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(1) 	Ein Haus wird gebaut  
a house AUX build(prt)  
'A house is being built'  
(2) 	 Ihm wird gratuliert  
him(dat) AUX congratulate(prt)  
'He is being congratulated'  
It is easy to predict which variant will occur with a given phrase: if, in 
nonpassive sentences, the main verb must appear with an accusative NP 
complement, the personal form is used. If it must appear without an 
accusative NP complement, the impersonal variant is used. Of course, some 
verbs may appear either with or without an accusative NP complement, and in 
these cases, both the impersonal and the personal form are possible: 
(3) 	Kein Fleisch wurde gegessen {cf. Er ass Fleisch) 
no meat AUX eat(prt} he ate meat 
'No meat was eaten' 
Es wurde nicht gegessen (cf. Er ass) 
it AUX not eat(prt) he ate 
1 No one ate' 
Clearly, any treatment ought to reflect this conditioning. 
4.4.1 The Subjectlessness of Impersonal Passives 
The terms 'personal' and 'impersonal' were probably chosen to describe 
these two variants because the former have subjects, while the latter do 
not. The treatment of basic rules above assumed that the impersonal pas-
sive is subjectless (along with the construction Ihm ist zu gratulieren).
This assumption may now be defended. 
Personal constructions have a nominative subject which controls verb 
agreement and can function as the controller for understood subjects in 
EQUI-sorts of constructions; the impersonal don't. The evidence for this 
is we11 known, but the es which may appear in matrix initial position in 
impersonal constructionsis deceptive. For example, the impersonal passive 
appears with a dummy es in matrix initial position, however, as the second 
sentence in (3) does.-This seductively resembles a subject, particularly 
to English ears {and eyes), used to finding subjects in sentence-initial 
position, but also to native German speakers, since initial position is a 
favorite spot for German subjects as well. Note further that the es in the 
second sentence in (3) is identical in form to the nominative/accusative 
singular neuter pronoun; moreover, verb marking in impersonal passives 
would agree with third person singular subjects. The difficulty with 
taking this as evidence of es's subjecthood is that any sentence in German 
may appear with matrix initTal es, including the first sentence in (3): 
Es wurde kein Fleisch gegessen 
it AUX no meat eaten 
'No 	meat was eaten' 
Moreover, this es and the impersonal passive es share a number of 
peculiar properties-. Both are limited to matrix Tnitial position. Thus 
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neither may appear post-verbally in declarative sentences (4a), in any
embedded sentence (b), in questions (c), or even in 
exclamations (d}: 
(4) Es wurde geredet
it AUX talk(prt)
'People talked' 
Es ist der Tom gekommen
it AUX T come(prt)
'Tom came' 
a. * Dann wurde 
then 
es geredet * Dann ist es der Tom gekommen 
Dann wurde geredet Dann ist der Tom gekommen 
b. * •..ob es 
whether 
geredet wurde. * •.•ob es der Tom gekommen i st. 
•••ob geredet wurde. • •• ob der Tom gekommen ist. 
c. * Wurde es geredet? * Ist es der Tom gekommen? 
Wurde geredet? Ist der Tom gekommen? 
d. * Geredet wurde es! * Gekommen ist es der Tom! 
come(prt) AUX it 
Geredet wurde! Gekommen ist er! 
The nominative/accusative neuter singular pronoun es shares none of these 
peculiar properties, as is well known. There is tnerefore no reason to 
take the superficial similarity of the two words as evidence for the es in 
impersonal passives being a subject. Let us furthermore conclude thata 
unified treatment of the es in the two sorts of constructions exemplified 
in (4) would be desirable--that is, we should prefer to account for these 
common peculiarities.
This leaves only the 3rd person singular form of the impersonal passive 
as putative indication that we ought to find a third person singular sub-
ject for it. But let us first note that if we are indeed to favor a 
unified analysis for the two es's in (4), then we must a fortiori favor 
analyses which treat the impersonal passive es as a noncontroller of number 
agreement, just as the other, "presentational""" es in (4) is. For this es 
demonstrably does not control number agreement:-
Es kamen zwei Menschen aus Bern 
it came(pl) two people(pl} from Bern 
'There came two people from Bern' 
That is, sentences using the presentational es may have either singular or 
plural verbs. Second, how much weight are weto give the fact that such 
sentences do not appear in first or second person Surely we need not 
attribute this to an actual third person subject, since we can equally well 
regard the third person as the unmarked person. Any verb for which first 
and second person marking would be inappropriate ought then to appear in 
third person. 
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Given this evidence that es is not a subject, and the fact that no 
other likely candidate is in sTght, we postulate that impersonal passives 
are subjectless.
This hypothesis leads to several testable predictions about impersonal 
constructions. First, recall that VP's have been defined as CVPr-NP om.l· 
There is no such constituent in impersonal constructions, which mean~ tt1at 
we should find no analogue of impersonal constructions where VP's are 
required. One such construction involves the complementizer ohne: 
Er ging, ohne sich zu verabschieden 
he went without self to say-good-bye
'He went without saying good-bye' 
Nerbonne {1982d) argues that this construction requires VP's {and that 
pragmatic control of the subject position is allowed). If this is so, we 
should expect to find some impersonal constructions here if these have 
subjects. If they are subjectless, on the other hand, we should expect to 
find none. In fact, none are possible: 
* Es wurde tagelang gefeiert, ohne geschlafen zu werden
AUX days-long celebrate(prt) -w-.o-.--s~le_e_p~(_p_r~tr)-.-t-o~AffOfflX.--
Es wurde tagelang gefeiert, ohne zu schlafen  
sleep{inf)  
'They celebrated for days without sleeping'  
The present treatment predicts that VP complement constructions will 
systematically exclude impersonals, and this seems to hold. The treatment 
which view es as a subject cannot explain this (even if the treatment could 
add something to this effect, i.e. so that it could be made compatible with 
the facts). 
Second, the present treatment predicts that es appears in impersonals 
only as a sort of zero-alternative to fronting. 1hus we predict the 
failure of the impersonal es to appear within the VP. If es is a subject, 
this is unexpected behavior. Furthermore, we might expectthat where the 
fronting construction is inapplicable, the alternative would be as well. 
In that case we would predict the impossibility of the es in subordinate 
clauses as well, where fronting does not apply. 
4.4.2 The Lexical Nature of the Passive 
Nerbonne (1982b) presents evidence that the impersonal passive is a 
lexical rule. Some of the arguments involved extends immediately to the 
personal passive, and, if both passives are to be described by a single 
rule, then all of the evidence that impersonal passives are created by 
lexical rule extends indirectly to personal passives. 
To begin, there is a preference {within many theories) that rules with 
lexical exceptions ought to be lexical rules. The preference is plausible 
enough, given the concept of the lexicon as the finite repository of 
exceptionality . The preference is strengthened by two further considera-
tions brought forward in Baker (1979). First, a most restrictive syntax 
would only allow phrasal rules to apply to phrases without reference to 
their makeup, in this particular case, without reference to the particular 
lexical items in the phrase. Since we favor more restrictive systems, we 
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ought to favor allowing no exceptional rules in the syntax. Second, it is 
argued, a lexical rule might plausibly be learned lexical item by lexical 
item, in which case we would expect children to learn such rules by hearing
the outputs of the rules--in particular, without overgeneralizing. This 
scenario is implausible for phrasal rules, since they most naturally are 
learned to be applicable to phrase types (without regard for the makeup of 
the phrases). If children did try to learn phrasal rules with lexical 
exceptions, we would expect overgeneralization. Since children do not 
overgeneralize rules with lexical exceptions (according to Baker), they 
probably learn such rules lexical item by lexical item. 
I am not aware of any extensive work in GPSG on the relationship
between the lexicon and syntax, so that the force of the above considera-
tions for the present case is unclear. But at least the concept of the 
lexicon as the finite repository of exception has a great deal to recommend 
it in any theory. The last two arguments in favor of excluding rules with 
lexical exceptions from the syntax are appealing, but they obviously rest 
on premises that one could take issue with: the first, on the premise that 
disallowing syntactic rules with lexical exceptions results in a 
significantly more restrictive theory (and of course that, if it's signifi-
cantly more restrictive, then it's linguistically sound); the second, on 
the premise that children really do not overgeneralize lexical rules. 
If phrasal rules allowed reference to the internal makeup of the 
phrase, then they might well be learned to be applicable to certain lexical 
items as these are encountered. 
For whatever it's worth, however, there do seem to be lexical excep-
tions to the passive rule: 
Es wird heute zu Hause geblieben~ 
it AUX today at home stay(prt)
'People will [have to] stay at home today~' 
* Es wird heute zu Hause gewesen~
be(prt} 
Both of these verbs are subcategorized to take predicative phrases, but 
only bleiben may be passivized.
There are also some more concrete indications of the lexical nature of 
this rule, as well. The following is summarized from Nerbonne (1982b). 
First, the combination of passive participle plus nonfinite passive 
auxiliary werden may form a constituent. This is shown by its ability to 
appear before the finite verb: 
Gebaut werden muessen noch zwei Haeuser 
build{prt) AUX must yet two houses 
'Another two houses have to be built' 
Geholfen werden muss ihm 
help{prt) AUX must him 
'He must be helped' 
(Note that the first of these is a personal passive, and the second an 
impersonal.) The existence of a constituent of this sort is a natural 
consequence of a lexical formulation of the rule, but would require 
structure-building power of a phrasal formulation. 
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Second, there are apparent exceptions to the generalizatfon noted above 
that impersonal passives are found exactly with those verbs which do not 
take accusative objects. It is not always the case that personal passives 
are found in sentences with verbs which would normally take accusative 
NP's, and impersonals in those with verbs which do not. A sizeable group 
of speakers accept impersonal passives with accusative reflexive pronouns, 
such as the following: 
Da wurde sich geschlagen 
there AUX self strike{prt)
'People fought there' 
The sich in sich schlagen would be clearly accusative in other persons. 
Thus""lch schlug mich mit ihm 'I fought with him.' This is a puzzling 
exception to an otherwise very solid generalization if one ignores the 
lexical status of the operands of the passive rule. Attending to this, 
however, and noting that sich schla~en is a wellknown lexical reflexive, we 
readily obtain the proper modificat1on of the rule: impersonal passives are 
formed of those inputs--possibly lexically complex--which do not take 
accusative NP complements. Thus sich schlagen may contain an accusative 
NP, but since it doesn't take one, it forms an impersonal passive. 
The connection to the lexical vs. syntactic status of the passive is 
this: we divide up the reflexives {in what is in fact a standard way--cf. 
Curme, 1922:338; Stoetzel, 1970:23-28; or Cranmer, 1976:56-7) into the 
lexical and the syntactic. There are toss ups, but there are clear cases, 
too. Now the lexical formulation of the passive rule predicts that pas-
sives may be formed only from the lexical reflexives, such as the above, 
and never from the syntactic ones, such as the one below: 
Er redete von einer Geschichte ueber sich 
he spoke of a story about self 
This is clearly a syntactic reflexive because it is buried in a modifier of 
the verb; because its meaning is predictable, given the meaning of its 
components; and because its meaning is reflexive, not reciprocal,
media-passive, or detransitivized (all of which are found only in lexical 
reflexives) . The prediction that only lexical reflexives may appear in 
passives seems to be borne out : 
Es wurde von einer Geschichte {* ueber sich) geredet 
it AUX of a story about self speak{prt) 
A third and final detail about German syntax (concerning again those 
speakers who allow the use of reflexives in passive sentences) confirms the 
lexical formualtion of the rule as well. Let us first recall that only 
major constituents {"Satzglieder," or "sentence elements," in the sense of 
Bach, 1962) may be fronted to the position before the finite verb. This is 
explicit in the fronting MR above. Thus a locative prepositional phrase is 
frontable, but not the object of the preposition alone. 
Er lief in dem Haus herum 
he ran in the house around 
'He ran around in the house' 
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In dem Haus lief er herum 
* dem Haus lief er in herum 
An emphatic reflexive pronoun sich selbst exists as well in German, and it 
may be fronted: 
Sich selbst hat er damit helfen wollen 
self self AUX he thus help want 
'He 	wanted to help himself that way' 
Like the nonemphatic reflexive, this reflexive may appear in passive 
sentences, too, but then, interestingly, it may not be fronted: 
Es wurde sich meistens nur selbst geholfen, und keinen anderen 
it AUX self mostly only self help and no others 
1 People mostly helped themselves, and no one else' 
* Sich selbst wurde meistens geholfen, und keinen anderen 
This indicates that sich selbst does not function as a sentence element fn 
the passive sentences, which is predicted once it is assumed that the 
passive is only possible where the sich selbst is part of a lexical verb. 
(The active sentence where it is fronted indicates that it may be added 
syntactically, too, so that the emphatic reflexive, like the unemphatic 
one, has both a syntactic and a lexical variant.) 
Based on the general considerations at the beginning of this section, 
and these three details of the syntax of passive sentences, we should favor 
a lexical formualtion of the passive rule, i.e. one that operates on 
individual lexical items. 
4.4.3 	A Formulation of the Rule 
Passives without agent phrases are presented here. 
Passive Metarule 





-NPnom (=compn)  
There are two cases. Either the set of feature complements for this 
lexical class includes as one compi [-NPacc], or it does not. If it does, 
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--> <n, [(P)VP (P)VP_compl ], 
+pass 





w.meaning: ix1.• xxi_1ixi+1.• ixi 3xn(P)VP'(x1) •• (xi_1)(xi) •. (xn)> 
If, 	on the other hand, there is no comp = [-NPacc] then 1 
--> 	<n, [(P)VP (P)VP_compl ], ix1 .• ixn-l3 xn(P)VP'(x1 ) .• (xn-l)(xn)> 
+pass • a Convent. ilJl)lication: (P)VP'(~1) •. (xn.) +prt -compn might be intentionally brougm: abou~ 
-comp1. 
-compn-l 
Notice that the output of the passive rule is a participial phrase, and 
that no mention has yet been made of the passive auxiliary werden , which is 
introduced by metarule below. Let us examine applications of each of the 
clauses of this rule before considering how well it accomplishes its task. 
We first examine an application of the rule to a verb which does take an 
accusative NP complement, bitten. This is introduced in BR 8, repeated 
below for convenience : 





<8, 	 [pyp PVP_PPum ], AX1AX23 X3(V 1 (x1)<x2)Cx3))>  
-fin -NPacc  




The Head Feature Convention will ensure that the (P)VP (and subse-
quently, the V) in subtrees admitted by this rule has the features 
[+pass,+prt], i.e. that it is in passive participial form. To better 
appreciate how this rule functions in the gralffllar, let us apply to it the 
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complement-adding MR, FAC, repeated here for convenience: 
Flat Adding of Complements (FAC)  
<n, [PVP Y ], F > --> <n, [ Y X ] F{X 1 ) > {P)VP j-anom ' j 
aagr aagr
+X a +Xa . 	 . 
+X; 	 +X.1 -x. 	 +X . 
J 	 J 
-X 	 -X m 	 m 
<8, 	 [VP PPum PVP_PPum ], AX23 X3(PVP 1 (PPum 1 ){x2){x3))>  





{Of course, the Contoured Adding of Complements Metarule would have been 
applicable, too, but the above suffices for demonstration.) The features 
on the internal (P)VP node aren 1 t particularly informative--they 1 ve been 
listed to-date to emphasize that this node is identical to the node on the 
input rule but for the addition of the [+pass,+prt] features, so that 
lexical insertion should operate essentially the same way here as in the 
nodes in active rules. But all the complement features are predictable
from the rule number, and they are all passed from the major node by the 
HFC (except of course for [-NPacc]). Since the features aren't important, 
and are a nuisance to write, they'll be dropped in the future. The rule 
above may be used to admit subtrees of the following sort: 
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um einen Gefallen I 
V 
-fin 






'asked for a favor' 
The order of the subconstituents PPum-V is determined by LP rule (2) in 
3.3.1 above, repeated here for convenience: 
X-verb < v_fin 
The rules responsible for the expansion of PPum do not concern us here. 
Several other aspects of the tree above will receive comment after we have 
examined an application of the passive rule to a verb which is not subcate-
gorized [-NPacc], i.e. an impersonal passive. For the sake of variety, we 
examine a separable prefix verb from class 15 in this application. BR 15 
is first repeated. 
<15, [PVP PREF, V ], PREF+V'>: ein-gehen, hin-weisen, 
-fin auf-passen, ••• 
-PPauf 
-NPnom 
Since this rule doesn't introduce a category subcategorized with the 
feature [-NPacc], only the second variant of the passive is applicable.
Applying this here, we obtain: 
- 187 -
<15, [VP PVP_NPnom ], AXl 3x2(PVP'(x1)(x2))> 
-fin and conventional implication: PREF+V'(x1)(x2)  +pass might be intentionally brought about.  
+prt  
-PPauf  
As it stands, the FAC MR is applicable here, but we choose to apply the 
Contoured Adding of Complements MR (CAC} instead. This has the advantage 
of creating a constituent PREF+ V, which, as 3.3.2 noted, may be required 
anyway (guaranteeing the existence of the constituent is trivial, should it 
definitely be required--(5) would do this). CAC MR is repeated here for 
convenience: 
Contoured Adding of Complements (CAC) 
<n, [pyp y ], F> --> <n, [(P)VP Y,Xj-anom'PVP_clit ], F(Xj')> 
aagr aagr
+X +X +X a a a. . . 
+Xi +X. +X. 1 l 
-Xj +X. J 
-X. 
J 
-X -X -X m m m 
Applying this to the rule immediately above, we obtain: 
<15, [CVP PPauf, PVP_clit ], 3x2(PVP'(PPauf')(x2))> 




This admits the following subtree: 
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go in (prt) 
'gone into details' 
(Redundant features have 	 been suppressed in the lower PVP node in (6). 
We shall turn directly to the introduction of the passive auxiliary 
werd-, but these examples may have sufficiently clarified the workings of 
the rules. in particular the passive rule, so that a discussion of their 
details and motivation may be fruitful. Let us first note that in making 
the type of passive dependent on the need for an accusative complement.
this proposal reflects the conditioning of the passive rule by this factor 
and thus satisfies the desideratum established in the introduction to this 
section. With reference to 4.4.1, we may note that impersonal passives 
have no subjects. and no provision for the later introduction of subjects 
according to this passive rule. Cf. the tree i111t1ediately above. 
The generation of passive sentences has been broken down into two 
stages, the introduction of the passive auxiliary, to be presented below, 
and the above passive rule, which creates participial phrases. This was 
done for two reasons. First, there are passive participial phrases which 
appear adnominally without the passive auxiliary, werd-. For example: 
das var kurzem gebaute Haus  
the recently built house  
Although more must be said about tense in their generation, it seems most 
economical to conceive of these phrases as created by the same passive rule 
responsible for (1) and (2). But in this case the passive rule must be 
separated from the rule introducing the passive auxiliary werd-. Second, 
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there are conjunction facts which indicate that the participial phrases
created by this passive rule are constituents to the exclusion of the 
passive auxiliary. Thus the (standard) VP without werd- is subject to 
conjunction (7a), as is the CVP without werd- (7b), and the PVP without 
werd- (7c): 
(7a) Die Kinder wurden ins Haus geschickt und dem Gast vorgestellt 
the children AUX into house send(prt) a the guest introduce 
(prt) 
1 The children were sent into the house and introduced to the 
guest' 
(b) 	 Es wurde ~etanzt und gefeiert 
it AUXance(prt) and celebrate(prt)  
'People danced and celebrated'  
(c) 	 Ihm wurde geschmeichelt und zugelaechelt 
him AUX flatter(prt) and at-smile(prt)  
'He got flattered and smiled at'  
Several of the points made in 4.4.2 about the lexical nature of the 
German passive are reflected in the present rule. First, note that this 
metarule applies to rules to which no syntactic complements have been 
added. This is the significance of the rule's requiring that all such 
features be marked [-compi]--essentially requiring that verbs be marked 
[+pass] before syntactic rules apply to them. The rule thus applies only 
to (rules for) individual lexical items, and not to (rules for) phrases 
which the syntax has constructed. 
Second, the system allows for lexical exceptions. We noted earlier 
that the verbs introduced by BR 9, repeated for convenience below, are 
apparently split vis-a-vis passivizability. 
<9, [PVP V ], V'> 	 sein, bleiben, werden, •.. 
-fin  
-pred  







is instantiated only by bleiben, and not by gewesen (nor by geworden). 
This is not a principled explanation of the failure of certain verbs to 
passivize--merely the postulation of a system consistent with this failure. 
If the exceptions are indeed lexical, nothing more is reasonable. 
Third, the possibility of sich appearing in an impersonal passive is 
allowed if sich is allowed to appear within lexical verbs. In that case, 
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sich schlagen would simply be an element of the class introduced by BR 2 
--the cl ass of intransitive verbs: 
<2, [VP V ], V'> schlafen, lachen, existieren, 
-fin .•• ,sich schlagen 
The deri vation of impersonal passive sentences using these verbs is quite 
straightforward. Syntactic reflexives could not have been specifically
provided for before the passive rule applies, since the passive rule 
requires that all syntactic complements be yet missing. We may plausibly 
assume that the attempt to add reflexives after the passive metarule has 
deformed the original will be successful just in case a suitable nominative 
antecedent is available. Since nominative antecedents are never available 
in impersonal passives, no syntactic reflexives may be found there. This 
explains the ungrammaticality of the example used in 4.4.2 above, repeated 
here: 
Es wurde von einer Geschichte (* ueber sich) geredet 
it AUX of a story about self speak(prt) 
A final point regarding the lexical status of rule may be made before 
we turn to the introduction of the passive auxiliary. We noted in 4.4.2 
that one normally frontable item, the emphatic reflexive sich selbst, is 
not frontable in impersonal passive sentences, even though ,t may appear 
there. Again, given the assumption that sich selbst may appear in imper-
sonal passives by virtue of its ability to function within the verb as part
of a lexical unit, the fronting behavior is predicted . To see this, 
suppose that sich selbst helfen, like sich schlagen, is part of the class 
of verbs introduced by BR 2 (above). Then the passive MR applies to it to 
derive : 
<2, [CVP VP], 3x1(VP'(x1) + intentionality implicature> 
The fronting MR ((1) in 3.4 allows that any possible daughter of the matrix 
CVP may be withheld from the CVP itself, and expressed in fronted position. 
Sich selbst isn't frontable in this passive construction because it isn't a 
daughter of the matri x CVP. 
Let us turn then to the introduction of the passive auxiliary, effected 
by the following metarule: 
Passive Auxiliary Metarule 
<n, [(X)VP ], (X)VP'> --> 
+pass 
+prt 
<n, [(X)VP ••• AUX+pass ], AX1, ,,AXn(AUX'((X)VP(x1) .•. (x2)))> 
+pass 
-prt 
Passive auxiliaries include werd-, and less frequently, gehoer-. 
Notice that passive vps with auxiliaries are marked [-prt], and so are 
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distinguished from the participial phrases introduced directly by the 
passive rule. The notation (X)VP is meant to function as a cover term for 
PVP, VP, and CVP. As we saw in (7a)-(7c), all of these may be combined 
with the passive auxiliary. Using this metarule, we may immediately extend 
the subtrees (5) and (6) to VP or CVP phrases. We first apply the auxi-
liary-introducing metarule to the rule responsible for (5), obtaining: 





In extending the tree (5), we tacitly apply the tensing MR, as 
well. 















wurd- um einen Gefallen ~ 









'be asked for a favor' 
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auf Einzelheiten  






go in (prt} 
'gone into details' 
Since the Passive Auxiliary Metarule allows the passive auxiliary to 
combine with PVP phrases as well as 11standard 11 VP's, it allows in 
particular that the passive auxiliary might combine with the participle to 
the exclusion of the participle's complements. Let us suppose that it does 
so with a verb of the class admitted by BR 4, repeated here: 




which, given an application of the passive, admits: 





This is then a proper input for the auxiliary MR, which yields: 




This is the rule which would admit the Geholfen werden constituent which we 
took as evidence that the passive ought to be formulated lexically in 
4.4.2. Without rules introducing modals such sentences cannot be derived 
here, but the strategy is clear enough. If the dative NP complement were 
added here via the CAC MR, the constituent PRT + AUX would be preserved.
If this were a subconstituent of a CVP with a finite modal, it would be 
subject to the fronting metarule, so that the sentence geholfen werden muss 
ihm would be derivable. But the details of this derivation cannot be 
presented here. 
To demonstrate the analysis of entire sentences, and the treatment of 
es, let us first recall BR 100, repeated here: 
<100, 	 [5 X, CVP/X ], CVP/X'(X')>  
+me  
The alternative, the use of es, may best be described via an additional 
basic rule: 
Es-introduction  
<301, ls es CVP], CVP'>  
+me 
We could, if we chose, subsume this under F-MR and BR 100, given the 
appropriate conventions about extracting~. In this case, we might be 
tempted to attribute some complement status to the ~--perhaps calling it a 
"dulTITl.Y NP . 11 The nomenclature is of no great significance.
What is significant here is that this treatment analyzes the es of 
impersonal passives and the "presentational" es in a unified way.-Both are 
introduced by the same rule. This is, of course, impossible in any treat-
ment which regards es in impersonal passive sentences as a subject. But 
given their identicaT and very peculiar properties, demonstrated above, a 
unified treatment is clearly most desirable . 
To conclude this section, a derivation of one personal and one 
impersonal passive. Given the rule responsible for (5'), repeated here: 






we need only add the NPnom to obtain the CVP rule required in F-MR and in 
Es-introduction. We add this using the FAC-MR: 





This might be used, as is, in conjunction with BR 301, to derive such 
sentences as es wurde Herr Schmidt um einen Gefallen gebeten. Or the 
fronting metarule may apply, yielding: 





This may be combined with one instance of schema 100, viz. 
<100, [5 NPnom, CVP/NPnom+fin ], CVP/X'(X')> 
+me  
+lig  
to obtain the following tree: 
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NPnom 	 CVP /NPnom
+3sg 	 +me 
+fin~ 	+3s 
Herr Schmidt 
AUX PPum 	 PVP 
+~;9t +£1~s 
I 	 +prt +8 
wurde um einen Gefallen ~  









Herr Schmidt wurde um einen Gefallenen gebeten  
Mr. S AUX for a favor ask(prt) 
'Mr. Schmidt was asked for a favor'  
Finally, an example of the treatment of impersonal passives might not 
be out of place. Applying the passive rule, then the CAC MR to BR 15, we 
obtained the following (first derived above (6)) : 
<15, 	 [CVP PPauf,PVP_clit ], 3x2(PVP'(PPauf')(x2))> 
-fin -fin + intentionality implicature 
+pass +pass  
+prt +prt  
+PPauf -PPauf  
To this we apply the passive auxiliary metarule (and the Tensing MR) 
to obtain: 











3X2AUX 1 (PVP 1 (PPauf 1 )(x2))> 
+ intentionality implicature 































go in (prt) 
'[They] went into details 1 
Notes--Chapter Four 
1. To a certain extent the choice between haben and sein is temporally
determined, of course. All unprefixed intrans1t1ves whichdenote telic 
Aktionsarten use the auxiliary sein, and, with the exception of bleiben and 
sein, all other intransitives ancfall transitives use haben. Thus telic 
Tiitransitive sterben, gestorben sein; atelic intransitive schlafen, ~ 
schlafen haben; and transitive essen, with gegessen haben. Verbs whTcn are 
ambiguously telic or atelic may have Perfects with both auxiliaries: {in
den Fluss) schwinwnen, -
geschwo111T1en sein, but (im Fluss) schwimmen, geschwommen haben. Prefixed 
verbs use the auxiliary of their unprefixed stem, even if this contradicts 
the semantic indicatio; thus herumgehen 'to walk around, walk about' 
clearly has an atelic sense (and consequently may be used with duratives).
But the expected* herumgegangen haben is wrong due to the telic stem gehen
'to go,' which has the expected gerangen sein. Thus: herumgegangen se1n. 
The determination of transitivityfor this purpose) is also complicated. 
Cf. er hat mir geholfen 'he helped me' vs. er ist mir entgegengeko111T1en 'he 
acco111T1odated me.' Again, the complicating factor may be the unprefixed 
stem (but it may also be whether the transitive form is basic or derived 
from a basic intransitive). The entire picture is slightly more 
complicated in the South, where the atelic intransitives liegen, stehen, 
and sitzen unexpectedly form Perfects using sein. 
2. It is worth noting that the Perfect Infinitive (as it is used  
above), like tenses in subordinate clauses (cf. 1.7.2), may indexically  
refer to an event time not among the speech, event and reference times of  
its matrix clause.  
3. What follows in the text is not simply a presentation of Baeuerle's 
semantics for the Perfect, but rather my sketch of what any semantics with 
similar ambitions must be like. Baeuerle's rules are flawed in not showing
how the Perfect index is affected by the tenses. The rules amount to 
requiring that e<s and that r<s. 
4. A qualification: people hesitate about the above example, which 
suggests to me that it may be grammatical, but unco111T1on and perhaps
stylistically marked. Should it turn out that these ought to be generated,
then a further rule would be required {or a generalization of the present 
one), just as in the case of the Perfect Infinitive (cf. below). But the 
well-formedness of such examples would not demonstrate that the Perfect MR 
presently in the text is unnecessary, only that it's insufficient {or too 
little general). If it turns out that such examples should be generated,
the obvious path to pursue would be to allow the Perfect {and other tenses) 
to be introduced on PVP's. 
5. The parallel between this rule and the complement-adding metarules, 
{6) and (7) in 3.3.1, is suggestive: if we regarded the auxiliary as a sort 
of final complement (to participial verbs) then the Perfect MR and the 
Perfect MR (Contoured) could be instances of the Flat Adding of Complements
MR and the Contoured Adding of Complements MR, respectively. If we did 
this, however, we would still need some way of deriving the participial
rule, with its added required complement, from the BR. Alternatively, we 
might make the presence of the feature [-perf. aux] depend on the the 
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